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Abstract 
 
Colombia has one of the oldest democracies in Latin American, however it has a history of 
violence that stretches from the time of the breakup of Gran Colombia. Simón Bolívar’s 
vision started to erode in the 1830s and ended in 1903 with the independence of Panama. 
Contemporary Colombia saw violence continue with peasant revolts in the 1920s and 30s, la 
Violencia in the 1940s, the formation of the insurgent groups like the FARC and ELN in the 
1960s, the creation of drug cartels in the 1970s and their transformation into narco-terrorist 
groups and then micro traffickers in the 1980s and 1990s. There have been limited periods of 
peace for the citizens of Colombia. 
 
These events have consequently challenged Colombia’s judiciary and police forces in the 
areas of general violence, inequality, geographical policing challenges, corruption, case 
backlog and Colombian police leadership. As former president Belisario Betancur states, 
‘Modern times have not been easy for Colombia’ (1998, p.XV).  
 
The challenges in writing this thesis have been considerable. This author has utilised 
experience gained from living and working in Colombia for over five and a half years and the 
experience of his protected sources as well as the foundations laid by other academics and the 
media in order to present the most significant of the challenges to Colombian policing in the 
last forty years. The goal of this document is to form a compendium on these areas for those 
who are new to Colombian policing, its judiciary and the history that has helped to shape 
them. 
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List of Abbreviations 
 
 
ACCU - Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá  /Peasant Self-Defence Forces 
of Córdoba and Urabá - the pre-curser group to the AUC. 
 
ANP – Anti Narcotics Police 
 
AUC - Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia - The United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia - 
Formed from the AUCC 
 
BACRIM - Bandas Criminales – Criminal Bands 
 
CAI – Centro de Atencion Inmediata – local police station 
 
CNP – Policía Nacional de Colombia - Colombian National Police  
 
CTI - Cuerpo Técnico de Investigación – Technical Investigation Team – Judicial Police and 
a part of the Fiscalía 
 
DIJIN - Dirección Central de Policía Judicial e Inteligencia - Central Judicial Directorate of 
the Colombian National Police and Intelligence centre. 
 
DIPOL - Dirección de Inteligencia Policial – Police Intelligence, more Akin to MI5  
 
DIRAN Dirección de Antinarcóticos (DIRAN) – Anti Narcotics Police  
 
ELN - Ejército de Liberación Nacional – National Liberation Army 
 
FARC/FARC-EP - Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo 
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People's Army 
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Fiscalía – La Fiscalía General de la Nación - Attorney Generals Office 
 
GAO’s – Grupos Armados Organizados – Organised Armed Groups the new name for 
BACRIM groups. 
 
UP Unión Patriótica – Patriotic Union the Political Party of the FARC in the 1980’s and 
1990’s 
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Introduction 
 
Colombia has a reputation for conflict. That reputation revolves around Colombia’s over 65-
year struggle with violence due to an internal civil war with guerrilla groups, lawlessness 
throughout its territory and the 45-plus year struggle with illegal drugs, principally cocaine. 
In light of this view of Colombia’s past, this paper aims to present the challenges faced by 
law enforcement in Colombia and how Colombian policing adapted to regain control of 
territory, protect citizens and oppose the production and trafficking of illegal drugs. The 
purpose of this thesis is to provide a compendium of knowledge on Colombian policing in 
order to provide those new to the subject with an overall view of where Colombian policing 
has been, the challenges faced and where change has transpired. Principally this thesis will 
explore the main challenges faced by the Colombian National Police (CNP), but also those of 
the Attorney General’s Office (the Fiscalía), the impact of those challenges throughout 
Colombia’s history, the issues that remain and potential soultions. Issues facing Colombia’s 
Judicial Police (CTI) and the Colombian military will be explored in the periphery. In order 
to provide a better foundation to present the aforementioned, this author will now describe 
the basic structures of Colombia’s government, the Fiscalía/CTI and finally the Colombian 
National Police.  
 
The Formation of Contemporary Colombia & The Structure of Government 
 
In the 19th century direct Spanish colonial rule was lost across Latin America and Gran 
Colombia was born from Simón Bolívar and Francisco de Paula Santander’s revolution to 
create a grand republic to unify a large part of Latin America. Gran Colombia continued to 
grow and assisted in the liberation of other areas from the Spanish. However, departments of 
Gran Colombia sought separation from the idea of centralist government, preferring a more 
federal model. Gradually various regions broke away to form their own countries – first 
Venezuela, then Ecuador and finally decades later Panama with assistance from the United 
States. The department formally known as Cundinamarca went through numerous name 
changes over the years from the Republic of New Granada to eventually the Republic of 
Colombia, more commonly known simply as Colombia. 
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The Republic of Colombia is a unitary republic comprising 32 departments, and one 
capital district. Since Colombia adopts the representative, republican, and democratic 
form of government, it is governed by representatives of the people, who are elected 
through direct vote.  The country embraces a system made up of governmental 
powers (mainly an Executive Power, a Legislative Power, and a Judicial Power), and 
also has a written Constitution. (Ramirez 2007) 
 
In 1991 there was a complete constitutional change, which had a great impact on the function 
of the Colombian police (Ruiz-Vásquez, 2015, p. 3). As part of this change the government 
created a constitutional assembly and five new jurisdictions across Colombian to focus on 
terrorism, anti-narcotics and cases of police corruption. The constitutional assembly was 
designed as a more inclusive model where by indigenous persons, ex-guerillas, peasants, 
union leaders and academics were included. This new design utilised prosecutors and judges 
who were anonymous in order to curb corruption and assassinations of key players in the 
justice system. This was also the first time that Colombia’s constitution formally stated the 
right to preserve life and protect human rights of an individual or a group and therefore it was 
a considerable step towards more comprehensive citizen safety. Lastly, Article 315 in the 
Colombian constitution makes for greater ‘decentralisation’, allowing local mayors (rather 
than the central government) to have more control, in areas like ‘citizen security’. This 
reform was the largest since the 1886 constitution and still considered the most significant in 
Colombia’s history Ruiz-Vásquez (2015). Also during this constitutional revision the new 
‘Corte Constitucional’ (Constitutional Court) oversaw and provided judicial powers to 
policing agencies Goldmsith and Lewis (2000). 
 
Appendix items one to three show organisational charts of the Courts, Fiscalía and 
Colombian National Police, with organisational charts from the two former agencies 
originating from their official websites. 
 
The Courts 
 
The Constitutional Court is one of five of the main judicial branches of the Colombian state, 
along with Superior Council of Judicature, Supreme Court of Justice, Council of State and 
the National Institute of Medicine and Forensic Science. The Constitutional Court is the final 
appeals court where citizens or institutions can challenge the Colombian constitution, 
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legislations and statutes. This court was created in conjunction with the 1991 constitution to 
provide fair and reasonable justice to Colombian citizens.  
 
The Supreme Court of Justice is the highest court of ordinary jurisdiction and is the final 
resort for judicial cases and appeals, to judge the President’s administration if required, to 
judge the Attorney General’s office (Fiscalía), ambassadors and diplomats. Therefore it is the 
highest court to oversee and prosecute all Colombian policing agencies either via the 
President’s administration or the Fiscalía. 
The Council of State is the highest Court of Administrative Litigation and advisory body of 
the Government, with a remit to unify Colombian law through their interpretation, to plan 
and reform draft laws and amendments to the constitution, to examine decrees and advise the 
Colombian government on matters of law. 
The National Institute of Medicine and Forensic Science provides medical legal advice, 
forensic legal advice and services to the Colombian government and the criminal the justice 
system. 
 
The Fiscalía & CTI 
 
Another outcome of the 1991 Constitution was the formation of the Fiscalía General de la 
Nación (Attorney General’s Office) and CTI (Cuerpo Técnico de Investigación – Technical 
Investigation Team – Judicial Police). The Fiscalía was created in 1991 and opened in 1992. 
It serves as the legal legislative component of Colombian policing, providing criminal 
prosecution, administrative and legal support to all public prosecutions within Colombia. All 
investigations must be assigned a ‘Fiscal’ or a judge to authorise a police investigation. 
 
CTI 
 
The CTI (The Judicial Police) are a policing agency positioned under the Fiscalía, with a 
focus on high level criminal groups, narco terrorism (which they approach from a more 
technical policing perspective such as with the use of communications interception) and also 
as a hub to support victims of domestic violence and victims of sexual violence.  
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The Colombian National Police 
 
The Colombian National Police (CNP) sits under the Ministry of Defence rather than a 
civilian ministry. While this might appear unusual compared to the policing model in the 
U.K. it is not unique, for example the customs police (Guardia di Finanza) in Italy also falls 
under the ministry of defence (Gobinet, 2008, p. 101). The Colombian force is around 
160,000 strong, spread across eight specialised departments; Anti Kidnap/Anti Extortion, 
Anti Narcotics, Citizen Security, Criminal Investigation, Indigenous/ Rural security, 
Intelligence, Government/VIP Protection, Traffic. These departments are deployed across 
eight policing regions in Barranquilla, Bogota, Cali, Cucuta, Medellin, Neiva, Pereira and 
Villavicencio. The policing powers of the CNP have changed considerably over the years and 
have been modified again with the new police act of 2017, which is set out in more detail in 
the appendix four. Colombian police officers have the powers of arrest and ability to enter 
premises and homes where it is deemed appropriate and proportional, however, most street-
based officers still rely on seeking permission from senior command officers. Police 
conscripts are also utilised and have limited powers, they are considered an augmentation to 
existing police officer deployments rather than able to function alone except for basic 
guarding duties at public events. 
 
It should also be noted that although previously mentioned the Constitutional Court provides 
judicial powers to policing agencies, including the Colombian National Police. The CNP is a 
part of the military in Colombia, therefore they are also answerable to the Ministry of 
Defence for all administrative matters, including crime statistics and finances.  
 
Inquisitorial to Accusatorial  
 
Part of the judicial reform that commenced in 1991 aimed to revise its courts from an 
inquisitorial system whereby the court is a key component in the investigation process to an 
accusatorial model. In the accusatorial model the court is not actively involved in the 
investigation process, but resides as an impartial arbiter of justice during the trial. This 
process, however, was not fully implemented until the mid 2000s. Torres states that before 
this time the inquisitorial system was ‘woefully deficient on several fronts’ (2007, p.8). 
Backlogs were a considerable problem and ‘the average processing time for a theft case taken 
to a Bogotá court was approximately 567 days’ (Torres, 2007, p. 8). In the mid 2000s the 
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Colombian judiciary moved to the accusatorial model, which has had some considerable 
positive impacts on Colombia’s courts and policing and will be discussed further and in more 
detail in Chapter Five. 
Theme 
 
The main theme for this paper is to explore the history of each chapters subject and present 
the challenges and outcomes not just with Colombia’s policing, but also the changes with the 
insurgent and criminal groups that they have fought for decades. Whilst some might argue 
against using the term ‘fought’ in relation to a police force, this author wishes to make clear 
that Colombia has a police force and not a police service. Susan Martin roughly highlights 
the responsibilities of a police service as such: ‘Police not only enforce the law and arrest 
offenders; they also are responsible for preventing crime, protecting life and property, 
maintaining peace and public order, and providing a wide range of services to citizens 24 
hours a day’ (Martin, 1999, p. 115). In contrast, Colombian police forces are currently far 
more recognisable as a militaristic group, with a military rank structure and a quasi-military 
remit, which will be described in more detail throughout this thesis. 
 
This thesis will cover Colombian policing challenges across six chapters, with a different 
focus presented in each chapter: the war on drugs, paramilitary/criminal groups, insurgencies, 
police leadership and the overall Colombian criminal justice system. The first chapter will 
look at the war on drugs and its actors, from one of the most famous narcotraffickers Pablo 
Escobar, through to changing nature of drug trafficking with a focus on the downfall of the 
classic Colombian family-based cartels and the advent of contemporary micro trafficking 
cells. The challenges focused upon will be how the police handled the traditional cartels and 
what were the outcomes. The second chapter will then move on to the rise of paramilitary 
groups with a focus on the AUC (United Self-Defence Forces) and their eventual evolution 
into the BACRIM (‘bandas criminales’) groups, how those groups challenged the police and 
the outcomes of this. The third chapter will focus on the historically prominent guerrilla 
group in Colombia, the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), the FARC’s 
political party - the UP (Unión Patriótica), the previous peace processes in the early 1980s 
through to the 2000s, and finally their change of focus from a Communist insurgency into a 
drug trafficking body with some Marxist influences. When it comes to the FARC the focus 
will be not only the police, but also the Colombian military who have taken on some policing 
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responsibilities in remote areas. Challenges and outcomes here will focus on the current 
peace process. The fourth chapter present the perspective of the leadership of the Colombian 
police, both in terms of its internal processes and in relation to the war on drugs. This chapter 
will assess challenges and outcomes relating to the war specifically as they pertain to police 
structure and leadership. The police leadership chapter will aim to quantify police leadership: 
is it appropriate and efficient? The fifth chapter will briefly look at the criminal justice 
system (CJS) as a whole to assess how the CJS could be impacting Colombian policing. The 
last chapter will present this author’s findings, namely how Colombian policing has changed, 
where its future lays, the cost of corruption - an issue that was constantly raised throughout 
this author’s research - the impact of inequality, and why the current peace process with the 
FARC might be the last.  
 
The first three chapters will commence chronologically from the origins of each chapter’s 
subject, with the first chapter beginning in the 1970s during the time of Escobar. Chapter 
Two will go back as far as the 1940s at the commencement of la violencia onwards to the 
paramilitary groups, while Chapter Three will start in the 1960s with the origins of the FARC 
and continue until the current peace process. This will allow this author to present multiple 
Colombian policing challenges across a broad spectrum and some of the outcomes of those 
challenges, be they from Pablo Escobar; the paramilitaries or the FARC; and the Police 
force’s own place within the Colombian criminal justice system across the decades. In 
contrast the police leadership, criminal justice system and conclusion chapters will be from 
an overview perspective considering the most pertinent issues covered over the preceding 
chapters, with the primary focus being on the contemporary situations. 
 
There are a few considerations that this author wishes the reader to please take into account: 
firstly not all sources are native English speakers, therefore some quotes will be in broken 
English; this was due to this author aiming to translate and not interpret the answers in order 
to ensure the source’s meanings were preserved. The interviews took place over a five-year 
period, therefore references to the FARC peace process or areas of legislation will be seen to 
change reflecting the changes in these processes and local legislation during the interview 
process. This author has chosen the quotes from the most pertinent sources, therefore some 
interviewees will be quoted more than others due to their experience in Colombia and the 
relevance of their profession. For example this author would quote a barrister more on the 
subject of Colombian law as opposed to other sources – for their ability to articulate the 
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pertinent points efficiently and concisely. However, it should be equally noted that all 
opinions were considered and used regardless of whether they agreed or disagreed with this 
author’s narrative, or indeed any of this author’s personal or professional views. Hearing 
opposing views to different debates has been one of the highlights of this study. 	
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Literature Review  
 
When one looks online for books on Colombia on Amazon.co.uk or.com, there is a mix of 
travel guides and books on Pablo Escobar and Colombia’s violent history. When looking 
through a more academic lens, there are over 20,000 sources of information on Colombian 
policing. However, most of those results appear to this author (this author was unable to 
verify all 20,000 sources) to be combined studies across multiple countries or subjects 
whereby Colombian policing was on the periphery of the study rather than the central focus. 
Despite these examples, it is not to say that such specific focused work on Colombian 
policing does not exist. Dr Juan Carlos Ruiz-Vásquez has multiple papers on Colombian 
policing and there were a few other notable experts in the field. This author will now break 
down each area of research, from academic articles and journals, through academic books 
and finally other sources, such as the media. 
 
Articles and Journals 
 
Dr Juan Carlos Ruiz-Vásquez has over 25 years of experience in academia. He is an 
Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, Government and International 
Relations at the Rosario University in Bogota Colombia. Dr. Ruiz-Vásquez has published 
four papers on policing, three specifically on Colombian policing and has written several 
chapters in books on Colombian policing. This author was fortunate enough to discuss this 
thesis with Dr Ruiz-Vásquez and acquire a copy of his thesis titled ‘Colombian Police Policy: 
Police and Urban Policing, 1991-2006’ - a paper that as of June 2018 has not been published, 
and of which Dr. Ruiz-Vásquez very generously gave a full copy to this author to read in 
relation to his own research. In light of the fact that this work has not officially been 
published, and to avoid abusing the considerable trust that Dr. Ruiz-Vásquez has shown; this 
author will avoid referencing or quoting the unpublished thesis directly, ensuring there is 
minimal crossover between the two works instead using it as a foundation for research. 
However, this author will quote his other works, specifically Ruiz-Vásquez’s 2012 article 
‘Community police in Colombia: an idle process’, his 2013 article ‘Colombian police under 
fire: image, corruption and controls’ and finally his 2015 article ‘Crime and Punishment in 
Colombia’. The first of Ruiz-Vásquez’s work covers the creation and deployment of the 
Community Policing model within Colombian Policing. The second article covers the ‘extent 
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and impact corruption’ and Colombian public perception of the police. The third covers 
crime historically in 1990s Colombia, external factors for example extradition and the history 
of violence the country has endured. 
 
Professor Andrew J. Goldsmith is currently the Strategic Professor in Criminal Justice at 
Flinders University in Australia, has significant academic experience in criminology and 
international policing and was a source this author utilised during the research process. 
Goldsmith and James Sheptyckis’ ‘Crafting transnational policing: Police capacity-building 
and global policing reform’, is the top search when entering ‘Colombian policing’ into 
Google Scholar as of June 2018. Examining this result reveals the book to have one chapter 
focusing solely on Colombian policing, with this chapter’s perspective being transnational 
policing in regards to foreign assistance. Similarly Goldsmith’s Civilian Oversight of 
Policing: Governance, Democracy, and Human Rights (2000), which is the first result to be 
displayed from Google’s book search also in June 2018, is a book that covers this author’s 
subject in one chapter among the far greater study of the books overall theme.  
 
Eduardo Moncada is currently the Assistant Professor of Political Science at Barnard College 
– Columbia University New York. Moncada has an exceedingly large amount of academic 
experience covering multiple papers and a book which again formed the basis of this author’s 
research including citations within this thesis from Moncada’s 2009 paper ‘Toward 
Democratic Policing in Colombia: Institutional Accountability through Lateral Reform’. 
Moncada has focused on specific policing issues of race, accountability and urban violence 
amongst other subjects. In contrast, this author will aim to specifically cover Colombian 
policing and peripherally the Colombian judiciary in regards to their challenges over multiple 
decades.  
 
Elvira Maria Restrepo is currently the Assistant Professor at the department of International 
Studies at the Miami University of Arts and Sciences, having originally studied and gained 
her PhD at Oxford University in Politics in 1999. Restrepo has a large amount of experience 
researching and publishing cross-disciplinary works covering conflict, human rights, 
women’s rights, criminal justice and peace building and is also a member of the Colombian 
bar after being certified in 1991 in the United States. Restrepo has written multiple papers 
and contributions, including as an occasional columnist at El Espectador, a Colombian 
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national newspaper. This author read and will cite considerably from the The Colombian 
Criminal Justice in Crisis: Fear and Distrust (2003). 
 
Colombian Policing and Insurgency Books 
 
Whilst it was also stated that other forms of previous research have not focused exclusively 
on Colombian policing, three books have crossed into several pertinent areas on enough 
occasions that this author considered them to be key areas of research before conducting 
one’s own studies. The books of choice are: Steven Dudley’s Walking Ghosts: Murder and 
Guerrilla Politics in Colombia, Mark Bowden's Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the Worlds 
Greatest Outlaw and Garry Leech’s The FARC: The Longest Insurgency.  
 
Firstly, this author will briefly analyse Walking Ghosts as this is the most relevant of the 
books in relation to the author’s studies, and also covers in more detail an issue that is key to 
this author’s work; namely the first process with the FARC and the Unión Patriótica (UP). 
Steven Dudley, the author of Walking Ghosts, has his roots in reporting and investigation and 
is a co-director and co-founder of Insightcrime.org, a website whose purpose is the 
investigation and analysis of organised crime across Latin America. During the course of this 
author’s research, multiple Colombian agencies and embassies considered InSight Crime a 
reliable source and Mr Dudley a reliable journalist. Therefore, this author considers Dudley’s 
book to be a reliable source for preliminary research into Colombian policing, especially with 
regards to the FARC and political impacts on Colombian policing. The edition this author 
owns is the 2004 print, which will serve as the backbone for his research into the FARC and 
their attempt in the 1980s to enter the Colombian political arena, which will be relevant in 
regards to the peace process environment. The book itself covers the UP (Patriotic Union 
party) from its formation, to its use by the FARC to be represented politically at the state 
level, and its eventual dismantling by right-wing paramilitary groups. The book also offers 
more background of the political landscape of Colombia from the 1940s onwards. Another 
main focus of the material is a look at the first peace process with the FARC in the 1980s, the 
predominant issues of the time and the eventual outcome of that process which offers this 
author key points for comparison to the 2012-2016 peace talks held with the FARC in 
Havana, Cuba. Whilst Leech’s book also covers these same points, they are only a chapter 
each, whereas Dudley covers the issue in considerably more detail.  
 
 19 
The second book mentioned – Bowden’s, Killing Pablo, focuses mainly on the rise and fall of 
Pablo Escobar and the key actors involved, from the CNP, military, Colombia’s Civilian 
state, civilians, the FARC, other Colombian cartels that were in opposition to Escobar’s 
Medellin Cartel and foreign actors such as the United States government. This author’s 
edition is the 2007 Kindle Ebook version of the 2001 original. The book’s author Mark 
Bowden is a career journalist and writer, having written for multiple publications.  He is also 
the author of Black Hawk Down. This book is written to show an overarching narrative of the 
events and occurrences throughout Escobar's criminal career.  Whilst it is presented in a more 
informal format with some artistic license employed, with the Guardian’s Robert McCrum 
stating ‘Bowden's account is somewhat flawed by imagined dialogue…’ (McCrum, 2001) 
there is a great deal of research contained - also acknowledged by McCrum in the same 
review and additionally confirmed by several of this author’s primary sources when 
discussing research material. Be that as it may, due to the artistic nature of Bowden’s writing 
style employed within the book, caution will be used in relation to this material and this 
author will only quote or reference areas that are relevant, known to have factual grounding, 
or have been quantified by either his own research, the details given by primary sources 
during interviews, or covered by academia. Whilst it could be considered questionable using 
what some may claim is a fusion of fact and fiction, this author has discussed the book at 
length with those working within the field, and coupled with his own research and 
experience, this author believes that the general themes and discussions of the book can be 
used.  
 
The last source is Garry Leech’s The FARC: The Longest Insurgency, which specifically 
covers the FARC from their inception, through the creation of the UP, into their 
reclassification as ‘Narcoguerrillas and Narcoterrorists’. This author’s edition is the 2012 
Kindle Ebook of the 2011 original and therefore it was published just before the current 
peace process was announced. Garry Leech is a journalist, lecturer at Cape Brenton 
University and public speaker. He has covered multiple issues in Colombia for over twelve 
years and his book was spoken highly of by those this author interviewed, although some 
sympathies with the FARC were noted. Smith notes that ‘Leech is sympathetic, but he's no 
apologist’. He also says that ‘The FARC is a most excellent corrective for what passes for 
coverage of the FARC in most North American media sources, and a serious study of the 
group's origins, politics, problems, and prospects’ (Smith, 2011). The book also covers 
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political and criminal aspects within Colombia during this time frame, which are pertinent to 
this author’s narrative. 
 
This author believes these books have offered an excellent foundation and have been 
instrumental in assisting the construction of the interview template for his primary source 
collection. This author has used these three books as reference points to compare with other 
works and to a lesser extent, academic articles which have covered similar ground. Of the 
three books, this author believes that Dudley’s work was the most relevant to his studies and 
was the only book to be recommended by several of his primary sources as essential for 
research. Also, Dudley’s work has been constantly referenced both online and by this 
author’s sources as being the most factually accurate, relying less on artistic license to 
enthrall a more casual than academic reader.  
 
Non-Colombian Policing Books  
 
Whilst the three aforementioned books form the core of the Colombian research, three 
policing books also gave this author considerable foundation research and comparisons to 
work from; The Handbook of Intelligent Policing - Consilence, Crime Control and 
Community Safety by John Grieve. Professor Grieve has been instrumental in this author’s 
studies from multiple perspectives, from the author’s attendance of Grieve’s workshops 
during the lecture phase of this doctorate, through reading of Grieve’s research and finally as 
one of this author’s supervisors. Grieve has had 36 years of policing experience in England 
and Northern Ireland, has been the chairman of the John Grieve Centre since 2003 and is 
currently an Emeritus Professor at the London Metropolitan University. Grieve’s work 
provided this author with a stable foundation of intelligent policing across multiple areas 
from the national model by Bowers to Europol and the Understanding of Intelligence by 
Kleiven and Hartfield. Whilst this book provided an excellent foundation to work from, it 
became clear during the course of this author’s research that most of subjects covered within 
this book would have limited crossover and also that appropriate citations would be limited, 
due to the fact that the present work does not focus on the Colombian Intelligence Policing 
model. The Handbook of Intelligent Policing provides an exhaustive overview of police 
intelligence, its history, functions and where its future lays. This book aided this author in 
exploring well established and tested methodology, providing a comparison to Colombian 
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policing and whether the intelligence-led policing model would be something that Colombian 
policing should focus on cultivating or not. 
 
Policing Critical Incidents – Leadership and Critical Incident Management by Alison and 
Crego 2008. Professor Laurence Alison has over 15 years of academic experience covering a 
multitude of subjects from use of force in the 1990s to police leadership. Alison is currently 
the Director of the Centre for Critical and Major Incident Psychology within the Applied 
Psychology Group at the University of Liverpool. Professor Jonathan Crego has over 25 
years of experience in incident management and is the Director of the HYDRA foundation 
that provides learning and research methodologies for law enforcement and criminal justice 
amongst others he is also the visiting Professor at Institute of Criminal Justice Studies 
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, and at University of Portsmouth International 
Centre for Policing and Security, University of South Wales. This book has provided this 
author with excellent insight into police leadership especially with regards to the importance 
of leading critical incidents, which were covered in Chapter Four. Those issues are key to this 
author’s critique of Colombian police leadership. Alison and Crego are cited quite often in 
the Police Leadership chapter as their experience within this area is significant. 
 
Police Corruption - Deviance, accountability and reform in policing by Punch, 2009. 
Professor Maurice Punch has over 20 years of academic experience in the U.K., U.S. and the 
Netherlands. Punch’s published works focus on corruption, institutional deviance, use of 
force, issues of state collusion in regards to counter insurgency and zero tolerance policing. 
Punch is a visiting Professor at the Mannheim Centre at LSE, and King's College London in 
the Dickson Poon School of Law. Punch’s book very clearly presented the acute problems 
with corruption and accordingly, the issues with aiming to remove it from policing culture - 
an idea that is essential, but exceedingly hard to accomplish due to all the causal factors 
usually at hand. Police corruption is a reoccurring theme within this paper and therefore 
Punch’s considerable experience and work in this field was key to this author’s research and 
is citied multiple times throughout this thesis. 
 
When this author encountered issues with Colombia’s crime statistics, which will be further 
explored in the methodology chapter, books focusing on the problems with statistics were 
also researched. Dr. Daniel Levitin’s 2016 book A Field Guide to Lies and Statistics, 
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researched late into this authors thesis, was the preferred source due to the writing style and 
examples within. Levitin is Professor Emeritus of Psychology and Behavioural Neuroscience 
at McGill University in Montreal, Canada amongst other positions. Levitin’s research over 
the last five years has covered quantitative methods for analysing acoustic (and time-series) 
information. Levitins book covers the problems of statistical analysis from multiple angles, 
including recording, reporting and evaluation with cases studies. Whilst Levitin is not citied 
frequently throughout this thesis, the research was instrumental to this author in his 
preference to staying with a qualitative rather than quantitative research method.  
 
Online Resources 
 
Online this author found a lot more information from online sources such as InSight Crime, 
The Economist, Colombia Reports and The City Paper.  
 
This author utilised primarily Insight Crime and The Economist for his online research owing 
to their greater experience and professionalism in the field, both from this author’s own 
experience, but also that from his colleagues and protected sources. InSight Crime.org is non-
profit news source specifically covering organised crime in Latin America, it has offices in 
Washington D.C. in the U.S. and Medellin in Colombia. InSight Crime was founded by 
Jeremy McDermott and Steven Dudley. Dudley who also wrote one of this authors key 
research books, Walking Ghosts. The online news site contains background information on 
both legitimate state actors such as presidential administrations, non-state actors such as 
NGOs and criminal groups such as the BACRIM (Bandas Criminales – Criminal Bands).  
 
The Economist was also used as a research tool when there were turning points within 
Colombia, be they political, criminal or economic. For example, the Economist’s article on 
October 29th 2015 titled ‘Lessons from Colombia’ detailing the potential for peace with the 
FARC and what that could mean not just for Colombia, but also the wider region. 
 
Both Colombia Reports and The City paper were both recommended by this author’s 
protected sources. The City Paper is also delivered to the British Embassy and considered a 
local trusted news source. Colombia Reports is an online English news site and has been 
active since 2008 when it was founded by Adriaan Alsema who is a journalist and also 
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only printed English Language newspaper (as of September 2017). The current Editorial 
Director Richard Emblin has over 25 years of experience in journalism and photojournalism. 
The paper’s emphasis is political, economic and environmental factors within Colombia and 
was a weekly reading source for this author along with the previously mentioned 
publications. 
 
Several other journals, books, papers and websites, will be quoted throughout this author’s 
work, however, these additional works will be utilised more to highlight a particular issue 
rather than regularly cited throughout this thesis. 
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Methodology 
 
… [M]ethods should follow from Questions. How we do something in research 
depends on what we are trying to find out. (Punch, 2013, p. 7)  
 
Justification for study 
 
The aim of this study is to present the history of the most pressing challenges that Colombian 
policing has faced and some of the outcomes of those challenges. The aim of this paper is not 
to present a complete structural analysis of the police and how they have evolved during this 
time nor to fully critique Colombia’s jurisprudence. Rather it will present an overview of 
Colombian policing challenges, then present the key outcomes that in this author’s 
experience have had the biggest impacts on Colombian policing. Chapters will conclude on 
how policing adapted and how these issues might continue to affect Colombian policing with 
the challenges that lay ahead. Whilst some of the areas to be presented have been covered in 
previous research, particularly that of Dr. Juan Carlos Ruiz-Vasquez, not all have been 
covered together and not during this pivotal point in Colombian policing in which the 
potential for peace exists between the state and the insurgent groups of the FARC and the 
ELN, as well as the largest organised criminal group, Clan de Golfo.   
 
The overall goal of this author’s thesis will be to focus primarily on the different actors from 
different perspectives who have challenged Colombian policing and peripherally the 
Colombian military, focusing particularly on the war on drugs, the AUC (arguably the most 
prominent paramilitary group), the FARC (as the principle insurgent group), police 
leadership, and judicial reform in the move from an inquisitorial system to accusatorial 
model. The rationale for this choice of thesis is that Colombia is at a significant turning point, 
and this author has had the privilege and benefit of working in Colombia during what is 
arguably one of the time of the country’s biggest transitions. This will enable the author to 
provide a fresh perspective on Colombian policing before, during and after some of the most 
significant changes in Colombia’s policing history; the potential end of armed conflict within 
Colombia, the end of Plan Colombia (financial assistance provided primarily by the United 
States - which although might be extended, will not be confirmed within the time of this 
author’s research), and Colombia’s society at large with the changes in policing as a whole.  
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Although other papers and books on Colombian policing exist, very few unique papers have 
been written exclusively on Colombian policing challenges over a long time frame; the most 
pertinent work found by this author was the paper ‘Colombian police policy: police and 
urban policing, 1991-2006’, written by J.C. Ruiz-Vasquez at the University of Oxford in 
2009. Whilst Ruiz-Vasquez’s paper does cover a very similar topic, it provides a different 
perspective, having preceded the assessment of judicial reform and the current FARC peace 
talks. This topic needs revisiting in order to elaborate on areas covered within that work, and 
provide an up-to-date perspective on the subject. Ruiz-Vasquez’s paper has also not been 
openly published to the public and therefore, as previously stated, this author will refrain 
from directly citing this specific paper in order to not betray its content. However, his other 
published papers will be referenced. With this in mind, this author believes this work will 
potentially be a continuation of that done by Dr Vasquez, but with added emphasis on the 
areas that have changed after his study. This may be particularly true in the areas of judicial 
reform, Colombia quite frequently trading the unfortunate title as the number one cocaine 
producer in the region with Peru, and finally the peace process with the FARC.  
 
Another key issue relating to previous research is the question of the originality of the thesis. 
This is a goal that is hard to achieve, as there are numerous researchers who have already 
delved into many aspects of policing studies, covering a multitude of different perspectives. 
Nevertheless, this author believes that this work will be original primarily due to both the 
overall compendium of knowledge on Colombian policing and the moment in time in which 
it is being written. As previously indicated, Colombia is at a turning point due to the change 
in judicial style, the end of the current Plan Colombia and the prospect of disarming both the 
FARC, the ELN and Clan de Golfo (two of Colombian’s largest remaining guerrilla groups 
and the largest organised criminal group according to Protected Source Thirty-One). These 
factors will time lock this thesis, as it will be written as the subjects evolve from the 
perspective of someone who was both living in the country and working with Colombian 
policing agencies. Even though the results of many of the themes present in this thesis could 
be perceived and analysed by academics in the future, there is a possibility that much of the 
reasoning of how they came about could be lost. Therefore, this author argues that the most 
complete narrative of events requires someone constantly present in Colombia and 
professionally involved in the events as they evolve, in order to extract the largest and most 
pertinent information whilst being cautious to avoid personal bias.  
 
 26 
Creswell (2009, p. 73) asserts that in relation to research design one also needs to pose the 
question of ‘What do preliminary results show about the practicability and value of the 
proposed study?’. The preliminary results this author has found have been significant in three 
key areas: policing, judicial reform and peace processes. With regards to the first area, this 
author has been in discussion with serving senior police officers, who noted numerous 
examples of a considerable push towards a greater focus on changes in policing practices in 
Colombia. Bogota and other large cities like Cartagena and Medellin already have physical 
police presences across most of the cities in the form of police boxes (known as CAIs). 
However, there is a considerable legacy issue of a lack of trust between Colombian citizens 
and the Colombian National Police (CNP). According to Bowden (2007, p. 28/494), at one 
stage it seemed that a sizeable amount of the citizens in Medellin had more trust in Pablo 
Escobar and his cartel than the legitimate government, as he provided large scale investment 
to the local populace, ‘…doing far more than the government ever had for the poor crammed 
into the city’s expanding slums’. This has further been aggravated in the years since, by 
corruption and lack of training on the side of the police. In 2011 the Economist noted that 
‘Numerous officials from Mr Uribe's government had already been charged with crimes 
including collaborating with paramilitary warlords, bribing legislators, spying on opponents 
and corruption’. It is this issue of trust and training that the present CNP wish to address in 
the form of a more comprehensive community policing plan in order to both win back public 
trust and lower street level crime.  
 
The central themes at the core of this paper are the policing challenges faced by a number of 
different actors and their impact, by first describing their history then how each affected 
policing over a period of thirty-plus years. This will be assessed with regards to both the 
Colombian National Police (the CNP) and the CTI (Judicial Police), but also with a view of 
Colombia’s military. In order to answer this question, this thesis will break down five key 
areas that this author believes are central to Colombian policing over a time frame covering 
principally the 1970s to contemporary Colombia, with brief mentions prior to the 1970s when 
relevant. This author believes these areas will have shaped and in many cases continue to 
shape the mandate of the Colombian National Police. The five areas will be broken down 
chapter by chapter throughout this work and culminate in a conclusion as to where 
Colombian policing currently sits. The thesis commences by focusing on the commonly 
known persona of Pablo Escobar, which has been re-inserted into the public domain via the 
success of the Netflix show Narcos. The first chapter will act as the foundation for this thesis 
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as Escobar and how he affected Colombia will be a recurring theme. The subsequent chapter 
will continue with the theme of the war on drugs, but shift from Pablo Escobar to the 
paramilitary group The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de 
Colombia - AUC). It will examine the AUC viewpoint to ascertain how the war on drugs has 
affected Colombia internally, from a previously supported defence force, their peace process, 
and eventual evolution into organised crime groups. The third chapter will chronologically 
re-trace the same eras covered by the previous chapters, but with the perspective focused 
significantly more on Colombia’s civil war with the guerrilla groups, particularly the FARC 
with mention of the ELN and their history with the AUC. This will also focus on the Unión 
Patriótica, the UP, the FARC’s political party, and may hold some valuable insights into what 
the future of the FARC could entail in a post-conflict Colombia. The next chapter will focus 
on police leadership and rivalry not only between policing agencies, but also with 
Colombia’s military, which is of particular interest in a country with several active 
insurgencies. Several previous themes will be reintroduced, including postcolonial issues, 
corruption issues, foreign government involvement, and examining if the structures of the 
two main policing agencies in Colombia can adequately adapt to emerging situations. The 
penultimate chapter will discuss Colombia's criminal justice system, namely whether the 
system offers fair and reasonable justice to its citizens, how does the greater CJS affect 
policing, and what is the perception on judicial reform, specifically the change from a 
accusatorial to inquisitorial process as described in the previous chapter. This chapter will 
also explore the theme of corruption and its effects - is this a historic problem that has been 
resolved or a continuing challenge? Lastly, the conclusion will seek to bring all of these 
themes together, along with inequality issues, and finalise the narrative of this thesis by 
covering the challenges they have faced, the outcomes of those challenges and what 
challenges remain. The narrative of this thesis will not flow chronologically between chapters 
as the topics span similar if not the same time frames.  
 
The Methods Researched 
 
Now that the question has been posed for the empirical study that this author will undertake, 
the next logical consideration is that of which research method he will use in order to 
accurately seek an answer. In order to ascertain the most appropriate method, this author 
researched three key research designs: quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods. This 
author will now present a brief synopsis of each and conclude with his choice. Quantitative 
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research as defined by Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009, p. 5/82) is ‘…primarily working within 
the post positivist/positivist paradigm and principally interested in numerical data and 
analyses’. Creswell (2009, p. xxiii) agrees that Quantitative research is more focused on 
‘…collecting and analyzing data…’. Therefore, quantitative research is firmly fixed in the 
collection of numerical data from studies, comparing and contrasting these results to come to 
a logical and arguably fixed conclusion. This research method has the benefit of working in 
absolutes, in order to ascertain ‘significance’ through a mathematical solution; a clear binary 
answer where the test results will be either positive or negative. However, this author 
believes this research method would not be suitable for this study, as it would negate all the 
social nuances that would be prevalent in a study of Colombian policing. Whilst this research 
method would offer a clear conclusion of progress versus regression, it wouldn’t help to 
explain why, nor arguably would it allow the factoring in of complex societal changes during 
the time of the study, for example, the experience and opinions of longstanding diplomats or 
serving Colombian police officers whose knowledge could be argued as essential. However, 
if the statistics that that this author is basing his research on are fundamentally flawed, then 
this research will be unsound from the outset. 
 
Qualitative research as defined by Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009, p. 5/82) is ‘…primarily 
working within the constructivist paradigm and principally interested in narrative data and 
analyses’. Again Creswell (2009, p. xxiv) agrees with this description that qualitative 
research is based around ‘…collection of open-ended data… and personal interpretation of 
the findings…’. Consequently, qualitative research lies in the arena of communicating with 
the area of society whom the study is based around via either questionnaires or interviews. 
This form of research method has the benefit of being an analogue study of the case at hand, 
fixed neither in the absolute positive or absolute negative, but instead allowing for a more 
organic representation of the data taking into account social politics, societal issues and a 
more complete (although debatably not as clear) narrative of the events. This author believes 
that this research method would cover all the pertinent areas. It was also felt that it would be 
necessary to use an interview technique whereby the author's knowledge of that person would 
not only be relevant, but valued. The Verstehen approach was used as it requires knowledge 
and understanding of the person to a high degree, which this author already had via his 
professional or personal relationships. The Verstehen approach, according to Martin (2000, p. 
12), takes into consideration that ‘in order to understand human beings it is necessary to 
reconstruct the inner life of these human beings from its manifestation in their actions’ 
 29 
and that ‘[t]his reconstructing involves knowing what the inner lives of these human beings 
are’. In this case, interviewing those well known to the author professionally or 
personally allows one to identify the most appropriate interviewees and then to understand 
and reconcile their various perspectives. This approach should provide a deep understanding 
of the subject at hand. The information gathered could be further strengthened with the 
addition of statistical data, again where relevant and accurate data is available to this author. 
 
 
With these two designs in mind this author had initially focused on the mixed methods 
approach. Mixed methods research as defined by Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009, p.5/82) is 
‘… working primarily within the pragmatist paradigm and interested in both narrative and 
numeric data and their analyses’. Again Creswell (2009, p. xxiv) concurs, ‘Mixed methods 
procedures employ aspects of both quantitative methods and qualitative procedures’. Ergo, a 
mixed method research design will allow for a combination of statistical analysis to 
encompass the more mathematically fixed data, along with methodical analysis of the 
interpretative information gleaned from interviews with those who are most involved in the 
subject area. This author believes that this research method offers the ideal mixture of both 
designs for providing the most complete answer to the chosen questions of this study, 
absorbing the positive aspects of both designs while negating the shortcomings of each. 
However, that does not mean that this research method is without flaws. The most significant 
issue that the mixed methods design has, is that in allowing for both quantitative and 
qualitative sources this author will have to incorporate two very distinct data types and merge 
them into his study in a cohesive narrative, whilst simultaneously working to maintain the 
two very different styles. This complication is confirmed by Creswell (2009, p. xxiv): 
‘Designing a [mixed method] study is a difficult and time consuming process’. Creswell 
(2009, p. xxiv) also continues to state that there are ‘[s]ix types of mixed methods designs…’. 
Therefore this author will continue to not only describe why he chose the mixed methods 
research method, but also which type he chose. A further problem with this methodology is 
that it will be affected by the aforementioned issues with statistics, whereby any lack of 
accurate and applicable statistics could compromise this research at the commencement of 
the study. 
 
In order to best assess these subject areas, this author initially chose to use the mixed methods 
approach to research, combining the aspects of both qualitative and quantitative research.  
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Whilst the mixed method approach is a less tried and tested model in comparison to the better 
known quantitative or qualitative approaches, this author agrees that there is much to be 
gained from combining these two very different methodologies. As to the six main types of 
mixed method designs, this author will continue by describing the reasons for his preferred 
design, without covering the other designs which are beyond the scope of this paper. This 
author chose the concurrent triangulation strategy, noted by Creswell (2009, p. 213) as ‘the 
most familiar of the six major mixed methods models’. Creswell (2009, p. 213) states that 
‘[i]n a concurrent triangulation approach, the researcher collects both quantitative and 
qualitative data concurrently and then compares the two databases to determine if there is 
convergence, differences, or some combination’. This would offer an ideal combination of 
the two differing methodologies in order to ascertain a more comprehensive answer, and is a 
method used specifically to ‘offset the weaknesses inherent within one method with the 
strengths of the other’ (Creswell 2009, p. 213). However, academically statistics worldwide 
have been called into question over the years. Levitin explains that statistics are not 
certainties: ‘it’s important to remember that people gather statistics…[s]tatistics are not facts. 
They are interpretations’ (Levitin 2006, p. 3). In a 2001 paper Robert Morris evaluated 
inaccuracies in criminal statics for England and Wales where Morris comments that historical 
crime figures ‘…were consciously manipulated by the executive and its agencies to 
misrepresent the true incidence of crime’ (Morris 2001, p. 112).  
 
Throughout his studies this author had been constantly advised of the potential problems with 
statistics, from collecting data from erroneous sources, to inaccuracy and bias in how 
statistics are presented. Levin points out that sometimes the problems with statistics are not 
immediately obvious: 
 
Sometimes the numbers are ridiculous, but it takes some reflection to see it. 
Sometimes claims seem reasonable, but come from a source that lacks credibility, like 
a person who reports having witnessed a crime but wasn’t actually there. (2016, p, X) 
 
Upon further reading into the problematic nature of statistics, authors such as R. Morris from 
his 2001 paper ‘Lies, damned lies and criminal statistics: Reinterpreting the criminal statistics 
in England and Wales' and Levitin's 2016 book A Field Guide to Lies and 
Statistics detailed the very common issue with of statistical collection and presentation, with 
either problems concerning the accuracy around the collected data or how that data is 
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presented. Despite this, statistics are in common usage to present data on a range complex 
issues, in the same manner as the topics of this work. It was only when this work commenced 
with the mixed methods design, that this author was quickly made aware of the considerable 
questions about the accuracy and legitimacy of statistics in regards to Colombia - publicly, 
professionally and as also stated by nearly all of this author’s protected sources: ‘No, I don’t 
think crime statistics are accurate…’ (Protected Source 26), ‘…I think street crime is so 
visible here that the facts they presented of no homicides or no car thefts in Chapinero or 
Usaquén, that’s ridiculous!’ (Protected Source Seven). Nearly all sources indicated the same. 
This difficulty was not just encountered during the interviews, but seemingly occurs across 
Colombian statistical analysis.  
 
Furthermore, this author’s research indicated that Colombian government statistics tend to 
inflate the number of seizures or downplay the amount of production of narcotics depending 
on one’s perspective. A key example of this involves the figures around the amount of 
cocaine produced by Colombia. InSight Crime published an article about Colombia’s 
estimated cocaine production and the Colombian government’s seizures (Insight Crime 
2016a). Here InSight Crime casts doubt on the statistics cited by the Colombian government: 
‘While credit for high seizures can be given to security force capacity and intelligence 
sharing across borders, it is unlikely that authorities are seizing such a large share of 
Colombian drugs. And if this is the case, it raises the possibility that official cocaine 
estimates are not fully on the mark.’ Doubts around statistical accuracy occur not only with 
the Colombian government’s figures, but also the U.N.O.D.C figures, which Insight Crime 
called into doubt from 2012-2016. Ruiz-Vásquez (2015, p. 49) also has discussed the 
problem with data collection in Colombia, as figures of violence have been ‘inconsistent, 
contradictory and unreliable.’ and that ‘…some beat officers suggest that the data have been 
inflated in order to satisfy their superiors…’. This author had also witnessed inaccurate crime 
statistics whereby official statistics published by the Colombian government had shown zero 
homicides in a particular neighbourhood in Bogota, however, the British Embassy was aware 
of several within the timeframe originally quoted. Due to this author’s professional position, 
access to confidential statistics was available at the time of research, which were at 
consistently at a variance with the published statistics.  
 
In short, while on a general level statistics worldwide have been called into question, more 
specifically in the case of Colombia crime statistics were at the time of writing speculative at 
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best. For this reason, the author re-evaluated this thesis to shift to a qualitative approach with 
primary source collection via interviews, with the focus on experienced professionals with 
pertinent experience in the areas this author will cover. Quantitative data will be deployed 
where there is value to the thesis, but the majority of research methods will be qualitative, 
utilising and fully exploring the array of valuable confidential sources available to this 
author. 
 
This author will utilise the Verstehen approach to study these sources in-depth, analysing 
their professional experience to ensure their experience is relevant and appropriate, examine 
their character to asses if they would have a vested interest in distorting this study away from 
the facts at hand and to ensure this research has enough professional and cultural variety to 
provide a balanced perspective of the questions posed. This author also considered the use of 
surveys, however he was advised against it by his contacts. The reasoning being that most 
Colombian and foreign agencies with whom this author had contact for interview would not 
favour this type of mass data collection with their staff and would most likely this would 
block future interviews. Similarly this author was advised that even if such a collection were 
possible most respondents would either ignore the survey due to workload, or the data 
collected would be inaccurate due to fear of who would see the results, even if the survey 
were to be conducted anonymously. Therefore, this author would expect a very low rate of 
reply, and is conscious of Punch’s (2013, p. 101) warning that ‘Very low response rates are 
both disappointing and troublesome, since they carry the possibility of biased results’.  It 
should be noted that this author will seek to use statistics where possible if they can be 
verified by multiple sources, however, the chosen methodology will not be grounded in 
statistical analysis as the work required to verify all statistics along with the qualitative 
research would be too immense for this author working alone to achieve.  
 
The Chosen Method 
 
The chosen method will be a qualitative methodology whereby sources will take the form of 
interviews with British and American diplomats, previously serving Colombian military 
personnel, currently serving Colombian military personnel, previously serving Colombian 
police officers, currently serving Colombian police officers, public servants from other 
aspects of the Colombian criminal justice system and Colombian civilians. The aim was to 
interview the more senior officers at the beginning of the study and the more junior officers 
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nearer the end, with the rationale that the more experienced officers will be able to impart 
important historical knowledge, whereas the junior officers will have greater access to 
relevant issues at ground level. This cross-section of sources who live and work in 
Colombian society gave this author a well-rounded view of the pertinent issues within 
Colombian policing, issues within society that need to be addressed by policing, as well as 
both a professional and the public perspective of Colombian policing. It should be noted that 
of the forty sources interviewed, five later requested that their contributions be removed and 
they were re-organised as protected sources 36-40. Furthermore, four protected sources had 
their interviews rendered as inadmissible for various reasons; one source was removed after 
this author reviewed their statements and found them highly inaccurate and emotive, and the 
final three were removed due to lack of relevance and this author’s changes to the themes 
within this work. Those interviews were Protected Sources 17, 23, 34 and 35. This has left 
the author with 31 interviews from which to cite. Even though this author will not refer to 
these sources by name it is believed relevant to identify their backgrounds so the reader will 
know their relevance to the subject matter. 
 
 
Protected Source Profession Protected Sources  
  
Foreign government officials working in 
Colombia - with a policing or military 
background. 
1, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 20, 21, 22, 24, 
25, 28, 30, 31. 
  
Foreign government officials working in 
Colombia - without a policing or military 
background. 
2,3,4,15,18. 
  
Colombian government – with policing or 
military background. 6, 8, 16, 32. 
  
Colombian government – without a 
policing or military background. 26, 27, 29. 
  
Colombian citizens – professional 
lawyers/doctors. 14, 19, 33. 
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The focus will now switch to the sequence of research. Documentaries such as The House I 
Live In (2012), and written accounts by authors living and documenting Colombia, for 
example Leech’s The FARC: The Longest Insurgency (Rebels) and Bowden’s Killing Pablo 
will also be used. These sources will be referenced to augment perspectives on either the 
problem in comparison to other countries, for example drugs and incarceration in the US in 
comparison to Colombia in The House I live In, or the in-depth view of a particular subject as 
with Bowden’s narrative of Pablo Escobar. Also relevant will be the constant collection 
throughout the study of articles published by media sources both internal to Colombia, the 
aforementioned InsightCrime, The City Paper and Colombia Reports, but also to a lesser 
extent, El Tiempo (Colombian Newspaper) and Revista Semana (Colombian weekly news 
magazine), and from sources around the world such as the Economist, the Guardian, the BBC 
and CNN. These will also be used to reference the state Colombian police, albeit the sources 
will be treated with the more care due to the perception of bias. As Creswell (2009, p. 5) 
notes, ‘Researchers need to think through the philosophical worldview assumptions that they 
bring to the study’, a statement which arguably includes the considerable influence of the 
media, a media that is still largely fixated on Colombia’s violent past. Lastly, the primary 
sources will be utilised in order to glean new information to compare and contrast with the 
previously collected quantitative and qualitative research. This primary data will take the 
form of information garnered from interviews with protected sources, from various 
backgrounds of Colombian and foreign citizens to ensure this work presents the results from 
different perspectives as opposed to those that simply agree with this author’s own 
perspectives. However, although the mixed methods model will no longer be utilised, it is 
worth noting that in line with the concurrent triangulation approach, this author has collected 
quantitative data throughout the course of the study in order to capture the results of the 
changing political climate, especially with regards to the FARC peace process. 
 
Ethical Considerations & Personal Risk 
 
There are also numerous other considerations to take into account. These considerations do 
not relate to academic journals, other academic papers or information gleaned from 
government or non-governmental organisations, nor to Dr Ruiz-Vásquez’s previous research, 
but are in recognition of the significant ethical considerations when interviewing sources. 
This author has three categories of sources: sources within Colombian agencies, those within 
foreign government agencies working in partnership with the Colombian government, and 
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lastly Colombian civilians. This author believes the category with the highest inherent risk to 
interview is the first source, i.e. Colombian agencies such as the national police. The most 
problematic scenario would be if a source admitted to a human rights violation or 
involvement with organised crime groups such as narcoterrorists. In this scenario this author 
understands that in his role as an academic researcher he would be required to disclose any 
criminal offences to the relevant authorities, but also acknowledges that a degree of common 
sense must be deployed in this scenario. For example, it is debatable how useful it would be 
for this author to report on a potential crime, without evidence, that occurred a decade or 
more ago. From an alternate perspective, there is also a duty of care towards those being 
interviewed - for example, this author cannot disclose either the full contents or excerpts of 
these interviews to colleagues, friends or family of those being interviewed in case of adverse 
consequences. Personal risk on this subject will be variable depending on the research being 
undertaken at the time. Primarily living and working in certain parts of Colombia contain an 
inherit risk that will provide the baseline and this author’s own professional security 
measures will mitigate those risks. Interviewing diplomats within secure environments will 
not involve a physical risk, but could potentially involve reputational risks if the diplomat 
reveals information that holds a security classification or is of a sensitive nature. Conversely, 
there will be different considerations when interviewing Colombian agencies, especially the 
CNP, about issues that could be considered a criticism of their ability as a police force, a 
point that has been raised by Goldsmith (2003, p. 104):  
 
Two commonly encountered features of developing world settings that ensure 
theoretical interest but also practical difficulties in the field are lack of police 
legitimacy and the limited effectiveness of police on the ground. These factors can 
induce sensitivity among police subjects to being studied, and arouse suspicion 
among other groups towards researchers interested in policing and security issues.  
 
Therefore, a great deal of tact and diplomacy must be employed when interviewing certain 
groups in order to not cause offence or to be seen as critical. However, unlike Goldsmith 
(2003, p. 105) who ‘… visited Colombia another six times, and have spent a total of 
approximately four months there’, this author lived and worked in Colombia for a number of 
years and has partnerships with the CNP and other agencies that offer the privilege of greater 
access, but also opens up this author to greater personal risk should the partnership sour. 
There is the added concern that if diplomacy is not deployed appropriately, the interviewees 
could react in an overly sensitive way when questioned on certain subjects, and therefore 
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restrict access to future sources for interview. One last consideration is that of the impact of 
post-thesis publication: if this author is successful in his work and it is later published, this 
author understands that he will need to take all appropriate measures to ensure that his 
sources are not revealed either purposefully or by accidentally including a level of detail that 
could lead to a positive identification of that source. 
 
Interview Methodology 
 
This author’s interview methodology consisted of a semi-structured conversation whereby 
the nature of the interview was explained up front, then followed with a series of pre-set 
questions across nine categories. These categories were the war on drugs, the peace process, 
the FARC, organised crime groups, paramilitary groups, the role of the police in Colombia, 
political impact on policing, the impact that foreign investment has had on Colombia and 
policing strategies. The questions were open ended and used as guides for each interviewee to 
communicate the story of their experiences rather than forcing them to answer a specific line 
of questioning, though clarification was sought when appropriate. All interviews were held 
within a secure environment to prevent third parties from overhearing. Each interviewee was 
carefully selected from this author’s professional and personal contacts in Colombia. Their 
selection for this author’s research was based on a variety of factors: amount of time spent in 
Colombia if they were not native to the country, their experience, their area of expertise and 
this author’s own experience with that person. Employing this author’s own understanding of 
a person, therefore using a Verstehen approach, means this author carefully selected those 
who were believed to be able to discuss and impart knowledge on issues without showing 
notable bias. This author chose people from three different cultural backgrounds, Colombian, 
British and American (originating from U.S.) as a means of validation control to each other’s 
cultural perspectives.  
 
It was important to give equal consideration to differing accounts. Maxwell explains that ‘it is 
always possible for there to be different, equally valid accounts from different perspectives’ 
(Maxwell 1992, p. 283). This was certainly true of opinions of the conflict in Colombia and 
around the peace process, with different ‘sides’ of the argument could be considered as 
making equally valid points. The particular Verstehen approach used for interviews was 
interpretive understanding whereby ‘Researchers within the interpretive tradition reflect the 
view that ‘society’ is constituted and maintained and seek to comprehend it by understanding 
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the sense-making of the people involved’ (Rex and Baumann 2008). In the case of this thesis, 
the author will use the perspectives of those with the pertinent experience to quantify the 
subjects to be covered within this work. 
 
Each interview always commenced with this author stating: ‘The aim of this thesis is to better 
understand Colombia's policing and military, through qualitative research – interviews. My 
thesis title is ‘Pablo to Present, the Evolution of Colombian Policing’ (the original title of this 
work). For this interview you will be a protected source. Anything you want to share will be 
in confidence and you will not be referred to by name or agency. I will bring up subjects that 
you know I have knowledge or an opinion on, but I must be neutral in this process.’ This was 
to ensure all interviewees were as relaxed and open to discussing the questions posed without 
fear of reprisals as was possible. Reprisals either professionally or otherwise are a 
considerable concern in Colombia and therefore the principal reason as to why all sources 
were protected. 
 
All interviews were reordered and fully transcribed verbatim, with the most relevant quotes 
both in agreement and disagreement with the themes of this paper highlighted and separately 
collated for easier referencing. All information was collected and ordered by subject (e.g. 
‘corruption’). An application called ‘Scrivener’ was used to allow for ease of recording, 
organising and searching the data. All quotes were then compared and contrasted with each 
other and with this author’s academic research (especially in regards to any statistics or 
figures discussed) and when possible this author’s own experience working with the 
Colombian National Police, Fiscalia, CTI and other agencies. For example, one Colombian 
official made several strong assertions that contradicted this author’s findings throughout 
their interview. In one instance the interviewee strongly argued that there was absolutely no 
issue or evidence of rivalry in Colombian policing, yet all other sources stated this was a 
significant problem. The interviewee was a leader of a policing department and therefore bias 
was a consideration, also the interviewee appeared quite emotive about the subject in 
comparison with others interviewed. Post interview this author compared these statements 
with findings gleaned from all available sources: other interviews, academia and personal 
experience and found multiple inconsistencies. Therefore when validating the collected data 
there were clear reasons for this interviewee to show a bias that would present the police in a 
more favourable light, as ‘negative’ statements could impact negatively on perceived police 
leadership. Also taking into consideration that quite a few such contrary assertions were 
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made during the course of that interview, this author decided to entirely remove that source 
from the study, in case other erroneous opinions that were not as easy to quantify were 
included in the study and affected its accuracy. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this author had planned to use the mixed method research design with the 
concurrent triangulation strategy in order to provide the most complete narrative of events. 
However, this was changed to a qualitative research method in order to avoid complications 
by using statistics that were consistently questioned whilst conducting the primary source 
research. This author also recognises the ethical considerations when collecting qualitative 
data from all sources, knowing that this research could open up risk to careers or even lead to 
threats to life for some sources should this author not appropriately manage the material. It is 
worth noting that this author has interviewed a number of specialists across many fields - 
economists, veteran investigators, lawyers etc. - therefore not all the themes that this author 
will explore will have input from all of the interview subjects, rather this author will quote 
those with the most relevant career and experience in said field.    
 
The narrative of this thesis will not be chronological across all the chapters, but will instead 
flow from the origins or key dates of each chapter subject. For example, Chapter One will 
commence in the 1970s and move forward from there, whereas Chapter Two will begin in the 
1940s & 1950s and continue from there onwards. Whilst this format runs the risk of 
confusing those who would prefer a chronological narrative across the entire thesis, this 
author believes that a certain amount of flexibility about moving back and forth with dates 
will allow for proper background to be given and for the reader to be guided logically into the 
relative unknown arenas of Colombian policing. By the time the reader reaches the new 
frontier of the inner workings of Colombian law enforcement, hopefully both the historic and 
contemporary perspectives will appear considerably clearer. 
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Chapter 1 - The History of Escobar and the Outcomes for Colombian 
Policing  
 
First of all, President Nixon was the first to quote `The war on Drugs’ and I think that 
did a disservice to the expectations of many people because, in a war normally you 
have a beginning and an end and it is regarded as normal that you have acceptable 
losses.  From a law enforcement viewpoint, no loss of life is acceptable, so right at the 
beginning `The War on Drugs’ is really a misnomer. (Protected Source Eleven) 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to present one of the major challenges to Colombian policing, 
the drug cartels, with a focus on Pablo Escobar’s rise and fall and what the outcomes were on 
policing in Colombia.  
 
The War on Drugs in the United States 
 
 In 1972 the President of the United States, Richard Nixon declared a war on drugs (Frechette 
2007, p. 1). This war would extend far beyond the borders of the United States and would 
have far reaching consequences for Colombia from then until the present day. This author 
will outline the reasoning behind the war on drugs from a US perspective, Pablo Escobar’s 
impact on Colombia, how the war on drugs has changed and a look at contemporary 
Colombia drawing on interviews with those who currently or have worked with Colombia’s 
police from the 1990s until the present day. This paper will continually touch on aspects of 
the war on drugs and ways in which Colombian policing was challenged by the classic 
cartels, as well as discuss the lasting impact of such confrontations.  
 
A brief understanding of the origin of the ‘war on drugs’ is useful to give context to the rise 
of the cartels and the challenges that they, as well as international involvement, presented to 
Colombian policing. Colombia’s greatest ally in this has been and continues to be the United 
States. The reasoning behind President Nixon’s war on drugs has been a significant source 
for academic debate. The documentary The House I Live In concludes that the war on drugs 
was a method for racial control. The documentary firstly noted that many now illegal drugs 
were at one time perfectly legal and well marketed, and that opium along with cocaine were 
mostly used among the middle classes. Despite this, when an influx of Chinese workers 
started to threaten the white American workforce, opium was made illegal in order to 
marginalise the Chinese workforce. Likewise, it was thought that members of the largely 
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black workforce on the railroads in the US were using cocaine to work longer hours, so 
cocaine was outlawed to provide cause to reduce the black workforce and reduce their social 
mobility even though the largest market for cocaine at the time was the white middle class. 
Although these legislative amendments were performed in the early 20th century, one could 
argue that these earlier methods of societal control were re-used by Nixon when he coined the 
phrase ‘the war on drugs’. As the documentary argues, Nixon used this ‘war’ to crack down 
on a section of society he considered to be unsuitable for the United States. That said, it is 
important to note that Nixon’s initiative originally spent a significant amount of its budget on 
drug rehabilitation rather than on incarceration of drug offenders. Despite this, Nixon created 
a war that has spread internationally and is now viewed as a considerable industry. This stone 
of an idea thrown by President Nixon into the psyche of the American public has rippled 
through presidencies into the present day, where the idea of a presidential candidate not 
pushing the war on drugs is perceived as, politically toxic. 
 
Colombia has had a polarised role to play in the international war on drugs; from a position 
of co-operation in 1979 when Colombia signed a treaty with the United States recognising 
drug trafficking to the US to be a crime, to arguably a position of compliance with the drug 
cartels in the mid 1980’s. According to Mark Bowden’s (2007, p. 29/499) Killing Pablo, 
Pablo Escobar became ‘the people’s don’ - the poor communities in Medellin considered him 
a Robin Hood figure as he built free housing developments for them to live in. Also the 
cartels initially used their power to fight the FARC, ELN and other groups, replacing 
guerrilla control with their own groups as they took over territory. The cartels’ power and 
influence grew from the countryside into the heart of Colombia itself, the capital Bogota. The 
banks had flirted with the idea of accepting this new revenue from the cartels behind closed 
doors as a way to boost the Colombian GDP.  Businessmen were starting to consider the 
cartels as a new type of entrepreneur and the Colombian government for a brief period had 
Pablo Escobar as one of their congressman, standing in for New Liberal Party member Jairo 
Ortega. Escobar’s new position went as far as allowing himself to obtain a diplomatic visa 
which he used to visit the United States. Finally Escobar used his position of power to end 
the extradition of Colombian nationals to the United States where they would face 
prosecution and incarceration, by stating that extradition was an attack against ‘national 
sovereignty’ (Bowden 2007, p. 32/561). This point in time could arguably be considered the 
height of Colombian disparity with the US on the war on drugs, as significant parts of 
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Colombian society had almost embraced the cocaine trade, and those that ran it as having a 
positive impact on Colombia (Bowden 2007). 
 
Policing Challenges with Escobar 
 
Escobar was in congress from 1982 - December1984, but Pablo was still not fully accepted 
by Colombia’s ‘polite society’. His applications for private clubs amongst Colombia’s elites 
were rejected. This culminated in a political eruption which concluded in his removal from 
congress when Pablo tried to take his seat in congress in 1983 thus ‘… dash[ing] Pablo’s 
dream of social status and political power.’ (Bowden 2007, p. 35/610). This expulsion from 
congress by the ruling elite in Bogota inflicted significant damage on Escobar, and according 
to Bowden debatably more than any of his cartel rivals ever could have according to Bowden. 
This public rejection lead to one of the most violent stages in Colombia’s history. Escobar’s 
violence extended to assassinations of his judicial and political opponents, the bombing of 
aircraft, and culminated in his deadly bombing campaigns in the late 1980s until the early 
1990s. From the perspective of the international war on drugs, Escobar’s profile changed 
quickly - he transformed from being considered solely as a cartel kingpin into a 
narcoterrorist. Although former Peruvian President Fernando Belaúnde Terry coined the term 
‘narcoterrorism’ in 1983, the term has often been used in regards to Pablo Escobar’s terrorist 
tactics deployed against the Colombian government in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
 
The partnership between the US and Colombia started to change with the manhunt for 
Escobar and one of the acts that would significantly affect Colombian policing was the 
reinstating of extradition. The cartels being seen as narcoterrorists meant that the US could 
use terrorist legislation to target the cartels in a more aggressive manner; funding for the 
Colombian military was increased and postings of US military personnel were increased, 
(Bowden 2007). US president George H.W. Bush pushed for a stronger partnership with 
Colombian president Cesar Gaviria to combat this evolved threat. The Colombian president 
embraced this new partnership, seeing the new funding and support as a way to finally fight 
the cartels. Bowden (2007, p.39/685) describes the fights against the cartels as ‘Nothing less 
but a fight for the soul of Colombia’. This presents the Colombian police with a unique new 
apparatus in order to peruse criminality, one that both criminal groups and insurgents both 
fear, but at the cost of evolving the Colombian judiciary. However, this author has first-hand 
knowledge of international partnerships; they are rarely constructed overnight and also, rarely 
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operate seamlessly. Sovereign nations have a variety of government apparatuses that need to 
be interfaced with, and as a foreign government working on Colombian soil, not all agencies 
are willing to offer full co-operation. The influence of a third party could be construed as a 
failure on their part and an outsider’s advice could be seen as an attack on Colombian 
sovereignty; meddling in affairs that are not their concern, or worse, looking to weaken 
another state for their own benefit. It is for these reasons that the international war on drugs 
in Colombia, despite having an arguably strong catalyst, did not make immediate headway in 
dismantling the cartels. 
 
In the mid to late 1980s Colombia became a close ally to the US, especially in regards to the 
war on drugs. Substantial resources were poured into Colombia including DEA agents, 
military personnel and most significantly, phone interception and directional finding 
equipment in the hunt for Pablo Escobar and other high-ranking cartel members. As Kenney 
(2003, p. 198) describes, ‘Critical to this success was the generous provision of US training, 
technological and material resources to Colombian police, prosecutors, and military officials, 
some of which was used to create and maintain highly effective drug enforcement units’. 
Despite this influx of resources, initial progress was slow. Many academic papers, 
documentaries, Bowden, and one of my primary sources, have cited the main problem in the 
early hunts for Escobar, his associates and rivals, as being with the police and military tactics. 
Examples include, “not performing night operations” – (Protected Source Three), and slow 
response times with regards to their chain of command: they waited too long before acting on 
intelligence gleaned from the phone intercept team Centra Spike before action was taken 
according to protected source three. Between 1983 and 1990, Escobar had been removed 
from office and was considered one of Colombia’s most wanted. The United States was 
putting pressure on the Colombian government to extradite Escobar for the crime of running 
a drug smuggling operation to the US. In return Escobar had started a bombing campaign 
against the government, which had resulted in the loss of lives of many police and 
government officials. By 1990 ‘His bombing campaign had terrified the public, and polls 
showed growing support for striking a deal to end the violence’ (Bowden 2007, p. 94/1627). 
The police in this time had created a new unit called Bloque de Búsqueda (Search Bloc) who 
had been working with the American military and other agencies with sophisticated new 
surveillance equipment in order to try to locate and capture or kill Escobar. However, the 
search for Escobar ended after he and his lawyers reached a deal with President Cesar Gaviria 
to ensconce Escobar, and a significant amount of his cartel, in a prison designed by Escobar 
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himself called La Catedral. Amongst the terms of the surrender was a proviso that Colombian 
police and military were not allowed within twenty kilometres to La Catedral, Bowden 
(2007). This demonstrates how the role of police was prevented by the government from 
serving even as crime fighters, let alone a legitimate police force. 
The management of Colombia’s deal with Escobar had not only severely reduced the 
Colombian police’s ability to fight the drugs war domestically, but had also had the effect of 
increasing the proliferation of illegal substances internationally. By 1993 Escobar had 
escaped La Catedral and was once more a fugitive. He resumed his bombing campaign and 
war against the state and police. In early 1993 a new group called Los Pepes was encountered 
in the war. Bowden theorises that members of Search Bloc moonlit as vigilantes with the Los 
Pepes group and may even have been instrumental in its creation. In 1993 the hunt for Pablo 
Escobar ended with his death after years of running from the joint efforts of the US and 
Colombian authorities.  
During the time of the manhunt for Escobar, his empire had been considerably reduced, but 
what effect did that have on the cocaine production in Colombia? According to the UNODC 
figures (UNODC, 2010, p. 66), production was roughly stagnant. The global cocaine market 
showed that Colombia produced roughly the same amount of cocaine from 1990-1993, 
hovering around 100 metric tons. However, another important factor to consider is that at that 
time - referencing the 1990-1993 timeline - Colombia was not the biggest cocaine producer 
in the Andean region, with Bolivia producing 189 metric tons and Peru producing 492 in 
comparison to Colombia’s flat rate of around 100 metric tons, if the figures were accurate. 
Colombia was a minor player when compared to Peru and Bolivia, so why did Colombia 
receive more attention than its Andean neighbours? From this author’s perspective there are 
two answers; firstly the politics of the targeted country, and secondly, who was controlling 
the Peruvian drug trade. McClintock (1988, p. 136) notes that: 
 
 [t]he Peruvian government’s economic and foreign policies have been leftist, and this 
has angered US government officials. Yet, the Garcia government has not been 
severely sanctioned by the US…’ McClintock continues ‘[t]he Garcia government 
apparently realized that its commitment to the war on drugs would be a factor in US 
aid. For example, President Garcia accepted the US aerial herbicide-spraying program 
just a week or two before US aid bills were up for discussion in the US Congress.  
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Therefore this author theorises that due to the political disparity between US and Peru, 
diplomatic relations were likely harder. There was no comparable Escobar-esque 
narcoterrorist that Peru was seeking assistance with, and therefore it would have been more 
difficult to deploy stronger anti-drug tactics, with diplomatic compromises weakening the 
abilities of both sides. However, the second answer is arguably more pertinent to this paper 
and relates to who controlled the Peruvian drug market. McClintock (1988, p. 128) states 
‘Cocaine agribusiness is Latin America’s largest multination industry. Since the 
establishment of the industry in Peru, Peruvians have supplied the raw material for the 
industry –the coca leaves and coca paste – to Colombians who then process and distribute the 
cocaine.’. This is also echoed by Kenney (2003, p. 188):  
 
The Colombian cocaine ‘cartels’ can be traced back to the 1970’s, when numerous 
entrepreneurs sought to exploit the demand for cocaine in the US illegal drug markets 
by transporting small quantities of the drug from Ecuador, Bolivia and Peru to 
Colombia, where it underwent further refinement in makeshift laboratories before 
final shipment northwards.  
 
Therefore if Colombian groups have always had a controlling interest in the Peruvian market, 
and politically the US and Peru don’t ‘see eye to eye’, then logically it would explain why the 
US war on drugs in south America has and is much more focused on Colombia than Peru or 
other neighbouring nations.  
In the early to late 1990s after this expanded campaign by the Colombian government, with 
sizeable investment of resources by the US, what happened to Colombia’s cocaine production 
after Pablo Escobar’s death? The unfortunate answer is that, according to figures from the 
UNODC, that it grew considerably. From 1993-1994 it roughly doubled from around 100 
metric tons produced per year to 200 and then reaching over 400 by 1997, finally reaching its 
peak of over 695 tons by the year 2000. At the same time, Peru had significantly reduced year 
after year from around 500 tons in 1992 to 141 tons in 2000, and Bolivia’s cocaine 
production was relatively stable between 200 tons and 150 until 1999 where it reduced 
dramatically and stabilised at around 45 tons in 2000, again all figures from the UNODC. 
With the death of Pablo Escobar, all the help from the US, assistance from the larger 
international community (this author is aware that UK investment rose in the mid to late 
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1990s) and Colombia’s own crackdown on the cartels, why did Colombia continue to 
produce more and more cocaine in the 1990s and maintain that level well into the next 
decade? The answer is threefold; the evolution of the cartels, the rise of the FARC and the 
ELN as narcotraffickers, and finally the key issue of this paper that affects all other aspects, 
Colombian policing – its size, its tactics and most importantly of all, its geographical 
presence across Colombia. The years following the death of Pablo Escobar marked the point 
at which the international community as a whole would start to focus more on Colombian 
policing rather than exclusively on the cartels. This was the realisation that in order to fight 
the war on drugs efficiently Colombia would need long-term investments, rather than foreign 
governments assisting solely on a target per target basis. 
 
Firstly there is the issue of the evolution of the cartels’ operations. Originally the drug cartels 
had a more family-based structure and indeed involved multiple family members, usually 
from the head of the cartel. However, after Pablo Escobar had raised the profile of the cartels 
in Colombia, there was a sustained campaign by the Colombian government, with assistance 
from international partners, to win the war on drugs by targeting the families associated with 
illegal drug cultivation and trafficking. This crackdown did not achieve the expected results 
of reducing production. Instead as Kenney (2003, p. 188) states, ‘in the six years following 
the incarceration of the last original kingpin, the estimated potential production of cocaine in 
Colombia increased by 143% from an estimated 300 tonnes in 1996 to 730 tonnes in 2001’.  
The cartels themselves had also changed their mode of operation. Centralised family run 
cartels were being replaced by siloed groups. In essence the old cartel structure had changed 
from a well-structured hierarchy which contained all the aspects of the business - drug 
cultivation, refinement, transportation routes and co-ordination - into several smaller 
fractured groups - micro-traffickers who are operating more akin to terrorist cells: ‘Drug 
enforcers have removed the largest, most notorious organisations from the Colombian drug 
trade only to confront hundreds of small, obscure, yet reasonably sophisticated groups about 
which they know next to nothing’ (Kenney 2003, p. 193-194). This is further discussed in a 
future publication by Kenney (2007) that this an ongoing issue whereby micro-traffickers are 
unquantified and too numerous while the police faces a diminution of resources that they can 
expend against these groups. This leaves Colombian policing with the more nebulous 
challenge of taking on traditional narcotrafficking, fractured across multiple unknown cells in 
multiple parts of Colombia. 
 
 46 
This structure would spread the risk both geographically and across multiple groups, 
presenting law enforcement and the military with multiple smaller targets. The result would 
require significantly more work by government agencies. Previously, once they had identified 
a cartel there would be a considerable effort to identify all members and the modus operandi. 
Despite the investment required, the payoff was removing a significant player from the drug 
trafficking game. Now, however, the investigating agencies would be faced with a similar 
amount of work with a considerably reduced payoff. The new contemporary cartels are 
smaller and more adaptable and attract less risk. Even though singularly they produce less 
than the traditional cartels, collectively they are producing and shipping more cocaine from 
Colombia, overall a point reinforced by Kenny (2003, p. 194): ‘While individual enterprises 
may transact less frequently and in smaller quantities than before, on the whole the 
Colombian drug trade produces more cocaine and heroine today that it did during the boom 
years of the 1980’s and early 1990’s’. This is a point reinforced by nearly all of this author’s 
protected sources, which is highlighted by Protected Source Twenty-Six’s description of the 
problem in 2016: ‘Cocaine production from what we have seen on the ground has increased 
100% from the same point in 2015, in fact the figures that I have seen shown an almost exact 
doubling’.  
 
Policing Post Escobar 
 
While covering the drug war as a journalist for more than a decade, I came to 
understand that what drugs haven’t destroyed the war against them has. (Simon, 
2012) 
 
By 1994 the Colombian government was facing decertification by the United States in 
accordance with the ‘Anti-Drug Abuse Act, established by congress’ (Frechette, 2007, p. 4-
5). This classification process was used to judge if a country was fully cooperating against 
the illegal drug trade with the United States, with decertification meaning the potential for 
losing all assistance from the United States. Bagley (2013, p. 24) explains ‘Washington has 
demanded that the countries of the region follow its lead in the war on drugs and, as in 
previous years, upheld a formal “certification” process that often sanctioned those nations 
who did not “fully” cooperate’. In 1994 it was believed that Colombian President Ernesto 
Samper had received funding for his presidential run from narcotraffickers (Frechette, 2007). 
Friction between Colombia and the US developed further when it was believed that President 
Samper appointed two men as heads of the Armed Forces and National Police, who were also 
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believed to have been corrupted by narcotraffickers. The final straw from the US perspective 
was when Samper’s ruling party moved to continually dilute legislation that was created to 
toughen sanctions against the drug traffickers. These factors eventually lead to the 
decertification of Colombia by the Clinton administration. In 1996 intense friction between 
the two governments reached its highest point, where the US revoked Samper’s VISA, 
effectively banning him from entrance into the United States. Only when Samper’s successor 
President Pastrana took office did diplomatic relations begin to significantly improve:  
 
As a direct result, levels of drug-fueled violence in Colombia spiralled out of control 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Indeed, during much of the first decade of the 
2000’s Colombia became one of the most dangerous and violent countries in the 
world. In July 2000, President Clinton and the U.S. government responded by 
backing the Andrés Pastrana administration in its war against run away drug 
production and trafficking in Colombia via the adoption of Plan Colombia. (Bagley 
2013, p. 7) 
 
The partnership between the two countries had constantly ‘u-turned’ since the 1970s. 
Samper’s administration, however, now the diplomatic rift was starting to heal with 
Pastrana’s administration. The relationship was further strengthened when Pastrana’s 
successor Alvaro Uribe took office in 2002:  
 
Supported by almost $8 billion in U.S. aid under Plan Colombia over the course of a 
decade, by 2010 Colombian President Uribe and his program of “democratic 
security” had managed to beat back the FARC guerrillas, demobilise many – if not all 
– of the country’s paramilitary bands, and substantially reduce the country’s 
astronomically high levels of drug-related violence. (Bagley 2013, p. 7-8)   
 
Uribe was the first President to win in the first round of elections since the process had been 
changed in 1991 and used his popularity to make considerable changes to how Colombia 
fought the war on drugs. Uribe was quick to utilise Plan Colombia to its fullest potential and 
with that, significantly improve diplomatic relations with the United States. Uribe was often 
cited by this author’s protected sources as the president who changed the tide of the fight 
against the drugs trade, particularly with regards to corporation with the United States, a 
belief that was also echoed by (Frechette 2007). This partnership had a profound affect on 
Colombian policing during this time with Ruiz-Vásquez (2013, p. 4) noting that ‘The war on 
drugs not only provided more funds and donations from the US government but it renewed 
the image of a more efficient police force as three cartels were dismantled and spectacular 
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raids apprehending drug barons were widely publicized by the press.’. This is not to say that 
Uribe was considered by all protected sources as positive influence for Colombia, with some 
sources discussing his links to paramilitary organisations (Bloque Metro), falsos positivios 
and his friendship with the Ochoa crime family. Whilst acknowledged, this strays from this 
chapters narrative on Uribes policing policy amendments. 
 
One of the single most important changes made under the Uribe administration was the 
restructuring of the national police and military. Arguably one of Colombia’s greatest 
weaknesses has been the level of lawlessness across its territory. Without a strong police and 
military presence across Colombia, large parts of the country had been self-governed, which 
in a lot of areas had meant that the FARC, other guerrilla groups or organised crime groups 
had control, as there were no legitimate government bodies to oppose them. ‘Uribe has begun 
to restore the authority of the state by placing police in all the 1098 counties (municipios) in 
Colombia. He also has added 111,000 men to the Army and police’ (Frechette, 2007, p. 15). 
This helped bring a legitimate government presence to more areas in Colombia than there had 
been before. Arguably one fundamental rule that criminologists and economists agree on, is 
that more police and therefore a greater police presence across a country means less crime: 
‘..an increase in the number of police, regardless of new strategies, has been proven to reduce 
crime’ (Levitt & Dubner, 2006, p. 117). However, this author found that although this 
situation has improved, there are still large parts of Colombia with either minimal or non-
existent police presence, which was recounted by all of the protected sources: ‘…there are 
great swathes of the country where if there is a state presence at all, it’s highly ineffective and 
viewed as such by people who live in those areas’ (Protected Source Four); ‘…in terms of 
general policing they will always have difficulties in those areas because it’s just too remote 
and there’s no access’ (Protected Source Five); ‘…what happens is that it gives a safe haven 
for these groups to carry out their crimes with impunity’ (Protected Source Elven); 
‘Colombia doesn’t put its officers where it matters most…’ (Protected Source Twenty). 
When there are problems in specific areas, the Colombian state will send a task force to work 
on the issue at hand. However, most of this author’s protected sources saw this as an 
inefficient use of resources as it doesn’t resolve the crime issues within that community, but 
instead is considered a political problem that requires a rapid political solution, as opposed to 
a legitimate policing problem that should be met with a policing solution.  
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Yes of course you can send re-enforcements, but 10,000 people is a serious amount to 
be sending to one area to try and fight the upsurge in homicides. It was a case of go in 
stop it and then withdraw, as soon as that happens it will happen again as soon as the 
police and military presence leaves. (Protected Source Twenty-Two) 
 
It’s kind of evident that it’s going to be very difficult to stop people doing quite a 
simple thing, which is growing simple plants and then producing from them, 
something that has a very powerful effect on people and is therefore naturally 
lucrative and so the actual ability of anything to disrupt that dynamic is a bit doomed, 
because the activity too easy and too rational and too profitable. (Protected Source 
Two) 
 
Policing Challenges & Outcomes 
 
The increase of police and military by the Uribe administration had had a considerable effect 
on lawlessness in Colombia. This author has presented how the illegal drugs trade in 
Colombia has altered significantly over the past thirty years, with the traditional cartels 
having been dismantled and the remnants evolving into contemporary, terrorist cell-like 
structures. Also the FARC have been described as changing from a political insurgency into 
something more akin to an organised crime group. This author will now lastly and most 
relevantly, cover the issue of Colombian policing itself: how did the war on drugs change 
Colombian policing? Protected Source Two stated that ‘One of the great weaknesses of the 
Colombian state has been that it hasn’t had a presence in a lot of the country, or a very weak 
presence, therefore local political bosses or more recently the FARC and the ELN or other 
guerrilla groups have taken on the role of the state provisioning services or security.’ This 
solidifies the argument that if one can’t effectively police one’s own country, it creates an 
environment that would be ideal for the construction and cultivation of organised crime 
groups who could operate with almost total impunity. This is an issue that was only recently 
focused on by the Uribe administration by increasing the central government presence across 
the country. The geographical issues in relation to policing in Colombia is a core issue of this 
thesis and one that Colombia has only recently tried to amend, as Protected Source Three 
explains: ‘15 years ago you couldn’t travel from Bogota overland almost anywhere because 
of being an official from another country. Obviously Colombians had to, but you always flew 
to Cali to Medellin, flew to Cartagena you just wouldn’t think to go by road.’ 
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The Challenge of Corruption 
 
When this author discussed the issue of Colombian policing with his first protected source, 
many issues surfaced that were also highlighted in academia such as police presence, 
corruption, FARC involvement in drug trafficking and tactics against the contemporary 
cartels. Firstly the discussion centred on corruption in Colombia. Referring to their arrival in 
the late 1990s, Protected Source One comments that ‘even corrupt officers have to perform at 
some level’ and ‘At that time [in the late 1990s], if we said we would not deal with any 
agency that’s got a corruption problem you would have no-one to work with’. Police 
corruption was highlighted by over half of this author’s sources as being a sizeable problem 
that the sources had either witnessed first-hand or knew of via trusted partners: 
 
 I remember in the 90s the Cali cartel used to bribe or pay a (salary) to all police in 
Culca, the director of the police at that time dismissed all of the police officers 
operating in that district. (Protected Source Eight) 
 
 Yes I do think there is a corruption problem and this is often revealed when individual 
police offices are being prosecuted by the state. I think it has severely hampered the 
efforts of the CNP against OCG’s & terrorist groups. (Protected Source Thirteen) 
 
 There’s not enough infrastructure, there’s not enough business there’s not enough of 
anything in certain parts of the country and when you have someone like Pablo Escobar 
who comes in like in Medellin years ago and starts handing out money, I think it’s hard 
to turn down. (Protected Source Twenty-One)  
 
High level corruption was not discussed in isolation, rather several sources also recounted a 
constant existence of low level corruption with street level police officers:  
 
I will tell you how it works. The traffic police will stop you (for a road traffic offence) 
and say they will take your car if you don’t give money directly to them…. (Protected 
Source Fourteen) 
 
There is undoubtedly a certain amount of low-level corruption on a daily basis, by the 
police to the general population, whether it’s a bribe of $10,000 COP or $50,000 
COP…. (Protected Source Twenty-Two) 
 
Internal corruption of the police prevented the efforts that honest people working in 
the police and have reduced the impact they should have had. (Protected Source 
Twenty-Six) 
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One particularly damming perspective on police corruption during the time of the classic 
cartels comes from Ruiz-Vásquez (2013, p.407) where he states that ‘In Colombia, many 
drug barons have previously been policemen.’. This highlights a considerable challenge to 
Colombian policing during this period, with law enforcement officials working as both 
protector and also in opposition of the legitimate state. 
 
The one key area of disagreement between sources was if this problem was historical or 
contemporary with Protected Source eleven proposing that the issue was not as prevalent in 
modern Colombia: ‘No these smaller cartels do not have the access to Colombian 
government like they used to.  It is a lot harder now, for a variety of reasons, to corrupt the 
institution’. However Protected Source thirty-two disagreed: ‘No, quite the contrary, I think 
corruption has increased significantly in our country, now it is not only in the judicial system, 
but also mayors, governors, representatives of the chamber and the entire political class’. 
Also there was considerable concern about corruption with the upper hierarchy of 
Government, ‘For example in plan Colombia you don’t know if the government use all of 
this money to combat drugs, maybe 50/50, 50 for the politicians’ pockets and 50 to combat 
drugs’ (Protected Source Six). Throughout the course of this research this author gleaned that 
those sources who were Colombian believed that corruption within the police and wider CJS 
had worsened, whereas those who were foreign diplomats or foreign workers we more 
inclined to believe that corruption was considerably less in contemporary Colombia in 
comparison to the time of Escobar and the late 1990s. The reasoning for this is that 
corruption is seen as more covert activity than it once was, from the times of Samper 
receiving large amounts of money from cartels packaged as presents and received by his 
presidential campaign, to today where land transfers and offshore accounts are more 
commonly used. However, despite the issue and challenges with corruption, a key point 
raised by Protected Source One is that work must carry on:  
 
So it’s quite easy for us to be, as I say a bit sanctimonious and say, well corruption is 
dreadful, it’s awful and we don’t do that, but I damn well sure that I know what I 
would do if someone said we are going to kill your wife and children, unless you look 
the other way for 20 minutes. (Protected Source One) 
 
As Protected Source One points out there are stark differences between the theory and the 
reality of the situation. If corruption is as deeply ingrained, as this authors research suggests 
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then it will not be eradicated from Colombian society quickly. Indeed, Protected Source One 
argues that the situation needs to be put into perspective, ‘So it needs to be contextualised, 
even now, certainly in the 90s this was a brutal country where there were some posts in the 
anti-narcotics police where you had to have some level of corruption in order to just survive’. 
Trying to eradicate corruption as a police officer on the ground could get one killed; 
reduction of corruption to reasonable levels (this author personally believes its elimination 
would be unrealistic in any country), would be a slow process and require considerable 
political will from the highest levels of the Colombian state with assistance from international 
actors. . This author has witnessed first hand corruption with regards to government 
contracts. Favoured tenders were rushed through a procurement process with limited 
oversight, allowing for contracts worth tens of millions of dollars to be initiated and paid, 
before commissioning a study on the requirement. This also lead in one instance to the work 
never being completed, but the project still being paid in full.  
 
Analysing the current state of corruption has become a difficult and nebulous task. Overt 
corruption is perceived as reduced, however, the entire issue of corruption appears to have 
moved slightly away from the public eye and into the shadows. 
 
New Policing Practises 
 
When discussing whether Colombia’s police had taken on new policing tactics such as 
problem-orientated, intelligence-lead or community policing due to foreign investment in the 
war on drugs, Protected Source One commented that:  
 
Certainly the Colombians have taken on over the last 15 years, the idea of dealing 
with intelligence being more of a key role, rather than being exclusively operationally 
focused, but the Colombian police, to a greater extent than the UK police forces are 
very very short termist and results driven. However, they have now developed in 
certain areas an appetite for long-term investigations and some patience, so that if you 
want to take down Pablo Escobar or Loco Barrera or whoever it is, you’re not going 
to wrap them up in two weeks or even a year whereas before it was a short-term 
attitude to operations partly because the Colombian police is very hierarchical and 
careers are made of the results that you got, particularly the more senior you get.  
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This is a perspective that was widely echoed among the protected sources; the training or 
resources exist, but they were not being deployed to enhance or utilise more advanced 
policing tactics: 
 
I think they have great capabilities in some areas of the police and then I think they 
have a very low level capability in others. (Protected Source Two) 
  
…community policing is a new concept to Colombia, so I think that people don’t quite 
know how to handle it yet… (Protected Source Ten)  
 
They have the kit, they have the training and they have all the theory, they can explain 
it all to you, but when you observe them on the ground it doesn’t seem to translate. 
(Protected Source Eighteen) 
 
Protected Source Twelve believed this was more of a policing mindset, with the police focus 
being solely towards serious international crime and militarist policing to provide security 
rather than community level policing:  
 
Have you ever heard of Sir Robert Peel’s principles? One of his main principles is:  
the police are merely citizens who happen to undertake the role of keeping the people 
safe, they are part of the community at large, they don’t control the community and I 
think here, that is very much not the case, they are not part of the community they 
serve, they are part of the Colombian defence forces, they are not merely citizens who 
happened to have undertaken the role to keep the rest of the citizens safe, they are 
something apart and different and I think that is the way they are perceived. 
(Protected Source Twelve) 
 
This author’s twentieth Protected Source highlighted from personal experience that, ‘I helped 
them [the police] go to the UK to visit the CPS and they were looking at the juvenile 
cautioning program, you know so there are some good initiatives, but again you’re talking 
about your second category policing strategies, you know it’s too disparate, it’s far too 
disparate’. Whilst the two sources agreed there is some progress being made, Protected 
Source Twenty debated that not enough is being done at higher levels. It is worth noting that 
the sources who believed progress with new policing platforms was being made were more 
involved with senior Colombian police, usually at General level, whilst those who did not 
were more likely to work for, or in partnership with Major or below ranks. Fundamentally 
this author believes it’s a matter of perspective; some sources can see the overarching 
policies and how they have changed over 15 years, whilst other sources were frustrated with 
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the slow nature of judicial reform in Colombia. Either way, assessing the performance and 
strategies of Colombia’s national police will not be straightforward.  
 
Another key point to consider is that the police are operating within a country that is still at 
civil war and therefore, have a role along with Colombian military to provide state security.  
‘It’s going to require an extraordinary change of character to move from policing areas in a 
time of war to policing areas in a time of peace’ (Protected Source Four). The outcome of 
different policing policies is that although multiple types of policing have been researched 
and implemented, they lack long term funding and prioritisation. There has been a focus on 
training in different techniques, but which appear to become more disparate during 
implementation. Of the policing models examined by this author, intelligence-based policing 
is cited as the most successfully deployed according to protected sources, whereas 
community-based policing have suffered the most setbacks. Ruiz-Vásquez (2012, p.46), 
when discussing community level policing, states that it ’went directly against the Colombian 
Police Force profile, which was highly hierarchical and compartmentalised with enormous 
differences between the officials and the other ranks of subordinate officials, administrators 
and officers’.  
 
In relation to the concepts previously discussed by Kenney that put forward on the cartels 
evolving into terrorist cell structures, Protected Source One believes that the police are 
changing their tactics to follow suit: ‘The other change over time is that the Colombians are 
now more interested in networks and taking down networks as opposed to just chopping the 
heads off the networks, they still do an element of that for iconic reasons and sometimes, 
getting back to the career making final blow…’. Therefore while there does appear to be a 
constant narrative in how the police investigate, this only appears to pertain to high-value 
targets, which could be considerably problematic considering the fractured nature of modern 
micro trafficking cartels:  
 
In terms of the practicalities of the war on drugs what seems interesting is that there’s 
been a sea change from big cartels headed up by prominent capos to more granular 
and low scale flexible I suppose drug trafficking networks. Which seems to have 
created difficulties for criminal justice agencies simply because you don’t get the 
same visibility as they would have done 20-30 years ago. (Protected Source Four) 
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Therefore, although multiple policing concepts have been introduced by foreign influence 
and training, they need to be adapted to focus at every tier of policing, from cartel and 
insurgent heads, to street level crime. However, on the other hand, the structure of the 
national police is as previously stated, still results-driven which will affect what is targeted, 
and the duration as long-term investigation could be cut short to arrest a figurehead, rather 
than long-term policing strategies being deployed in partnership with communities. The 
problem with utilising short-term operations against high value targets is highlighted by 
Kenny (2003, p. 187): ‘Yet despite impressive short-term results, the head hunting approach 
had little sustained impact on the Colombian drug trade’. So the national police and other 
policing agencies in Colombia need to apply a wider range of policing concepts across the 
entire criminal spectrum, rather than focusing solely in one arena. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Finally there is the dual question of how the war on drugs has affected Colombia and how 
Colombia has affected the war on drugs. ‘Some Colombians say that the United States saved 
the country’ (Marcella, 2009, p. 27) whilst others comment that the overall drug war has 
caused a considerable amount of suffering for the Colombian people: ‘The price that 
Colombia has paid for its role in the “war on drugs” has been high in both blood and treasure’ 
(Bagley 2013, p. 13). This was reinforced by a number of this author’s sources:  
 
What I think the war on drugs has also done is probably take Colombia’s attention 
away from its own domestic issues: social and economic, growth issues, inequality, 
poverty and a lot of the resentment that is felt by different parts of society towards the 
elite in Colombia. (Protected Source Eighteen) 
 
It’s prevented Colombia’s development, both on an economic front, because of the 
amount of money that has to be invested in law enforcement to combat drugs is 
disproportionate. Also it has affected Colombia economically in the rural areas where 
the drug traffickers have taken control and therefore prevented development of rural 
areas. (Protected Source Twenty-Four) 
 
The drug war is a needed battle, I have seen what drugs do to an inner city, the 
economy, housing market and business community. It has been a battle that politicians 
easily lose interest in, until there is a void of other newsworthy items or they receive 
pressure to take action. (Protected Source Twenty-Eight) 
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One of the most important wars we fight. The drugs trade underpins economies, 
national and international trade and serious and organised crime. (Protected Source 
Thirty-One) 
 
The war on drugs has had a toxic impact on Colombia, from homicide rates, general 
criminality, social destabilisation and significant economic effects. However, the common 
narrative from this author’s academic research, the majority who have been interviewed and 
those that this author has worked with, is that it’s a fight that is necessary as there are 
currently no realistic alternatives. The result is a nearly unanimous perspective that the war 
on drugs has had a toxic effect on multiple aspects of Colombian society and has put a heavy 
burden on the GDP in terms of policing and military costs. 
 
In regards to how Colombia has affected the international war on drugs, the answer is more 
nebulous. Colombia has shown significant results in the war against drugs; her partnership 
with the United States has strengthened year after year, the guerrilla groups are weakening 
and more cartels are being dismantled, but what result has this had on the production of 
illegal drugs in Colombia? ‘While individual enterprises may transact less frequently and in 
smaller quantities than before, on the whole the Colombian drug trade produces more cocaine 
and heroine today that it did during the boom years of the 1980’s and early 1990’s’ (Kenney, 
2003, p. 194). This is also echoed by the UNODC report of October 2008: ‘In 2007, the coca 
cultivation area in all three producer countries increased, though production remains largely 
stable.’ Despite those reports, in 2012, Colombia was the second largest cocaine producer 
after Peru, although currently figures from the UN and the US appear to show different 
conclusions (WOLA 2012). Considering the historical issue outlined by McClintock that the 
drugs trade is an international business, and the heads of those business interests may not 
reside in the country with a drugs production problem, could the Colombian organised crime 
groups be controlling Peruvian drug production, ergo the problem of illegal drugs still 
remains with Colombia? This author would argue that this is potentially the case, with most 
sources discussing overlap between cartels in different countries, although there isn’t enough 
hard evidence to prove it as a certainty. Regardless, by 2014 and into 2015 Colombia was 
once again the leading cocaine producer in the world: ‘Regarding the potential cocaine 
production for 2015, the estimate was of 646 metric tons, an increase of 46 per cent 
compared to 2014.’ (UNODC 2016) again this was echoed by Protected Source Twenty-Two: 
‘Certainly internationally from what I know, I know that Colombia is back as number one 
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source of cocaine, obviously with Colombia bordering Ecuador and Peru, I think it’s always 
going to be a bit of a gamble who is number one, as things shift between exit routes out of 
countries or exit out of the continent’. How has this been possible? One issue underlined by 
most sources is that the illegal drug production and trafficking industry has changed 
considerably since the time of Pablo Escobar and therefore is far harder to fight.  
 
When the war on drugs started it was clearly defined, narcotrafficking groups versus 
law enforcement groups, but now because of the 90s when the major trafficking 
groups/cartels were destroyed, the war on drugs has diversified the drug traffickers 
have diversified into separate gangs. So you have the criminal gangs, the BACRIMs, 
small cartels, transport cartels. It’s not like one big cartel you can just go and attack 
anymore you have to attack them on different fronts. Also as well as that, more recently 
it’s been driven underground, so it’s more underground now than it was in the days of 
Pablo Escobar where it was in everyone’s face. (Protected Source Twenty-Four) 
 
These underground groups are a sizeable problem. Previously Escobar and those like him 
flaunted their wealth and therefore were an easier target for law enforcement, but now with 
narcotraffickers operating more akin to terrorist cells as highlighted by Kenney (2003), 
identifying and locating them is increasingly problematic:  
 
They use a lot of different methods to launder money and move drugs, for example, six 
months ago the police captured a significant narcotrafficker and it was reported that this 
guy had more money than Pablo Escobar, but he wasn’t known. There are a lot of 
narcotraffickers now, but they are not as well known, the police don’t know or the 
intelligence agencies. (Protected Source Six) 
 
This fits in with the previously discussed model of traditional family run cartels being 
replaced by smaller cell organisations, replacing known groups with multiple unknown cells. 
The impact of dismantling these smaller cells is minimal in terms of overall cocaine 
production in comparison with previous efforts against the cartel families with their 
centralised command structure. 
 
The war on drugs has significantly challenged Colombian policing. The classic cartels’ 
evolution into micro traffickers means that no longer are these groups an easily quantifiable 
threat to the Colombian state that can be targeted by Colombia’s traditional policing 
methodologies such as targeting the heads of organisations. Currently cocaine production 
figures are showing substantially increased output (as previously quoted from Protected 
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Source Twenty-Six). Whether Colombian policing can adapt to tackle this new threat will be 
for future academics and policy makers to assess. Protected sources stated that corruption 
becoming less identifiable is also cause for concern, even if the perception of the problem has 
reduced. One positive outcome that should be noted is that the Protected Sources and Ruiz-
Vásquez believe that the public image of the Colombian police has markedly improved. 
 
The image of the Colombian police has significantly improved since the 1990s. 
Surprisingly although the corruption of the Colombian police is presumably high, the 
police is still one of the most appreciated institutions among Colombians. (Ruiz-
Vásquez 2015, p.04) 
 59 
Chapter 2 - The History of the AUC & BACRIM and the Impact on 
Policing   
 
In 1997, the regional paramilitary groups had formed a coalition called the United 
Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) and 
three years later its leader, Carlos Castaño, publicly acknowledged that 70 per cent 
of the AUC’s funding came from drug revenues. (Leech 2011, p. 80) 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the largest paramilitary group that Colombia has 
had: the AUCC/AUC. It will further examine the issue of state collaboration, the AUC peace 
process, and the group’s evolution into the largest organised crime group in Colombia along 
with the policing challenges and outcomes associated with them. 
 
History of the AUCC/AUC 
 
Colombia is considered by most academics and this author’s sources as being a stable 
democracy Ruiz-Vásquez (2015), something that is arguably relatively unique in the Latin 
American region. An exception occurred between 1953 and 1958, where a non-violent 
military coup lead to General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla taking the position of President without 
an election. The reason this was successful, however, lies with a problem that Colombia has 
faced in contemporary times: violence. One of the most significant periods of violence, and 
one which has shaped many of the aspects within this thesis is La Violencia, an event so 
significant that of the time Bailey commented that  
 
…[I]t has defied not only the contemporary jargon of sociologists and political 
scientists but even the time-honoured terminology of insurrection, rebellion, riot and 
revolution. Perhaps because the only element of this phenomenon that all observers 
can agree upon is, the fact that it is and has been eminently violent, it has come to be 
called simply ‘la violencia,’ or ‘The Violence’. (Bailey, 1967, p. 561)  
 
There are academic debates on the start and end of La Violencia - for the sake of argument 
this author will use the dates put forward by Bailey, where La Violencia started in 1946 and 
affected over 20 percent of Colombian citizens until 1966. This extended level of violence 
had two significant outcomes; first was the build-up of private defence groups by rich land 
owners to protect their property, and the second was the formation of several working class 
 60 
guerrilla groups to fight the oligarchy and those that supported them, the AUC (Auto 
Defensas) was borne out of the people’s attempt to combat the FARC and other insurgent 
groups, according to Arnson. C et al, (2005), ‘particularly in areas where there was no state 
presence, where there was no police force, so they set up this kind of armed militia groups to 
combat the FARC, who stole their land, stole their crops…’ (Protected Source One).  
 
In this chapter the author will examine the buildup of private defence groups, while the 
formation of guerrilla groups will be the focus of the next chapter. It should be noted that, to 
provide a more cohesive narrative, when discussing paramilitary/private defence groups this 
author will mostly refer to the AUC and its precursor group the AUCC Autodefensas 
Campesinas de Córdoba y Urabá (Peasant Self-Defenders of Córdoba and Urabá), as they 
were the most prominent paramilitary groups within Colombia over the last forty years. The 
AUCC in its initial formation was centred mostly in Northern Colombia (Códoba and Urabá 
regions as the name suggests) as a means to fight the FARC. The AUC was formed from the 
AUCC after its founder Fidel Castaño disappeared. His brother Carlos Castaño Gil took over 
the leadership of the group and rebranded the AUCC to the AUC. In parallel to this the group 
Los PEPES (Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar—People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar) was 
founded (Torre.L, 2008, p. 50) of which Fidel Castaño was also a founder. Los PEPES were a 
vigilante group which targeted Escobar and his cartel. Later after Escobar's death this group 
would be incorporated into the AUCC and help push its propaganda as a force for good in 
Colombia.  As referenced previously, during the time of Escobar, Colombian legislation 
enabled the use of private defence groups to protect landowners’ assets. However this was 
exploited by the classical cartels to build small paramilitary groups with sophisticated 
equipment, for example communications equipment and military grade weapon systems: 
‘Yes, the AUCC made a deal with Pablo Escobar and Carlos Castaño, but with other Cartels 
as well, however, Pablo Escobar created a big empire working with the AUCC’ (Protected 
Source Six). According to Dudley, ‘By 1988, the paramilitaries had evolved into a 
sophisticated national network.’ (2004, p. 121). Throughout the research of this thesis, this 
author found that most sources either suggested or stated outright as an absolute that the 
paramilitaries were in collusion/joint working with the legitimate Colombian state. Most 
academia suggests the paramilitaries in general had similar objectives to the government and 
therefore collaborated operationally:  
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While General Lemus denied any links between his troops and paramilitaries, 
Amnesty International claimed to have ‘received information indicating strong 
collusion between units of the 18th Brigade of the Colombian army and paramilitaries, 
including reports of joint military-paramilitary operations or army units wearing 
paramilitary armbands and identifying themselves a paramilitaries. (Leech, 2011, p. 
97) 
 
Nearly all of this author’s sources asserted an absolute collusion between the two actors. For 
example, when Protected Source Sixteen was asked about this issue, the source replied 
‘Rumour no. It is a fact!’ Protected Source Six was just as insistent, stating that the previous 
Colombian President Álvaro Uribe Vélez was directly involved: ‘What happened with the 
Army and AUC, the AUC was created [by] the rich people (cattle ranchers) in Colombia to 
protect their farms and lands, they and the government paid the AUC for protection, the 
originator of this was Uribe’. From another more unorthodox perspective the collusion 
between paramilitary forces and legitimate state actors could be argued as a logical pairing. 
As an example, during the time of Escobar, the families of Castaño and Escobar held a 
delicate truce, however, their ideologies were not aligned as Castaño apparently did not 
approve of financing through drug trafficking at the time. In 1991 the truce between the two 
groups ended when Pablo Escobar dispatched sicarios to kill Castaño. It was at this point 
according to that Castaño and his brother Fidel had helped to found Los Pepes and 
supposedly fought against Escobar's cartel alongside the Colombian state (Dudley 2004). 
 
This could be considered a pivotal moment for two reasons. Firstly, the legitimate state 
seemingly could not provide safety and security to its citizens for a multitude of reasons, 
including geographical policing issues and accepted collaboration between state and non-
state actors. The AUCC accepted the opportunity of state collaboration, and began to 
transform from a paramilitary force into a militia by co-operating and working operationally 
with official state actors. 
 
State Collaboration  
 
After the death of Escobar and the Colombian state’s war with classical cartels, the traditional 
paramilitary/militia groups began to merge, until in April 1997 when Carlos Castaño Gil 
found the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia - AUC (United Self-Defence Forces of 
Colombia in English). Again, there is a certain logic as to why state actors would have 
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accepted this independent section of civilian society taking on state actor roles; and that was 
to provide a pseudo policing force where the Colombian state had no or limited presence. It 
was also the paramilitary war with the FARC that helped the AUC justify their existence: 
 
In the initial part of the AUC there were certainly was some compliance from the 
military and from the police, because they basically lost control of the rural areas and 
they didn’t have the strength or equipment to take the fight into these rural areas, so 
with the formation of the AUC, that gave them a way to combat the FARC in those 
rural areas. (Protected Source Twenty-Four) 
 
However, the exception can become the political rule, a pattern that was present in most of 
this author’s interviews, especially when discussing the AUC engaging the FARC militarily:  
 
From there the AUC started to work with the army against the guerrillas, they would 
move in ahead of the army and engage the guerrillas or they would move in a pincer 
movement in co-operation with the army to surround guerrilla forces, this happened 
at the beginning. However, later the army has to fight the FARC, the AUC and EPL. 
(Protected Source Six) 
 
Some sources were uncertain about the degree of collaboration, with one source who fought 
on behalf of the government stating that paramilitaries did not receive government resources, 
but didn’t know if there had been collusion: ‘No, I don’t know for sure. I can say that the 
government has not provided any resources to the paramilitary’ (Protected Source Fourteen). 
There is also the question of legality, as these were not legitimate arms of the state, their 
actions including the government’s collaboration with them would have been illegal under 
Colombian legislation of that time, which one source stated was the case: ‘You had the same 
accusations here and there, there was no doubt that significant interaction between the organs 
of the state and the AUC in some areas as well they were clearly collaborating and that was 
illegal’ (Protected Source One). This was the genesis of the AUCC and then the AUC - 
similar to the FARC, they were formed by the civilian population in order to protect a certain 
class of society where the legitimate actors of the state could not. However, in contrast, the 
working class formed the FARC, while the AUC was formed by the upper middle or upper 
classes with the wealth to fund and expand their organisation quickly to more than 30,000 
soldiers (InSight Crime 2015).  
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The difficulty is that once such a force is created, regardless of the initial intentions or 
collaboration with the legitimate state, there are no guarantees that such a group would solely 
work according to legal objectives. With most non-state actors taking on security or policing 
roles, there is a great chance and opportunity of expanding on their societal deviance into 
areas/other areas of criminality. 
 
Yes it was the people themselves that formed the AUC, but it’s one of those things 
where although the government should have been very strict about the formation of 
essentially armed groups within the civilian population because the objectives of these 
armed groups fitted in quite nicely with the objects of the government, they turned a 
blind eye. (Protected Source One) 
 
Whilst this author recognises that in the 1990s and early 2000s Colombia was in an 
unenviable situation - its limited policing and military resources were not able to protect its 
citizens from cartels, and the Colombian state was in a civil war with multiple insurgent 
groups - this was still a pairing of legitimate state actors with deviant civilian actors without 
official oversight or control. From one perspective it could be argued that the legitimate 
government required support due to its lack of resources, which therefore potentially justifies 
such co-operation under these extreme circumstances. Whilst this author is not trying to 
justify the actions of this time, it is worth considering the defensibility of collaboration with 
such a non-state actor versus one’s own country potentially becoming a failed state. Also it is 
worth noting that this partnership was not unique to the Colombian state, many private sector 
actors were also collaborating with the paramilitaries and funding them: ‘In 2007, the 
relationship between multinational and the death squads was made evident when Cincinnati-
based Chiquita pleaded guilty in US federal court to funding AUC paramilitaries to protect 
the company’s business interests in the banana-growing region in northern Colombia from 
guerrilla attacks’ (Leech, 2011, p. 142). So the AUC were operating as a militia for the 
government and as private security for corporations operating in Colombia.  
 
Despite the precarious position the Colombian government was in at this time, this author 
would also argue that there was always considerable risk in this decision of collaboration 
with these rogue civilian groups, especially one with considerable resources. Academic 
sources highlight the AUC’s resources: ‘…the AUC has become one of the best-equipped 
armed groups in the world during its rise between the late 1990s and the early 2000s’ 
(Nussio, 2011, p. 88). The next pertinent issue is what happens when deviant actors with 
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considerable military-esque resources take actions that are not favoured by the legitimate 
state. Many examples of this can be seen since the AUCC and AUC’s inception. Even when 
collaborating with the Colombian state, there were many reports of violence by the AUC 
against opposing groups, be they political, social or geographical:, ‘According to the 
Colombian government’s Ombudsman’s Office, the paramilitaries were responsible for more 
than double the number of massacres attitude to both the FARC and the ELN’ (Leech, 2011 
p.06). Amongst almost all of the Colombian sources this author interviewed, there seemed to 
be conflicting attitudes towards the AUC, ranging from a mild form of reverence, to pity and 
even to contempt. This author believes that the reason there was a lack of strong denunciation 
of these forces, was and is still due to the lack of state resources across considerable parts of 
the country. In the absence of a strong government presence and protection in certain 
territories, the right to defend ‘what’s yours’ would be considered appropriate, even if this 
meant forming protection groups, which became paramilitaries and then evolved into militias. 
In contemporary Colombia AUC actions were initially justified to some degree by many of 
this author’s protected sources, which one could theorise was due to government 
collaboration at the time. Whilst those might have been the initial thoughts of this author’s 
protected sources, they quickly changed as the timeline of the AUC advanced:  
 
…I have read many testimonies from victims of the massacres that they did, not even 
the Nazis were as cruel as the paramilitaries.  I have heard this also from the 
Prosecutor of the Supreme Court that many people were tortured.  Some of the things 
they did were:  they inserted wire into a man’s penis, they played football with human 
heads, they would cover a person in sugar and then tie that person to a tree and that 
person would be eaten by ants within five or six days. One of the worst things I heard 
was from a woman they were torturing, they placed her son in front of her and were 
removing his skin until the woman passed out with shock.  In the hills outside the city 
the government wants the families to know the truth of what happened, as some 
families are still looking for members of their family from the 1990s. In the 
mountains the government and the prosecutors are having huge bulldozers digging as 
there may be more than 120 or 150 corpses buried all in one place, they have been 
digging and digging, but they still have not found the bodies. (Protected Source 
Fourteen) 
 
Such accounts of violence were corroborated by academia: ‘Meanwhile, Human Rights 
Watch, utilising statistics compiled by the Bogotá-based Colombian Commission of Jurists 
(CCK), attributed 78 percent of the human rights abuses and violations of international law in 
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1999 to the paramilitary, with the guerrillas responsible for the 20 percent and state security 
forces for the remaining 2 percent’ (Leech, 2011, p.06).  
 
Dudley (2004, p. 105-107) details an account of the paramilitary attack on the town of 
Segovia, during which approximately 43 people were killed and over 50 injured. The attack 
lasted just over one hour, despite local police and military presence, the streets were empty of 
state presence until after the attack had taken place. Dudley implies that such atrocities by the 
AUC didn’t just take place where there was no state presence, but such incidences were 
arguably allowed to take place (2004, p.163). However, this tolerance by the Colombian state 
and collaboration with policing actors would not go on forever; quickly the AUC were 
evolving more into a trafficking group and the collaboration with the state began to abate: ‘… 
three years later its leader, Carlos Castaño, publicly acknowledged that 70 percent of the 
AUC’s funding came from drug revenues’ (Leech, 2011, p. 79); ‘The Government had 
stopped talking about deals for paramilitaries; it was talking about jail’ (Dudley, 2004, p. 
197-198). A pertinent question at this stage is what had allowed the AUC such freedom to 
commit these atrocities and for so long? Before and even during the government opposition 
to the AUC, the historical close working relationship of the legitimate state with rogue actors 
had another effect, the corruption of state by the AUC. The AUC had considerable interest in 
politics in order to further solidify their position in Colombian society, they manipulated their 
police and military connections to extend their reach to Mayors. Protected Source One 
highlighted a little-known fact, that regional Mayors have a lot of power and resources at 
their disposal, something that the AUC wished to exploit. (Dudley 2004, p. 121) also notes 
that ‘Like the UP, the paramilitaries sought to use the new laws concerning direct elections of 
mayors and more control over municipal budgets to their advantage’. This issue was 
discussed further by Protected Source Three who stated ‘That’s why so many of these people 
are in jail, ex congressmen due to paramilitary associations because I would say half of the 
political class in the country have paramilitary associations at one time, either they knew 
about these operations or they gave them some support, encouragement, may have even have 
funded them’. This highlights a considerable problem; a rogue actor working in tandem with 
legitimate state actors also having profound political support in the political class, which 
explains why the AUC could be allowed such lenience with human rights abuses as its 
political ideals were shared by the oligarchy. Another pertinent issue is the AUC turning to 
drug trafficking. As previously mentioned, a considerable problem with uniting a civilian 
group without oversight or control by a legitimate state actor is that said group won’t 
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necessarily follow official state policy, instead they will be relatively free to follow their own 
agendas: ‘In 1997 most of those cells joined together into the so-called United Self-Defence 
Groups of Colombia AUC and same as FARC they became a powerful organization once 
they joined the lucrative illegal drug trade’ (Castillo, 2009, p. 25). Also, this author’s sources 
described at length that the AUC evolved into a trafficking and terrorist organisation: 
 
Then of course it morphed into its own terrorist organisation in its own right, it is 
recognised as a terrorist organisation by the United States. Then as it turned into a 
criminal organisation which has funded itself through drug trafficking, so in the late 
90s and early 2000s much of the work we did on the north coast which was with the 
Navy, the people we were working mostly against were the AUC as they are a 
trafficking organisation, which caused us yet another, different distinct security issue. 
(Protected Source One) 
 
They supported and became traffickers, originally the idea was protect the cattle 
ranchers, but then they changed their minds because it was a lot more lucrative for 
them, the rich people did not pay a lot to the AUC, so for that reason they preferred to 
work with the cartels. (Protected Source Six) 
 
They have a trusted network at the top, but it is probably one of the last nationally 
structured drug trafficking organisations that is left in the country, after the Cali cartel 
etc., all went away, we started getting a lot of smaller ones, but this is the one that sort 
of banded together and became pretty enormous and has a national influence. 
(Protected Source Nine) 
 
AUC as an Organised Crime Group 
 
It was at this point the AUC had changed from collaborating with the state to opposing it, and 
in September 2001 the AUC was reclassified by the US State department as a terrorist 
organisation alongside the FARC (Dudley 2004, p. 174), ironically their natural enemies. 
Therefore, September 2001 is a key date in the AUC’s evolution from state collaborator to 
the opposition of the official state. Whereas previously the legality of the AUC was a 
nebulous concept, now the reclassification by the United States meant that Colombia also had 
to focus on the AUC as legitimate threat to state security, and therefore the police and 
military started to shift their objectives in relation to the group. However, in the early 2000s 
whereas the police were now fighting smaller cartels with extra funding from the US’s Plan 
Colombia, the military also benefited from the extra resourcing from Plan Colombia, in order 
to fight the FARC, but also to police remote areas. This meant that AUC collusion with the 
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military continued for longer than it had with the police, which in turn meant further human 
rights abuses as highlighted by Protected Source Three: ‘The army has become much more 
efficient since the Americans set up Plan Colombia, it’s made a huge difference to them, but 
things still happen, which show that the army is not immune from corruption and human 
rights abuses’.  
 
Those who don’t disarm, will create other groups, which is the same thing that 
happened with the AUC, half of the AUC remained with their weapons, working as or 
with criminals. BACRIMs came from the AUC groups after they demobilised, then 
there were many BACRIM groups spread everywhere. (Protected Source Six) 
 
AUC Peace Process 
 
Between 2002 and 2006 the Colombian state negotiated a peace process with the AUC and its 
30,000 soldiers, and to date this has been the largest peace process in Colombia (Thorsell, 
2012), and arguably the most successful. Within four years the Colombian state had 
successfully carried out peace negotiations, and also brought about considerable changes in 
Colombian legislation. However a possible negative repercussion of any peace process is 
what happens to those who do not demobilise: ‘Throughout 2006, persistent doubts were 
raised about the re-armament of demobilised paramilitaries, their involvement in organised 
crime, and the penetration by paramilitary groups of government institutions and the legal 
economy’ (Arnson et al, 2006, p.2). With any peace process there is a margin of compromise 
and due to the numerous causal factors for the beginning of conflict, it is highly unlikely that 
any peace process would be able to adequately offer all parties involved a completely 
satisfactory conclusion. With this in mind, this author argues that a peace process should not 
be judged by whether it has demobilised an entire rogue group, but comparatively how many 
demobilised and what happened to those who didn’t. For example if 60 per cent of an armed 
group demobilised, and those who didn’t reduced their criminality, then arguably the peace 
process would have been successful. With regards to the AUC peace process, however, this 
author would argue that it was both a success with some long-term problems relating to the 
methodology utilised for demobilisation, and that this long-term problem has culminated into 
a considerable policing problem inside Colombia. Firstly, as previously mentioned the 
collusion of state actors with non-state actors had appreciable problems when it came to 
policing:  
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These disclosures were preceded by equally damning accusations that members of 
Colombia’s domestic intelligence service known as the Department of Administrative 
Security (DAS) had collaborated with paramilitary and organized crime groups, 
tipping them off about ongoing police or military investigations, providing them with 
information about targets for intimidation or assassination, and interfering in 
congressional and presidential elections. (Arnson et al 2006, p.3) 
 
 With that in mind, could official state actors be trusted to now reverse this partnership and 
provide the right to fair and reasonable justice to its citizens? These themes are constantly 
highlighted by academic sources as problematic areas of the AUC peace process:  
 
The Colombian government cannot afford to commit the same errors again, errors 
such as: engaging in a fragmented peace process with highly illegitimate negotiations; 
establishing selection criteria that are too lax; providing communication that 
generates confusion among both demobilised people and civil society; improvising 
DDR planning in spite of valuable earlier experiences; and not preparing the security 
forces sufficiently for the aftermath of demobilization. (Nussio, 2011, p. 91) 
 
This criticism wasn’t just aimed at the policing actors, but the criminal justice system as a 
whole, with Felipe Gomez Isa (2008, p.1) labelling the possibility of the right to justice as 
‘precarious’ in the time not long after the AUC peace process had been signed. This was 
despite Law 827 (later evolved to Decree 128 and the Justice and Peace Law of 2005) being 
drafted and utilised specifically for this peace process. To outline these legal frameworks, 
Law 827 was created first in 2002 which then evolved into Decree 128 in January 2003. This 
legal framework according to Isa was ‘Only establishes an administrative verification 
procedure of the demobilised paramilitaries judicial situation’ (Isa, 2008, p3), rather than 
offering the right to justice for the victims of the ex-paramilitaries actions. This Law and the 
subsequent Decree were ineffective to the degree that for over 20,000 ex-paramiltiaties, less 
than 50 prosecution cases were created, which it could be argued effectively served as a state 
pardon of the paramilitaries’ actions. Indeed it would fall into the paramilitaries’ constant 
narrative that they were performing a required service to the country, fighting guerrilla 
groups and providing policing and other state services where the state wasn’t present, 
however, the unintended consequence was to pardon other criminality where it could be 
stated there was little or no state benefit such as narcotrafficking. Isa also notes that it has 
been described as the ‘impunity by decree’ (Isa, 2008, p. 03). The challenge of the Justice 
and Peace Law of 2005 was to find an equilibrium between ‘peace and justice’, whereby the 
 69 
consequences of the previous actions by the AUC were not so severe as to prevent the 
paramilitary group to demobilise, but not too lenient as to prevent the right to justice to their 
victims, however the balance has seemingly not been struck. Isa (2008) concluded that most 
of the sentencing has been viewed as excessively moderate to the point of appeasement. 
However, he does point out that the victims were being provided more resources than 
previously and also highlighted the media as a contributor to assisting in the victims right to 
justice: ‘In the case of Colombia, we are dealing with chronic impunity with regard to crimes 
committed in the context of the military conflict, a burden which is not going to be easy to 
offload’ (Isa, 2008, p. 03). The inability of the Colombian criminal justice system to reduce 
impunity rates, provide fair and reasonable sentences to ex-AUC members, and have a 
comprehensive plan to re-integrate these individuals back into Colombian society left a 
considerable problem. This weakness in the CJS lead to a highly problematic long-term 
policing issue in Colombia in the formation of the BACRIM (Bandas Criminales) groups, 
around the time of the AUC peace process in 2002-2006 (Arnson et al 2006, p01).  
 
…[T]he BACRIM’s evolved around the demobilisation of the AUC … they are akin 
to the true mafia… (Protected Source Five) 
 
AUC’s Evolution to BACRIM 
 
The BACRIM groups were formed by those who ‘fell between the cracks’ in the post AUC 
peace process environment. Those who had not fully demobilised, or had not been effectively 
rehabilitated by the state but had considerable military and tactical training, turned to 
criminality without the AUC’s previous modus operandi and focus on fighting the insurgent 
groups and Communism. BACRIM itself is a title for large criminal groups that are not 
necessarily connected themselves, but are instead associated by the Colombian governments 
shared classification. The rise of these groups became seen as a problem during the later 
stages of the AUC peace talks: ‘Throughout 2006, persistent doubts were raised about the re-
armament of demobilized paramilitaries, their involvement in organized crime, and the 
penetration by paramilitary groups of government institutions and the legal economy’ 
(Arnson, 2006, p. 02). One of this author’s sources considered the rise of the BACRIM as a 
key failure of the AUC peace process:  
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That’s why the demobilisation of the AUC has essentially turned into various 
different criminal organisations and it’s now morphing back into the Rastrojos and 
Urabeños the larger organised crime groups. What they have managed to do is to use 
their ex-terrorist credentials as a way of recruiting and as a way of legitimising some 
of the things they do, in reality they are what it says on the tin, they are BACRIM and 
therefore a criminal organisation. (Protected Source One) 
 
As a result of the more hardened criminal aspects of the AUC evolution into BACRIM, they 
have also shed their previous political positions. These groups are now not so opposed to 
working with insurgent groups, as the main driving force behind their actions is financial 
rather than policy motivated as underlined by a number of sources this author interviewed.  
 
BACRIM has an economic interest, yes, and they are criminals, yes, but they are not 
as organised and they are not against everyone who look like guerrillas. They kill 
people for business reasons and not because they don’t like guerrillas. (Protected 
Source Sixteen) 
 
The BACRIMs, well that is a symbiotic relationship, the BACRIMS provide money 
to the FARC, FARC provide the logistics around, well you have to pay them, you 
have no choice, it’s not like there’s a casual relationship, if you’re going to grow or 
produce cocaine in this area, you will pay X amount per kilogram you’re producing. 
So therefore, there is an active relationship that they are not going to rock the boat 
over that because it’s not worth their while. (Protected Source Five)  
 
Therefore the BACRIM are far more similar to classical cartels, there is little to no political 
affiliation unless referring to their previous terrorist labelling to ensure greater credibility to 
their employers or to induce fear in their opposition, with their fundamental objective being 
financially based. One key lesson learned from the BACRIM in comparison to the classic 
cartels is that their criminality is considerably less visible in society, but without being as 
fractured as the micro traffickers’ terrorist cell-like structure.  
 
They [BACRIM] have a trusted network at the top, but it is probably one of the last 
nationally structured drug trafficking organisations that is left in the country, after the 
Cali cartel etc., all went away, we started getting a lot of smaller ones, but this is the 
one that sort of banded together and became pretty enormous and has a national 
influence. They have access all over the country to whatever they need and again they 
have some very good corrupt sources within the judicial system and some of these 
small departments, so they don’t have to worry about going to jail. (Protected Source 
Nine) 
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 This low visibility has allowed the BACRIM groups to expand considerably in terms of their 
members and their corruptive influence. They are also able to operate in urban environments, 
but share insurgent groups’ rural leadership structure. While this might make it appear easier 
for the policing agencies to target day to day operations of the BACRIM, their more fractured 
structure makes it harder to completely dismantle the groups:  
 
…for example in Boyaca, most of the BACRIM are run out of Tunja, which is the 
capital of Boyaca, so they are not run from sparsely populated areas, they are run 
from the cities. That’s not to say the leaders aren’t hiding out in the rural areas, 
because that’s probably where they are, but like most enterprises, you need to have a 
central location to run your business and on the scale of their business are being run. 
(Protected Source Twenty-Four)  
 
Also their fractured structure and low visibility makes it far easier for BACRIM to operate 
covertly across Colombia in major cities, including the nation’s capital, to the point where 
until June 2016 a considerable BACRIM operation was located in central Bogota three blocks 
away from the Presidential Palace:  
 
An example of that is where the police just taken back the Bronx, there they 
discovered the full depth of criminality that was going on from human trafficking, 
prostitution, drug running, everything, all being centred in the Bronx. The Bronx is in 
Bogota, about three blocks behind the presidential palace! It’s only now that they are 
understanding the scale of it! (Protected Source Twenty-Four)  
 
This evolution from AUC to BACRIM is arguably a key issue with the AUC peace process; 
there are reports of arms not being handed in, caches of weapons left by the AUC after the 
peace process or some members not demobilising at all: ‘A former member of the Bloque 
Córdoba, who demobilised in 2005, claimed in an interview that 45 of his companions 
“remained” in the group’ (Nussio, 2011, p. 89). Also there was a considerable problem in 
policing the demobilisation of the AUC despite NGO and other international support to the 
Colombian state. The incompleteness of that peace process without a comprehensive, post-
peace environment policing strategy, and the lack of providing a more visible state presence 
across all of Colombia - especially when according to Arnson (2006) there were considerable 
warning signs of fresh criminal groups originating from the AUC and the problems with the 
peace process - has enabled, to a point, the evolution of AUC to BACRIM, creating a purely 
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criminal entity from a once quasi-militia.  As of now, the BACRIM are a considerable 
criminal influence on Colombian society across their different organised crime groups. As 
one protected source noted:  
 
BACRIMs are probably operating on the scale of the large Russian mafia and their 
involvement extends beyond drugs trafficking, into human trafficking, into the sale of 
weapons, into prostitution, across the whole spectrum, illegal mining is one big area, 
extortion, they are probably on the scale of European mafias. (Protected Source Twenty-
Four). Whereas the FARC are heading to what could potentially be a successful peace 
process, with their criminality slowly reducing, most sources agreed that BARCIM 
criminality is rising: ‘With the FARC the crime has decreased, but with BACRIM (and we 
need to know that is more associated with drug dealing) has been steady’ (Protected Source 
Eight). All sources agreed that this situation is far from ending, and although most sources 
differed in their view on whether the war of drugs is winnable, a common thread was that in 
the current climate there is too much financial incentive for it to not inspire criminality: ‘It’s 
a no-win situation, my take on it is that it’s their main product here for the locals, for the 
FARC, for the BACRIM, for the criminal underworld, it’s a good source of income and no 
matter how many leaders you take away, another one steps in and takes up the mantle’ 
(Protected Source Seven). This isn’t necessarily a case of these groups fighting the state as in 
Pablo’s time, rather the contemporary issue is these quasi paramilitary groups with 
considerable resources fighting each other for dominance not only in narcotrafficking, but in 
order to secure large parts of Colombian geography: 
 
From these groups it is definitely a growing problem, there is an expansion of crime. 
They are fighting each other for control over certain important areas (important routes 
where weapons come in and out) so that they can get the drugs straight into Panama. 
They have been growing due to the amount of money they make, they have great 
information (corruption) coming out of Bogota, so they know where not to go and 
where to hide out, the groups are growing in power due to growing in numbers, they 
have expanded up in the North Coast in Colombia specifically in that area. In some of 
these very poor areas they can get people to do things for them for very small 
amounts of money, due to the poverty, but they also use violence and intimidation in 
towns to make people cooperate. (Protected Source Nine) 
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Policing Challenges & Outcomes 
 
BACRIM groups operate mainly in rural areas, but usually have a moderate urban presence 
as well, which poses a considerable geographical policing challenge to law enforcement 
agencies. However, of late 2015 BACRIM have been re-classified to GAOs (Grupos 
Armados Organizados), and as of November 2015 the military began targeting these groups 
operationally as though they were an insurgency by using airstrikes (InSight Crime 2016b). 
The argument in support of this goes, that these quasi-paramilitary criminal groups are armed 
with military grade weaponry and equipment, operate in both urban and rural Colombia, with 
a robust and experienced command structure, therefore there is a logic to considering them as 
military targets instead of a policing objective. However, whilst this reclassification could be 
defended as a necessity, it does highlight two key issues; one, a reluctance for the Colombian 
state to solely trust its policing agencies to tackle criminality, and two, weakness in 
Colombia’s traditional policing agencies to not be able to adequately police the problem, 
leading it to evolve into a military objective. Those issues are intrinsically linked. With the 
perceived problems of policing the GAOs, the Colombian state will favour a military option, 
and the more the military is used, the less the policing and policing strategies will be 
deployed. Therefore, the less experience, and possible funding they have, means the less they 
will be able to combat the problem. This potentially leads to a downward trend, which will be 
especially problematic when dealing with the FARC peace process, demobilisation, and 
increasing policing in previously inaccessible areas of Colombia. Therefore if policing is 
going to be successful with future peace processes and other challenges, the Colombian state 
will need to put more faith and considerable investment across all policing agencies, to set 
policing as the prevailing solution to a problem of criminality. 
 
Foreign Assistance 
 
There is also the issue of joint operations that the national police run with other foreign 
agencies. This author would state that in general this is likely to be a USG or HMG-based 
agency, as in his experience those are the two governments who have the biggest footprints in 
Colombia. Whilst these operations are also conducted against micro traffickers and insurgent 
groups their primary more focus is against larger criminal groups, such as those mentioned 
within this chapter. Protected Source One commented:  
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What hasn’t changed really for the Police, is that they are still very inward-looking, 
they are still very much focused on what happens in Colombia and what they can do 
in Colombia, what they can claim in Colombia and one of the difficulties for us is that 
we need to be able to demonstrate, that if the Colombian police have provided 
intelligence which allows another country or continent to operate and make a seizure 
and make arrests then they should be able to take some credit for that, but you know, 
they are very keen on who gets to do the press conference…. 
 
This points to a potential area of contention between foreign agencies within the Andean 
region and their Colombian hosts, specifically in this case with regards to the national police. 
Considering this along with the issue of the national police still being heavily results led (as 
previously cited from Protected Source One), it is logical that this could lead them into 
conflict with their international partners during joint operations, and undermine the 
international war on drugs. Despite this, most sources believed that rivalry was not a major 
problem within international partnerships outside of the Andean region, instead citing general 
good co-operation operationally and especially with regards to training: ‘Yes definitely the 
American and British influence is massive, at the same time the Colombians recognise that 
their skills have improved through international co-operation and training’ (Protected Source 
Seven). Whilst improvements were cited, many sources believed there was rivalry between 
neighbouring nations: ‘Yes I would say it has changed, I would say the police have improved, 
the international liaisons/relationships at the international level have improved. The police 
are becoming a lot more professional, but still there is a long way to go…’ (Protected Source 
Eight). Therefore, even a minor rivalry especially at international level in terms of the war on 
drugs, could potentially be quite damaging. As previously cited from McClintock (1988), the 
drugs trade and specifically the Colombian involvement in it is a transnational business, 
therefore if one is to be successful in fighting such an organisation, one needs to be 
internationally focused as well. The UNODC (2008, p. 3) report ‘The Threat of Narco 
Trafficking In The Americas’, echoes this: ‘Countries like Colombia show how progress 
against drug trafficking can pay dividends in reducing violence. But the problem is truly 
hemispheric, and can only be addressed through international cooperation and information 
sharing’. However, Protected Source One does believe that progress is being made in regards 
to the national police and the military assimilating some of the tactics offered to them by 
international partners: ‘To some extent the Colombian police have realised with a bit of help 
from HMG and USG agencies that international intelligence gathering is the way forward, so 
you can’t just start your effort at the Colombian border and work inwards, you need help’. 
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Protected Source Twenty had another perspective, but instead it was from an overall embassy 
level, rather a perspective from law enforcement ‘[The Embassy] gives them [Colombian 
groups] money to tell them stuff that they already know, we know what happens when you 
attack organised crime groups … we know the ideologies, we know methodologies, don’t 
worry about doing all this analysis, act!’ Their feelings are that foreign embassies in general 
focus too much on generating reports that have been constantly repeated, not in terms of a 
yearly update, for example UNODC reports, but instead repeating previous findings, rather 
than acting on already known information.  
 
Therefore, as described previously, there are multiple rivalries across multiple layers in 
regards to the war on drugs, internally to the police, with other Colombian agencies and 
finally also with international partners in the Latin American Region. So far in this author’s 
research, this rivalry has been quoted as unhelpful. This was not the sole perspective, 
however; a few sources deemed rivalry as positive stimulant to investigating groups: ‘Each 
agency has its own professional pride so each agency will think that they achieve better 
results, I think this is a natural competition between the two investigative units.  I don’t think 
this can been seen in a negative light, I would say this can be regarded as positive’ (Protected 
Source Eleven). Protected Source Thirty-One believed the truth lay in middle: ‘Absolutely 
there is (rivalry). Success is measured by statistics, kilos seized, cases brought. This is both 
healthy and unhealthy.’ Despite this, the overall general consensus of opinion was that 
rivalry, especially with regards to the sharing of information which could have assisted with 
the capture of high value targets like Pablo Escobar, was unhelpful at best, and corrosive to 
policing at worst, despite an argument by a few that rivalry could be driving positive results. 
 
Comparatively one of the most significant changes since the height of the AUC’s time, 
despite the minor rivalries, has been international assistance from the United States with Plan 
Colombia and the considerable amount of training provided by the United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada, Holland, Spain and other countries. Nearly all sources stated that 
international funding and training had greatly assisted Colombia’s policing and has made a 
big difference since the days of Pablo Escobar. This investment in funds and training has 
been highlighted by several of this author’s sources. 
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The police has increased in size, there’s belief in the capability that they have got, 
obviously there has been external investment as well to the tune of, over the period of 
time of plan Colombia with the Americans investing 1.2 billion dollars into the police 
to cover everything from small bits of equipment, training, Blackhawk helicopters. 
(Protected Source Five) 
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Chapter 3 - The History of the FARC & UP and the Police Challenges that 
Followed 
 
Although Colombia has had a long tradition of democracy with regular elections, the 
struggle between both parties ignited two civil wars that left about 300,000 people 
dead between 1899 and 1902 in the “One Thousand Day War” and between 1946 and 
1958 in “The Violence (La Violencia).” The bipartisan struggle generated a 
phenomenon of peasant self-defense and bandit groups of liberal members opposed to 
authoritarian conservative governments. In the 1960s, some of these bandits embraced 
communist precepts creating the first guerrilla groups: FARC, Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarios de Colombia; and ELN, Ejercito de Liberación Nacional. (Ruiz-
Vásquez, 2015, p.01)  
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the history of the FARC and its political party the UP 
(Unión Patriótica), in order to explain why achieving a contemporary peace process is a 
protracted and convoluted affair. The conclusion will seek to determine the problems with 
policing during a civil war and also how policing might develop post peace process. 
 
The Origins of the FARC 
 
Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, despite the emerging paramilitary threat, 
the FARC consolidated its control over many of Colombia’s coca-growing regions. 
(Leech, 2011, p .60)  
 
Rather than seeking to detail the full history of the FARC, this author will instead begin with 
a brief introduction before focusing on two key areas; firstly, the group’s involvement with 
narcotics, and in the following chapter, the FARC’s ventures in politics, from the formation 
of their political party the UP (Union Patriótica), posing the question of whether the FARC 
will seek to enter politics if there is a successful peace agreement. It should be noted that the 
purpose of this paper is not to ascertain if the FARC’s armed struggle and ideals of the UP 
were justified or not, but rather to what degree they became involved with the drug 
trafficking trade, and what insight one might glean from the objectives of the FARC-designed 
political group the UP in relation to the future of the FARC in politics. Adopting their name 
in 1966, The FARC is one of the oldest insurgencies in the world (InSight Crime 2016c) As 
of 2016 the insurgency has lasted for fifty years, but at the time of writing, there is a 
possibility that this may be the twilight year for the guerrilla group. The FARC’s origins lay 
in the peasant community: ‘The FARC’s approach is intrinsically linked to its roots in the 
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peasant self-defence organisations during La Violencia. Those roots pre-date the Cuban 
Revolution and, in contrast to most of the guerrilla groups that formed throughout Latin 
America….’ (Leech, 2011, p. 21). The formation of self-defence groups by the civilian 
population where the legitimate government lacked state presence is a common theme in 
Colombia. The FARC started off as a relatively small rebel group, consisting mostly of 
peasants who sought to oppose government policy and a rising threat by large landowners. At 
the time, the group numbered in the low hundreds, however, by 1999 this number had greatly 
increased to around 18,000 guerrillas (Stanford 2015) with an un-quantifiable number of 
civilian and political supporters. Initially the FARC’s principles were based in communist 
ideals, that the working class could oppose the ruling elite, overthrow the government of the 
time via armed and political revolution and commence a communist state. Colombia has 
always had a considerable issue with economic inequality; according to a USAID (Global 
Protection Cluster 2010) report: ‘Land distribution in Colombia is highly inequitable, and 
upward of 68% of the rural population lives below the poverty level. An estimated 0.4% of 
the population owns 62% of the country’s best land’. The same small minority also owns the 
majority of positions within Colombian politics and this inequality was the catalyst for the 
communist presence, support, and the FARC’s justification to not only exist but to thrive. In 
the 1960s to early 1980s, the FARC’s main modus operandi was in kidnapping and taxation 
of large landowners who were their political and ideological rivals. Whilst this tradecraft 
continued, it was in the late 1970s when illegal drug production started to take off, and the 
FARC started taxing narcotraffickers that the FARC’s income and structure began to change, 
and in 1982 at the seventh FARC conference its then leader, Jacob Arenas (nom de guerre of 
Luis Alberto Morantes Jaimes), started reorganising and tactically refocusing the FARC into 
becoming an army with one clear objective:  
 
The new income from kidnapping and illegal drugs allowed Arenas and the FARC 
leaders at the VII Conference to think long-term. And over the next few days, amid 
the cold mountain backdrop, they developed an eight year plan to win the war. It 
wasn’t complex, in fact, the main facet of the plan was simple: Build an army, then 
slowly surround the major cities. (Leech 2011, p. 25) 
 
It was at this point with increased finances and the command of Arenas that the FARC started 
to change substantially, from a small insurgent group in the low hundreds to over 20,000 
combatants at its peak in the early 2000s: ‘The FARC’s Seven Conference, held in May 
1982, was significant in that it led to a change in the group’s name and shift in its military 
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character’ (Leech 2011, p. 25). The FARC was now rebranded as the FARC-EP (ejército del 
pueblo - army of the people). This revised version of the FARC wouldn’t solely reside in 
remote areas and wait for the enemy to come to them, but instead would focus on taking the 
offensive, with the mantra of using ‘a combination of all forms of struggle’ (Leech 2011, p. 
25), both armed and political, including the formation of the FARC’s own political party that 
was separate from its former supporters and architect - this party would be the Union 
Patriotica (UP). 
 
I think they will always have an agenda, there are remote areas that are FARC 
controlled and if it is going to be a real democratic country, the Colombian 
government has to allow these areas to be represented, so there will be FARC 
representatives in the government, you can’t prevent that. You cannot have a 
democratic government that is not totally inclusive. (Protected Source Eleven) 
 
First Peace Negotiations 
 
In 1984 the Colombian Government under the Betancur administration (President Belisario 
Betancur Curates) started the first peace negotiations with the FARC. The agreement also 
known as the ‘Uribe Accords’ (Leech 2011, p. 25) was signed by both the Colombian 
Government and the FARC, guaranteeing a cease fire. However, during this time the FARC’s 
political party the UP had suffered considerable violence in the assassination of many key 
politicians, undermining any legitimate political presence that the FARC may have had. 
There is a lot of debate about the motives of the FARC when they created the UP, such as 
were they not truly interested in forming a legitimate political party? Some believe not, with 
one of this author’s sources saying that ‘…it gave them a weapon and that is what it was 
formed for, I don’t think it was formed for political purposes it was formed to be used by 
them to be used as a propaganda weapon’ (Protected Source Twenty-Four), or as Dudley 
(2004, p. 56) stated: ‘The Party (UP) would be the FARC’s lackey, an errand boy in the 
larger struggle for power that was just getting started’. During the peace talks from 1984 until 
1987 the FARC agreed to limit (although not stop) kidnappings, however, according to 
Dudley (2004, p. 54) the FARC increased ‘the pace of tax collection in the countryside’. 
Another key point and little known fact is that the FARC negotiated with government envoys 
and representatives, rather than with the President and his staff in person. Arenas supposedly 
had a ‘Red Phone’ with which he could talk directly to the president, but very little direct 
contact was made as discussed by Dudley (2004). Limiting communications, limited the 
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possibilities of this peace process. A defining comment by all accounts came from Arenas: 
‘The peace talks with the Government, Arenas explained to them, were nothing more than a 
means to an end. It was an opportunity, he explained, to expand on the master plan of 
building an army’ (Dudley, 2004, p. 56). In other words, the FARC arguably used the first 
peace process merely as a means to consolidate and reorganise their positions in the armed 
struggle.  
 
The peace talks broke down in 1987 and from this author’s research, this agreement has not 
been looked upon kindly: ‘the real winner of the Uribe Agreement was the FARC’ (Dudley, 
2004, p. 47); ‘First of all, I don’t think the previous ones have failed, because I don’t consider 
them serious peace processes at all” (Protected Source Fourteen). ‘Perhaps the only man 
more pleased than President Betancur with the Uribe Agreement was the FARC’s longtime, 
enigmatic political commander, Jacobo Arenas’ (Dudley, 2004, p. 47). Another interesting 
result was the breakdown in relations between the FARC and the Communist party. After the 
launch of the UP, the Communist party was relegated to the sidelines. Having reduced 
influence on the FARC both militarily and politically, was one of the first indications that the 
FARC would start to turn away from their political ideals and towards profiting from illegal 
drugs as their primary modus operandi: ‘Despite the (Communist) Party’s opposition, the 
FARC continued to collect taxes from drug traffickers and drug producers’ (Dudley, 2004, p. 
53). To make matters seemingly more unpalatable for the Colombian government after the 
peace talks with the FARC had fallen apart, the FARC joined the ‘Simón Bolívar Guerrilla 
Coordinating Committee (coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar, CGSB)’ (Leech, 2011, p. 
32). Three years later only the FARC, ELN and a small portion of the EPL were left. What 
could have been a potentially contentious issue for the Colombian Government instead 
showed that ‘The role played by demobilized Guerrillas in drawing up the new constitution 
led many Colombians, even on the left, to question the validity of armed struggle…. Many 
people began viewing the FARC as a Cold War Relic, an archaic Marxist-Leninist 
organisation’ (Leech, 2011, p. 32).  
 
One wonders if this could be considered a turning point in the FARC’s recruitment and 
retention plans, or potentially changing the objectives in the minds of the FARC secretariat. 
In November 1985 the Movimiento 19 de Abril guerrilla movement or M-19 which had been 
active since 1970, initiated the siege on the Palace of Justice in which 50 hostages were 
taken. The Colombian security forces stormed the building and killed all of the M-19 
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Guerrillas, but also sustained a considerable amount of collateral damage with over 100 
Supreme Court Judges killed in the attack. At this point M-19 was seen as the second most 
dangerous guerrilla group in Colombia. However, in November 1989 M-19 successfully 
completed peace talks with the Colombian government, and in December 1990 their newly 
formed political party the Democratic Alliance M-19: obtained most of the seats in the 
Constituent Assembly. This turn of events would have two consequences for the FARC; 
firstly, there would be considerable pressure imposed on them for more peace talks, and 
secondly, the legitimate idea of armed struggle due to the inability to enter the political arena 
would be considerably weakened in both the eyes of the politicians and the people.  
 
Second Peace Negotiations 
 
Another round of peace talks commenced in 1991 between President Gaviria and his 
administration, and the CGSB which the FARC had joined a few years prior. However, the 
Colombian military’s bombing of the headquarters utilised by the CGSB to discuss peace 
talks in December 1990 created a considerable amount of mistrust between the groups. As a 
result the peace talks with Gavira’s administration would take place mainly outside of 
Colombia, in Caracas, Venezuela and Tlaxcala in Mexico. A little known fact according to 
Dudley (2004) and Leech (2011) is that this was the only official peace process with the 
FARC where there was no cease-fire in place for the vast duration of the talks. The talks 
suffered numerous setbacks for which Accord issue 14 cites multiple reasons: ‘Parties unable 
to reach an agreement on the conditions for a ceasefire’; ‘the entrenchment of the 
Government’s position’ (Conciliation Resources 2004); and a number of assassination 
attempts, kidnappings, disappearances and military action which in 1992, ‘culminated in a 
joint declaration formally suspending the talks’ (Posso, 2004, p. 48). In 1998-2002 President 
Pastrana held peace talks with the FARC as a result of increasing political pressure due to the 
escalation in violence: ‘… Andrés Pastrana won Colombia’s presidential election by 
campaigning on a platform of peace. His message resonated with millions of Colombians 
tired of the escalating violence’ (Leech, 2011, p. 75). It is worth noting that the perpetrators 
of much of this violence were reportedly not the FARC, but paramilitaries: ‘[The] Colombian 
Commission of Jurists (CCJ), attributed 78 percent of the human rights abuses and violations 
of international law in 1999 to paramilitaries, with the guerrillas responsible for 20 
percent…’ (Leech, 2011, p. 105). It is also worth noting that the 20 per cent mentioned 
covers all insurgent groups active at the time and not just the FARC. Before and during these 
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official peace talks with Pastrana’s administration, a DMZ was created for the FARC of 
around 16,000 square miles named ‘Zona de Despeje’: ‘…when President Pastrana was in 
power and then the peace process he had with the FARC which essentially resulted in 
Colombia handing over a large swathe of this territory the size of Switzerland to the FARC as 
a demilitarised zone, it was a piecemeal, if you want to put it in Neville Chamberlain terms’ 
(Protected Source One). Gomez-Suarez and Newman discuss that: ‘However, other analysts 
narrowed the lessons learnt to the failure of the Pastrana–FARC peace talks (1999–2002), 
which according to them, was caused by FARC’s use of the 42,000 km² demilitarised zone 
(DMZ): ‘as a command and control centre for operations elsewhere in Colombia and for 
stationing thousands of troops, as well as for industrial-scale coca production and as a 
holding point for kidnapping victims’ (DeShazo, Forman and McLean, 2013, p. 820). After 
more than three years of talks, the process eventually broke down. Whilst there were a 
number of factors that contributed to the collapse, Leech highlights the primary issue as 
being: ‘…the issue of the economy’ and ‘…the FARC’s refusal to agree to a ceasefire… 
(Leech, 2011, p. 84), but also notes that whilst those were the official reasons projected by 
the Colombian government and widely accepted by Colombia’s ally the United States; ‘ the 
FARC was reportedly condemned for continuing to wage war outside the zona de despeje, 
few questioned the fact the Colombian military and paramilitaries were doing exactly the 
same thing’ (Leech, 2002). Leech also comments that whilst the FARC were accused of a 
military buildup inside the DMZ, the Colombian government were doing the same with the 
assistance from the US through Plan Colombia, and that lastly, there was also the issue of the 
AUC which the FARC insisted had to be disbanded before there could be an active ceasefire. 
In February 2002 the Colombian government ended the peace talks and utilised military force 
to retake the DMZ from the FARC. From the early 1980s until the early 2000s the FARC had 
been involved in different peace talks, however, none of them had managed to reach a 
conclusive accord for demobilisation of the FARC and the reintegration of the citizens back 
into legitimate Colombian society.  
 
No one said that maybe the UP was the way to get the Guerrillas out of the war… that 
there was once a hope, a time in which people dreamt of a peaceful Colombia. 
(Dudley, 2004, p. 230) 
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The Union Patriotica 
 
A key evolution of the FARC narrative is the creation of its political party. This author will 
provide a brief outline of the FARC’s first and most significant entry into Colombian politics, 
as this could give an indication of the FARC’s future in the political arena if a peace 
agreement is successfully signed. Running parallel to the armed struggle by the FARC in the 
countryside and the jungles, was the UP (Unión Patriótica). Formed in May 1985, the UP was 
created and envisioned to be a political apparatus with which the FARC could politicise their 
struggle against the Colombian government within Colombia's existing legal framework, 
whilst continuing to utilise their standard armed tactics in order to fight the existing 
legitimate Colombian politik and enable a Communist state. This tactic was known as ‘la 
combinación de toda las formas de lucha’ (The combination of all forms of struggle). This 
strategy has its roots in Marxism where the principles were against the bourgeois tendencies 
of the governing classes of the mid to late 19th and early 20th century, but rather than seeking 
reform on current governance, instead sought to alter the social and political class via 
revolution. This strategy of ‘la combinación de toda las formas de lucha’ was soon adapted 
by the FARC, particularly in terms of utilising disruption techniques against the Colombian 
government. One of the disruption techniques employed was of striking and protest; 
something that could only be instigated by political parties within Colombia, and as the 
FARC were classified as an insurgency, they had no legal basis for which to launch such 
social disruption. However as the FARC’s political party, the UP could achieve these goals 
within Colombia’s legislation. This was described by one of this author’s interviewees: ‘The 
FARC set up a political front in the 1980s and because the FARC continued fighting and they 
were following an ideology of struggle on every front, a combination of all forms of struggle, 
so what this meant was, that they kept fighting while they had this political organisation…’ 
(Protected Source Three). Whilst one could argue the ethics of such an action, the FARC’s 
move into politics, regardless of the motives, was the formation of a legitimate political party 
that was established within the existing Colombian legal framework. Arguably this could 
have been harnessed by the Colombian government of the time in a positive manner, and 
potentially could have created fresh diplomatic channels to the FARC secretariat that may 
have provided more options for successful peace talks, however, this was not the case. Not 
long after the UP was formed on May 25th 1986, they achieved a considerable election 
achievement: 328,752 votes. In comparison to the winning candidate it was by no means a 
significant political threat, however as Dudley (2004, p. 91) explains: ‘It was a tiny 
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percentage compared with the winner, Liberal candidate Virgilio Barco, who received 
4,212,510 votes. But it was the most any leftist candidate had ever gotten in Colombia’. This 
result was widely reported and not only did it not escape the attention of UP’s political 
opponents, but it also did not go unnoticed to the FARC’s military and policing opponents 
and the AUC. The FARC have traditionally used ‘hit and run’ covert tactics, using open 
warfare on their enemy only when the odds were significantly in their favour, or if not, by 
ambush, attacking from afar with small groups, or planting land mines. However the UP was 
a public facing, overt political organisation and therefore didn’t have the luxury of retreating 
to remote areas when faced with threats - a fact which had not escaped their many opposing 
actors. An important point to note is that the UP was not formed or staffed by the FARC in 
general, with a only a handful of FARC officers incorporated into the party. During the time 
of the 1986 election, Jamie Pardo Leal was the head of the UP as a lawyer for the Communist 
Party, although it is worth mentioning that he had been singled out for this position by Jacobo 
Arenas the FARC leader at the time. As Gomez-Suarez and Newman (2013, p. 824) state: 
‘The political reforms resulted in the introduction of the democratic election of mayors in 
1988. Although the UP was launched by FARC in May 1985, many of the people who joined 
it were not FARC members or communists.’. Therefore, although it was founded by the 
FARC, the UP is considered by academia to have been a political party with no known 
military capability. Despite this, the far right and the AUC as created by Carlos Castaño 
(Dudley, 2004, Leech, 2011 et al), fought a prolonged conflict with UP which was mostly 
kinetic in nature. This is the aspect that this author will focus on. After the UP’s political 
gains in the 1986 election, the UP was thought to be a considerable success for left and far 
left politics in Colombia with new members flocking to join the party’s ranks. Meanwhile, 
the AUC and even some of the country’s legitimate conservative government deemed this 
purely as the FARC’s success, and took measures to ensure the party would not continue to 
grow. As this author has so far highlighted, the measures taken were mostly violent in their 
nature: ‘The deaths were starting to pile up just as the fledgling project was surging’ (Dudley, 
2004, p. 93). The success of the UP in 1986 was matched by the violence against it that 
followed. Several assassinations against party members were successful in that year, most of 
which were attributable to the AUC, however, there is considerable anecdotal evidence of 
official state actors, namely the police and the army, being involved: ‘…In a few cases there 
is ample evidence of the participation of agents of the state, mostly army or police officers. 
For the most part, however, that evidence is either not available or it appears inconclusive’ 
(Americas Watch Committee (U.S.), 1989, p. 42). This narrative is consistent across 
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academia including research by Dudley, Leech, Bowden et al. There are many mentions of 
state actors’ involvement with assassinations on the UP, but very little evidence leading to 
any form of judicial trail. Where there is evidence leading towards government actors 
participating in actions against the UP, those actors have resigned from their positions and 
legal action is dropped. One such incident, was the previously mentioned attack on the town 
of Segovia, a UP political stronghold, on the 11th of November 1988. A group of AUC militia 
entered the town of Segovia killing 43 people and wounding more than 50; an attack which 
took place with no police or military interruptions. Dudley (2004, p. 126) notes that: ‘In all, 
the paramilitaries spent nearly an hour in Segovia. Witnesses said the police did nothing 
during that entire time, even though the station is about 150 yards from the Johny Kay, where 
the massacre began. The Army was noticeably absent as well’. Dudley (2004, p. 126) also 
mentions anecdotal evidence at the time: “When the army arrived, one army officer was 
overheard saying, ‘It’s all done.’. Whilst not conclusive, this author believes considering the 
quantity and regularity of the attacks on the UP without Judicial consequences at that time, it 
was highly likely that state actors were involved, a view that was shared by some of this 
author’s interviewees: ‘…and the paramilitaries and some of the drugs traffickers and so on 
just massacred these people. So in all about three or four thousand people were murdered and 
police may or may not have been involved, some of [the] army certainly was’ (Protected 
Source Three). Also Americas Watch Committee (U.S.)  state that: ‘Although Colombia has 
a high murder rate, the number of UP party members assassinated is so greatly 
disproportionate as to rule out the possibility of non-political motives in all but a handful of 
cases’ (Americas Watch Committee (U.S.), 1989, p. 44) which again highlights the 
probability of state involvement. Whilst it could be considered the elimination of the UP 
would hinder the FARC’s political aims, the then head of the FARC, Arenas, believed that 
the UP’s success or demise would greatly assist in his aims: ‘A dead UP would prove that the 
only way to change Colombia was through military insurrection, a position Arenas had been 
subtly advocating for years’ (Dudley, 2004, p. 95). Therefore the FARC need not provide 
protection nor assistance to the party, allowing the FARC to benefit without expenditure of 
resources, which especially in terms of personnel, were comparatively low at the time. The 
party leaders were not immune to assassination either; on October 11th 1987 the UP president 
Jamie Pardo Leal was surrounded whilst leaving a country home just outside of Bogota and 
assassinated. The next president of the UP, Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, was also assassinated 
on March 22nd 1990 at El Dorado airport, Bogota’s international airport, despite having a full 
protection detail provided by the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS), a now 
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decommissioned government agency. At the time of Jamie Pardo Leal’s death, Americas 
Watch Committee (U.S.) states that: ‘The leadership of Unión Patriotica claimed that Pardo 
Leal was the 471st party member to be killed since the movement was founded in 1985’ 
continuing that: ‘As of early 1989, the number of murdered UP members is estimated by that 
political party at more than 900. Though other sources dispute that figure, everyone agrees 
that the UP suffered the most from this form of repression’ (Americas Watch Committee 
(U.S.), 1989, p. 43-44). However, with the death of Bernardo, the second President of the UP, 
the party began to fracture: ‘Following Bernardo’s assassination, there was a massive exodus 
from the UP’ (Dudley, 2004, p. 166). Within academic sources this is generally considered as 
the point at which the Unión Patriótica began to decline towards its eventual cessation as a 
political party, and with that, the end of left-politics at the time: ‘The end of the UP was 
really the end of centre-left politics in Colombia. The FARC, meanwhile, had the perfect 
excuse to hang on to its guns forever, and the Communist Party had another martyr’ (Dudley, 
2004, p. 166). This perspective might be etched into the FARC psyche, therefore, this author 
would hypothesise that those within the FARC who do not want peace and to form a 
legitimate political party, could use the argument that the last time the FARC attempted to 
stand for its political beliefs without weapons with the UP, it ended in the violent obliteration 
of the party. 
 
If you look at it from an organised crime perspective, essentially the two biggest 
organised crime groups in the world are the Taliban and the FARC in a sense that 
they have these terrorist credentials, but the reality is they have morphed into a 
massive organised crime group that sustains themselves with illegal activity. 
(Protected Source One) 
 
Policing Challenges & Outcomes 
The Death of the UP and Transition to Criminality 
 
During the downfall and beyond the end of the UP, the FARC slowly but surely evolved 
more into an organised crime group. This transformation began slowly with the taxation of 
drug cartels; the cartels wanting to, and eventually operating in the same remote areas 
controlled by the FARC, where a symbiosis was formed out of necessity. This partnership 
had largely ended in the mid/late 1980s when the Colombian state once again began to 
refocus policing and military resources on the cartels, they were then re-classified as 
Narcoterrorists. With the cartels weakened, the illegal drug trade in Colombia was 
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fragmented: ‘Following the destruction of the Medellin Cartel and the subsequent dissolution 
of the Cali Cartel, the market became segmented, giving rise to about 500 small micro-
trafficking groups’ (InSight Crime, 2015). Kenney proposes that these smaller micro-
trafficking groups are more akin to terrorist cells (2007). This metamorphosis also coincided 
with the Colombian government’s crack-down on private protection forces, as criticism of the 
AUC and their actions had continued to grow. These factors together meant that large illegal 
drug production would again be required to move to more remote areas, however this time, 
without the private armies on which Escobar, Carlos Castaño and others had relied to protect 
their production sites and transit routes, calling for another collaborative effort with the 
FARC. Protected Source Five previously mentioned about the BACRIM groups and their 
symbiotic relationship with the FARC in the narcotrafficking business. Protected Source One 
also discussed how the ethos of the FARC has changed due to their shift in objectives: ‘The 
reality of it is that the FARC has long since given up the idea that they can somehow take 
over the country and run it as a communist collective…’ Nearly all the interviewees with 
whom this author discussed the FARC agreed that the contemporary primary objectives of 
the FARC had moved away from establishing a communist state, and focused more on 
revenue accumulation via involvement in the narcotics trade or other criminality: ‘…the 
FARC as subversive organisation, a terrorist organisation, but also a drug trafficking 
organisation…’ (Protected Source Three). In regards to the war on drugs, ‘The FARC, it’s 
part of their operational way of bringing funds in, same with ELN and the police can try as 
much as they want, they are in a losing battle’ (Protected Source Seven). 
 
Police and Military Rivalry 
 
The FARC are criminals, but they are also subversive and guerrillas and different 
bodies than just criminals and the police have tended to focus on the FARC as simply 
criminals, without political affiliation, but everyone has a political affiliation here. 
(Protected Source Three) 
 
This author has provided the initial narrative of the FARC in terms of their origins, political 
motivations and their Modus Operandi developing from communist ideals, then veering more 
towards narcotrafficking, but how have the FARC affected policing? Has fighting the FARC 
helped the police forces within Colombia to develop? 
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As the FARC began to increase their financial resources through drug trafficking, they 
became a legitimate target for Colombia’s National Policing agencies (CNP & CTI). The 
impact of this was that the army and police ended up with the same target list, however, as 
the police and army have a history of not sharing intelligence, this led to a lot of wasted 
resources in terms of repeated operations, but also to ‘green on green’ incidents (the police 
and the army targeting each other). This was particularly clear when interviewing my 
protected sources about the police and military competing against each other: ‘So it’s not 
tidy, [if] the Army was just dealing with FARC that would be fine, but then the FARC are 
also drugs traffickers so they trade with other drugs traffickers, so not the FARC and that’s 
the responsibility of the police to do something, so joint operations can be very difficult’ 
(Protected Source Three). As this author’s interviews progressed, a pattern emerged that 
showed not simply a CNP issue or an army issue, but a problem that cascaded down through 
all Colombian policing and military agencies: 
 
There’s no joint intelligence committee they set up the DNI, the DNI is formed of the 
police, the military and UEF (the financial regulators) for some bizarre reason. They 
all feed into the DNI who are basically the administers of this new intelligence 
organisation run by an ex-chief of Naval intelligence, a guy I used to work with, but 
that doesn’t cater for all of the intelligence that each of the organisations has, so they 
very much withhold their own intelligence because they are in competition with one 
another. (Protected Source Five) 
 
Underpinning the joint operational issues, is the fundamental issue of rivalry prohibiting 
efficient information sharing, thus causing multiple actors to expend resources on the same 
objective without those groups involved being aware that their work was being replicated. 
This would also have the knock-on effect that operational deconfliction would not be possible 
pre-operation, and therefore would be handled when the state actors encountered each other 
in the field. Whilst this wouldn’t be a problem in an office environment, it could potentially 
result in loss of life to either group if they were to encounter each other while armed and at 
the point of arrest of a shared subject. Although the initial discussion with all interviewees 
raised the existence of a considerable problem with multiple state actors working 
operationally against the FARC, as the interviews progressed, it appeared that the processes 
of joint working have considerably improved in time. Quite a few protected sources stated 
that although there have been problems historically, information sharing has improved as 
well as joint working in general. 
 89 
 
Before yes, but now no, now they are working together and sharing information. 
(Protected Source Six) 
 
Yes, they have had successes together and they realise, even though they are still 
going to have issues, that they will be saving a lot more of their counterparts’ lives by 
working together. (Protected Source Nine) 
 
Well in the past it was worse, ten years ago the President Uribe, he made a big effort 
(and it did work in a way) to get Military and Police to work together in a better way, 
but there are still differences. (Protected Source Eight) 
 
The protected sources commented on a marked improvement in the co-operation between the 
police and military, but also note that there could possibly be added improvement further 
down the line. An extra point to note is that rivalry against high value narcotics targets isn’t 
solely a problem between different agencies, but also within those agencies themselves. 
Protected Source One stated that: ‘Within the police you should say I want DIPOL to 
concentrate around the FARC, I want the Anti Narcotics Police to do what it says on the tin 
and just deal with Anti Narcotics, I want the Judicial Police to manage murders and 
homicides, but there isn’t that clarity.’ This source mentioned multiple times throughout his 
interview that rivalry isn’t solely cross agency, but inter-agency as well. However, that is also 
considered to be improving: ‘At the beginning every force try to combat the illegal drug trade 
independently, now it’s better, because the forces are working together’ (Protected Source 
Six). Another pertinent point is that policing within Colombia, means policing at a time of 
war. And given Colombia’s geographical complexities, there is a requirement by the 
Colombian state to utilise the military as police and vice versa. This issue was raised with one 
of this author’s protected sources; when asked the question of whether the army is used as 
police where policing resources are marginal or non-existent, Protected Source Sixteen said: 
‘Yes. The army is used to secure some areas and it works actually, you will see the army, if 
you travel around Colombia, standing in the road and we are happy because they are there 
and they are watching.’ In Colombia, due to the country being in a state of civil war, the 
police and the military both sit under the Ministry of Defence. Whilst this does raise 
questions about the objectives of Colombian policing, even beyond the traditional police 
service versus police force debate, this author believes that a degree of leniency be applied to 
the comparison with policing in the UK or US as neither country is in a state of civil war. The 
policing challenges in these countries will be different, even if the objectives may be the 
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same. In Colombia there is considerable crossover between the CNP and other agencies 
performing a policing role, with the military also providing a policing function when and 
where required. This author found that most of his protected sources believed that until the 
end of civil war in Colombia the best way for joint working between policing actors and 
military actors is with shared political leadership:  
 
So that has its advantages in the sense that the military police relationship although 
it’s not great they have the same boss, so you’ve got this kind of one arbiter of 
discussions, so if the army and the police have a big row about whose job it is then 
the Ministry of Defence can make the decision about who’s got what responsibilities. 
So in some senses that’s good, it’s not good in terms of … it’s not well received 
internationally because it makes it look like the police is just another section of the 
armed forces and that comes with its own connotations of what you’re dealing with. 
(Protected Source One)  
 
To reiterate the comments of Protected Source One, there are negatives to this in the way 
Colombian policing is viewed internationally, with many sources agreeing that once peace is 
signed unilaterally, that policing should migrate away from a military leadership structure: ‘I 
think there is a concern of capacity of the police to undertake this sophisticated and very 
challenging policing as it will appear to have heavy military involvement and there will need 
to be an adjustment in public psyche, to dissociate a martial response to crime to a civilian 
policing response to crime’ (Protected Source Four). This was a sentiment echoed by 
Protected Source Two: ‘I believe the police over time will need more civilian and less 
paramilitary strategies and that will be harder within the Ministry of Defence, it’s very hard 
to deconstruct a military culture if you report to the Ministry of Defence, it’s very easy, if you 
report to a civilian ministry. When we had Sir Hugh Orde over here, one of the things he 
pointed out is that it took us eight years in Northern Ireland to move to police primacy, it 
didn’t happen quickly and it happened in a very variegated way’. A little-known fact 
discussed by Protected Source Eight was that police used to perform military duties, when 
required; it can happen although there is no legislation to support this activity: ‘Funnily 
enough in the constitution the article that dictates the role of the police it doesn’t provide any 
meaning for the police to do military duties, but the condition of the country dictates the 
necessity’. This was corroborated by Protected Source Twelve: ‘For example, the military do 
an awful lot of the policing work in the very rural areas, the direct security of Colombia 
within Colombia’s own borders, which is not something we think would ever happen in 
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Europe, we don’t put the military on the streets’. Therefore this presents a problematic 
policing structure with which to counter the FARC; on one hand they are an insurgency, 
therefore the army take the lead, but they are also an organised criminal group, therefore the 
police can also separately target them. The rivalry between these two actors exacerbates the 
ability to fight the FARC as resources can be doubled in order to achieve the same goal, with 
the additional potential for green on green incidents. Lastly, the use of the military as a police 
force could create considerable and continual problems in rural areas where access to justice 
can be sporadic at best. 
 
Geographical Policing Issues 
 
Another area of concern is the geography of Colombia. As previously discussed the FARC 
operate in remote areas with the specific aim of avoiding Colombian state actors. Colombia 
as a country has great geo-diversity, however, as a result it has large regions with little to no 
state infrastructure due to the taxing terrain. This makes a permanent policing presence across 
all of Colombia’s regions currently untenable: ‘I don’t think so, I don’t think the 
infrastructure is in place to do that, you have areas in Colombia where the FARC controls 
everything and there is no sense of law or government in those areas and those duties are 
carried out by the FARC. Ideas have been drawn up to address this, but rehabilitation is not in 
place at the moment’ (Protected Source Ten). When discussing this issue with other sources, 
there was a general consensus of opinion as to how the police and military manage the 
geographical policing issues: 
 
Yes, basically they will conduct operations in those areas either through river 
incursion or by helicopter, but if it’s a near enough strike there is not much of a 
presence there or indeed an undercover presence there. (Protected Source Five) 
 
There are many places here in Colombia where it is very hard to travel to, you have to 
use a helicopter and only a helicopter, it’s not even possible to use a plane, because 
there are no runways. (Protected Source Six) 
 
You have to put the resources where the population is higher, because there are so 
many remote locations in Colombia you cannot get 100% coverage.  (Protected 
Source Eleven) 
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Geographically, Colombia is a very difficult place to govern and police and yes there 
are numerous locations that the state has relatively little or no control over. (Protected 
Source Thirteen) 
 
Colombia is roughly eight times the size of the UK, with a similar population, in 
those rural areas it is very difficult to police… (Protected Source Twenty-Four) 
 
(Can Colombia police all of its territory?) Absolutely not without significant increase 
in numbers and equipment. Much of Colombia is jungle and unappeasable. (Protected 
Source Thirty-One) 
 
The outcome from this author’s research is that the inability to have a legitimate state 
presence across all regions of Colombia, significantly reduces the ability of the state to police 
its citizens. As a result it has given large regions of the country (at one point the size of 
Switzerland) over to the FARC and other illegitimate actors, with those actors taking the 
place of the legitimate state and offering their own forms of policing to citizens: ‘…in the 
areas that they control there is a level of sympathy towards them, some may think that they 
are providing some sort of service which is more than the government is doing’ (Protected 
Source Eighteen). This geographical issue was discussed as not a unique occurrence: 
 
The Chilterns…were a centre of heresy because it was quite hilly and therefore the 
state couldn’t get to the Chilterns, the Chilterns are now full of stock brokers and 
bankers, so it’s very difficult to imagine a lawless Chilterns, but it was like that and 
even though they are very little hills. Topography makes a big difference, you can’t 
just build roads everywhere if the topography isn’t right, though Japan apparently has, 
but that’s the exception, nobody else has managed to do that. (Protected Source Two) 
 
Following this theme, another area of importance is Colombia’s borders with its neighbours - 
what challenges do they offer Colombian policing? As with all diplomatic relations, during 
the research process this author ascertained that the borders Colombia has with its neighbours 
are complicated, especially in regards to policing covering multiple factors. The first is the 
problem of bordering a country that is arguably close to being classified as a failed state: 
Venezuela: ‘You have loads of the FARC in Venezuela and Venezuela is more complex for 
Colombia due to numerous political reasons, you have loads of the FARC in Ecuador and on 
the borders doing their production, but most of the FARC in Venezuela and clearly 
Timochenko and the rest of them, I think Santos has brought on the relationship with 
Venezuela even with Chavez leaps and bounds from where Uribe was’ (Protected Source 
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Three). This message was echoed by Protected Source Four: ‘When you have areas like la 
Grahera, where you have the poorest border with the presence of a supposedly demobilising 
FARC, but then there are fronts that are still operating and criminal gangs moving across 
both Venezuela and Colombia it seems impossible that logistically you could monitor and 
what resources are held there and what resources will be sent over’. Since late 2015 the 
Colombian/Venezuelan border has been routinely closed in places and only opened 
sporadically. This has been used to try and control migration and crime (mostly smuggling), 
however, given the size of the border there are no statistics to show that this method is having 
considerable effect in reducing serious and organised crime such as narcotrafficking. Also if 
Colombian policing of the border is considered problematic, then this author would suggest 
that Venezuelan border control is considerably worse, given the current chaotic state of 
Venezuelan policing overall: ‘Yes, there is poverty there and the borders are very poorly 
controlled, especially in the areas where there is a very low population and that goes for both 
sides of the border’ (Protected Source Nine). Colombia is looking more and more to improve 
diplomatic relations, especially with its neighbours, whether in regards to training or sharing 
intelligence, which many sources highlighted during their interviews: ‘By having an 
international presence in Colombia by other partner countries, they have learned how to work 
and team up with other international resources, they communicate more effectively and it 
really shows’ (Protected Source Ten). 
 
The Impacts of Inequality 
 
To sustain the necessary political will, we must remember that it falls to our 
generation to make the biggest transformations in human history. …Greater equality 
is the material foundation on which better social relations are built. (Wilkinson and 
Pickett, 2010, p. 272) 
 
The damage done by both inequality and corruption is often overlooked, either due to the 
normalisation of both, or because it’s not seen as a large enough nor very interesting problem. 
However, many academics, including Wainwright (2016) and Chayes (2015) consider 
corruption issues to be critical with regards to a state’s security for its ability to fuel violence, 
especially in tandem with the difficulties of geographical policing and lack of state presence 
issues. In a discussion regarding the problems of corruption and the use of suicide bombers in 
Afghanistan in 2009 (also cited in the previous chapter), Chayes (2015, p. 07) writes that 
‘Corruption, it made plain, was not solely a humanitarian affair, an issue touching on 
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principles or values alone. It was a matter of national security…’. Corruption helps to fuel 
violence because citizens can become disenfranchised and turn on the legitimate state, a 
situation that has been replicated in Colombia ad nauseam. Equally, the dangers arising from 
inequality have been highlighted by Wilkinson and Pickett (2010), as well as E. Wayne 
Nafziger and Juhan Auvinen (2003, p. 01), who assert that ‘economic stagnation, political 
decay, and deadly political violence interact mutually: economic and political factors 
contribute to war, while war has an adverse effect on economic growth and political 
development’. Therefore, as highlighted by these authors, the issues of inequality and 
corruption directly and adversely affect state security. This relates to Colombia in two keys 
ways; firstly, inequality is linked to the birth of insurgencies in Colombia and increased 
recruitment in criminal gangs and organisations. Numerous sources discuss the problem of 
inequality in Colombia: According to Oxfam, '47% of people in Colombia live in poverty – 
15% in extreme poverty’ (2012); Colombia Reports (2015) states that ‘according to most 
sources, including the World Bank and CIA rankings, Colombia is on the top ten most 
unequal countries in the world in terms of family income. And most of its citizens are aware’ 
and the fact that ‘…much of the land in Colombia has been acquired through violent means is 
essential to understanding the role of inequality in the conflict’ (Colombia Reports, 
2015). The FARC, ELN and other groups were founded, recruiting most of their first and 
second generation troops, under the banner of social and economic inequality. This was and 
still is a problem in rural Colombia. This enabled these insurgent groups to not only recruit a 
significant number of citizens that considered themselves marginalised - which would have 
been historically accurate. This allowed these guerrilla groups to legitimise their insurgent 
actions by claiming to oppose an oligarchy and kleptocracy that oppresses the working 
underprivileged and poor, therefore reducing their social mobility to a stage whereby they 
cannot contribute to help shape the legitimate Colombian state. The problem of inequality has 
also facilitated the recruitment into cartels and gangs, whereby the argument is roughly the 
same; ‘join us and we will pay you well for little work’, with their modus operandi nearly 
always focusing recruitment strategies on poorer and more rural communities with limited 
state presence. This has fostered a culture where sicarios (hired killers) can be bought easily 
due to the alternative of being low paid or non-existent jobs, and the risk being low due to 
state presence being marginal or non-existent. 
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Policing During a Civil War 
 
Lastly, what peripheral impacts are there of policing in a war zone? A common factor cited 
across academic sources when researching into nearly all war zones is the country’s criminal 
and civilian population’s ability to acquire a wide variety of armaments: ‘…the ease of 
getting weapons here, crime can turn violent here as you well know, crime can turn violent 
here very quickly….’ (Protected Source Seven). Because of this, the Colombian policing 
agencies have had to adapt their style of policing and presentation of their officers in those 
areas to provide such force that is reasonable and necessary to avert the danger, not only in 
order to protect the citizens that they are there to protect, but also to ensure they can protect 
their own officers:  
 
Yes, I think in one sense, because they are operating in quite a lot of parts where the 
violence has receded, I think the military is much better prepared (including the 
police) than any other bit of the Colombian state and I think they, I mean if you look 
at the Colombian police, they have a whole different ways of operating, they look and 
feel very different in Buenaventura to how they look and feel in Bogota despite the 
fact that it’s a national force they have different more paramilitary type uniforms, 
heavier weapons (Protected Source Two).  
 
As previously discussed, the considerable amount of funding through Plan Colombia from 
the United States and other states has enabled the Colombian National Police to significantly 
improve their training by partaking in international training courses. Also the equipment they 
utilise has improved considerably, which has enabled more operational successes: 
‘Operationally they have now got the weapons and the technology available to defeat the 
enemy, whereas in the early days they were outgunned. The narcotraffickers had all the 
money to buy whatever they wanted heavy weapons, assault rifles and the police just didn’t 
have that type of weaponry, so now they have got the weaponry and they have the 
technological advantage’ (Protected Source Twenty-Four). These resources have enabled the 
Colombian state to be able to now take on the FARC in open or covert combat and win, 
which just twenty years ago was not possible. This author argues, however, that the 
ramifications of the police mirroring the profile of the military and vice versa - whilst 
currently justified - could lead to long-term policing problems such as the displacement of 
regular policing duties, in favour of paramilitary activity against insurgents. This author 
would argue his research has highlighted that for Colombian policing to refocus its efforts on 
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being an effective and efficient police force or police service, it should be separated from the 
military leadership infrastructure as soon as it is reasonable and appropriate to do so. 
 
A Successful Peace Process? 
 
All the indications are pointing to success, all egos appear to have been put aside, so 
hopefully this will lead to a basis for compromise, the FARC doesn’t really have 
anything to lose as it would seem that they have achieved everything they wanted in 
the peace process. (Protected Source Ten) 
 
For over fifty years Colombia has been in a state of civil war involving three main insurgent 
groups; M-19 (19th of April Movement), the ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, - National 
Liberation Army), and the FARC. Since 2012 the oldest and largest group, the FARC, have 
been in peace talks with the Colombian government in Havana, Cuba. In August 2016 all five 
of the key points of the peace process were agreed upon by both parties.  These were in the 
areas of; land reform (the Colombian state committing to more investment in rural 
economies); political reforms (to make it easier for political movements to participate openly 
in the political process that have in the past been marginalised); the elimination of illicit 
cultivation of coca for drug production; the foundation of a truth commission with 
transitional justice legislation to provide suitable punishments for those who demobilise and 
take responsibility for their complicity in war crimes; and a six month plus process in which 
all demobilised personal will report to one of 23 staging areas across Colombia to hand in 
their weapons and register for an aid package to assist with their reintegration into legitimate 
society. On October 2nd 2016 there was a referendum for Colombian citizens to decide 
whether they agreed with the peace proposal drawn up by the Santos administration and 
agreed by the FARC. Leading up to the decision the result was by no means certain, and this 
author witnessed a considerable amount of propaganda vehicles projecting ‘vote no’ 
reasoning in Bogota, with many civilian vehicles sporting ‘vote no’ stickers, but little to no 
representation for a yes vote. Arguably in the days leading up to the vote, the Santos 
Administration declined in popularity (The Economist, 2016a), as the administration had 
previously declared that there was no Plan B for peace, but rather a return to full war, it could 
have been considered a prudent move to utilise some funding to oppose the ‘no’ vote 
supporters with ‘yes’ propaganda. On Sunday the 2nd October 2016 the referendum on the 
peace agreement was held. 13 million votes were cast, representing 37 per cent of the 
country. The voters narrowly rejected the peace deal proposed by the Santos administration. 
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The final polls showed 49.78 per cent voting in agreement of the current peace process terms 
and 50.22 per cent voting against (Brodzinsky, 2016). It should be noted that the Colombian 
citizens with whom this author discussed this issue stated that they were voting ‘no’ due to 
the current terms of the peace agreement, and the perceptions of leniency and political 
legitimacy towards the FARC and its leader Timoleón Jiménez – Timochenko (Hilton, 2016) 
& (BBC 2016) rather than a no to the prospect of peace overall, a narrative that was also 
prevalent during interviews with the Colombian citizens around the time of the vote. This 
author believes that the legitimate state was ill prepared for a ‘no’ vote and also failed to 
campaign effectively. It campaigned publically only during the last few days where there was 
publicity featuring state actors and the FARC representatives. One such promotion featured 
Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri - more commonly known as Timochenko - the current leader of 
the FARC, publicly apologising for acts of violence against civilians. It appeared, according 
to the media, that both parties were determined to resume talks to create an agreement that 
will be acceptable for both sides and the Colombian people (The Economist, 2016b). Despite 
the ‘no’ vote result, there was no return to open warfare, and instead a new draft of the 
original peace deal with around 50 changes was signed by both the Santos administration and 
the FARC on the 22nd November 2016. This time there was no referendum for the Colombian 
public to decide, and after the signing, the amended peace deal was passed through congress 
where it passed 130 - 0, with those who opposed the deal walking out before the vote (De 
Còrdoba, 2016). While peace is by no means certain, there are those who believe that even 
with peace there is the possibility that a considerable amount of the FARC will fracture into 
other guerrilla groups, or transfer straight into criminal groups (Reuters 2017). When 
conducting the qualitative research this author posed the question of whether peace would be 
attained. All of this author’s sources believed that peace was inevitable, indeed it was the 
only question that all sources unequivocally agreed on, even if some sources believe the 
success of the peace agreement will be limited: 
 
That the older statesmen of that organization have realised that they really haven’t got 
anywhere to turn and I think if you combine that with the second issue which is that 
there is a genuine willingness I think on part of the Santos administration to be as 
flexible as possible in securing a peace agreement, I think you have a suitable 
atmosphere in which peace might be secured. (Protected Source Four) 
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I’m sure there’s a whole tranche that will demobilise, because let’s face it, most of 
them have been recruited as kids as teenagers and they will look at an opportunity to 
have a new life… (Protected Source Five) 
 
Yes, that is going to happen, because currently the government is offering them a few 
positions in parliament, I think around 11 positions. (Protected Source Six) 
 
I think it will succeed, to an element, however, I think Santos has the drive and the 
push to make this one succeed… (Protected Source Seven) 
 
So when you ask me will the peace process be successful, I would say there will be 
limited success… (Protected Source Eleven) 
 
Yes I think that it will work as it has been done in a very rational and organised way. 
Colombia will continue to have conflict, but we are negotiating the end of the armed 
conflict with the FARC. I think these negotiations will work. (Protected Source 
Sixteen) 
 
Policing in a post peace environment 
 
In this author’s experience there is some degree of specious reasoning taking place with 
regards to hopes for policing in a post peace environment. Amongst personal and 
professional discussions and from two of the protected sources, there appeared to be a 
thought that once there is a peace agreement, the troubles of conflict are wiped clean. 
However, protected sources who had experience working within conflict zones confirmed 
that although some problems can be significantly reduced following such an accord, there 
remain a wealth of issues that present policing problems post conflict. Protected Source Nine 
asserted that ‘FARC members are not going to bow to agreements that costs them billions of 
dollars of business, just because you have 32 guys up in Cuba negotiating regarding the 
Colombian peace process’. Protected Source Nine believed there would be displacement of 
previous FARC fighters into other groups: 		 FARC	members	have	got	to	go	somewhere,	where	will	they	go?	To	some	of	the	other	groups	or	to	the	ELN.		The	FARC	are	not	business	people,	some	of	them	were	recruited	at	the	age	of	13,	they	don’t	know	anything	other	than	fighting	in	the	jungle	areas.		How	are	you	going	to	bring	these	people	out	of	what	they	have	known	for	so	long	and	expect	them	to	take	on	regular	jobs,	it	is	not	going	to	work. 
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Therefore one of the key questions was how successful a peace process would be. Would it 
be similar to the AUC peace process with problems of re-offending and weapons not being 
handed back to the state? Protected Source Three, who has a wealth of experience in post 
peace environments, predicted that ‘Weaponry in some form will be handed over to 
authorities for the peace process, but I believe that will be a token effort.’ As discussed in the 
previous chapter, in a post peace environment if lessons from the previous AUC peace 
process are not fully understood and taken into account for the FARC’s agreement, then there 
will be a high probability that history will repeat itself with regards to the issues of re-
offending and weapon caches remaining outside of state control. This could lead to a more 
nebulous policing problem than that of simply combating the FARC, as personnel and 
equipment from the FARC could join any narcoterrorist group/criminal gang or there might 
be a rise in individuals/groups offering their illicit wares for hire. Again Protected Source 
Three believed this will be problematic. ‘It (peace) will succeed – the FARC secretariat will 
sign off peace with the Colombian government, but I find it hard to believe that it will 
translate to (all) FARC fighters putting down their weapons and giving up their participation 
in the drugs trade’. 
 
A possible solution to potential issue of appeasement or migration into another criminal arena 
will be due to the disarmament process and how FARC fighters are reintegrated into society. 
For this to be successful it will need to be conducted from a mental health perspective for 
both the wider community and for the ex-guerrilla as discussed by Hassan et al. (2013, p.15). 
If the mental health aspect is not covered it is unlikely that the ex-guerrilla will re-integrate 
with society fully and will be at risk to deviate into criminal groups, following a path that is 
known to them. 
 
Another solution is to reduce inequality and improve infrastructure across Colombia. As 
discussed previously in this chapter, Colombia has a high degree of inequality, reducing that 
and increasing infrastructure to ensure rural communities have the means to earn a decent 
living wage could deter some from a criminal lifestyle. 
 
Additionally, the issue of geographical policing remains, and potentially will be exacerbated 
as a result of large FARC-controlled areas being returned to a civilian population that does 
not have the resources available with which to police it, which could allow for exploitation 
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by enterprising criminal groups or other insurgent groups like the ELN. Such a negative 
outcome is not a certainty, as the CNP could choose to deploy resources into these areas to 
counter this problem. It would be an interesting subject for future study. 
 
A possible solution to the geographical policing issue would potentially be better 
communication with communities to augment the policing footprint that currently exists. An 
example of successfully working to create better communications between communities and 
police can be found in Kelling’s (2013) experience with the Safer Cities initiative in the 
United States, and how the community works with police – including how such work was 
promoted to the public. Kelling (2013, p. 136) explains that when a gun buy-back programme 
was reinstated in Newark in response to high levels of gun crime; ‘A coalition of community 
groups called a press conference and explained the three aspects of the program… They then 
called upon Safer Cities Officials to provide details. Again, we are seeking to send the 
message that the community was being supported by criminal justice and other agencies’. 
Moving towards this more community orientated policing model could work, but as Ruiz-
Vásquez highlighted in Chapter One, previous community level policing efforts have been 
left frustrated by lack of support. This author believes this could be due to the more 
militaristic objectives of Colombian policing, in particular the seeking out of high value 
targets rather than providing policing service strategies. 
 
Furthermore as previously mentioned, the Colombian National Police sit under the Ministry 
of Defence. This model as well as possibly suffocating more community-based policing 
strategies, has also created some confusion when deploying in remote rural areas whereby the 
police are sometimes performing military duties.  
 
Yes, I would say during my interactions with the Ministry of Defence and the heads 
of police, they would say that we have police presence across the whole country.  The 
reality in some of the areas that I have travelled to in the country is that, that presence 
may be there, but they are normally contained in a hut and they stay there for a few 
months and then they get helicoptered out again by the military, they are not actually 
out on patrol and they are not actually doing normal policing work, or they go in 
behind the military and take a military role. (Protected Source Eighteen) 
 
This author believes there is the potential to improve the Colombian National Police by 
transferring them to a civilian ministry, especially post conflict to remove military duties 
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from the police and further cement their civilian policing remit. Although this author also 
recognises the fact that this institutional change this might not revolutionise the CNP as some 
might hope, a point which will be continued later in this thesis. 
 
I think the problem the police have at the moment is that they are part of the Ministry 
of Defence and therefore they are not policing by consent, which is something in 
Europe we are very proud of… 
 
… Sir Robert Peel’s principles, one of his main principles is:  the police are merely 
citizens who happen to undertake the role of keeping the people safe, they are part of 
the community at large, they don’t control the community and I think here, that is very 
much not the case, they are not part of the community they serve, they are part of the 
Colombian defence forces, they are not merely citizens who happened to have 
undertaken the role to keep the rest of the citizens safe, they are something apart and 
different and I think that is the way they are perceived. (Protected Source Twelve) 
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Chapter 4 -  Colombian Policing Leadership 
 
Providing a service to the people of Colombia is not putting a patrolling paratrooper 
on the streets, the service to these people is chatting to them, walking into the local 
shops asking questions of the local community… (Protected Source Eighteen) 
 
This chapter will focus first on outlining the challenges that face contemporary Colombian 
police leadership with the conclusion discussing the impact on the future direction of 
Colombian policing. 
 
Leadership is key in deploying an organisation’s ethos in order for it to spread and thrive. 
This is especially true for policing, indeed Alison and Crego (2008, p. 55) state that: ‘most 
researchers agree that effective leaders are integral in improving employees’ productivity, 
enhancing their commitment to an organisation’s goals and values, increasing their 
motivation and instilling in them a sense of group identity’. So leadership is considered a 
powerful commodity, one that can be used to shape and structure organisations for the better, 
but how does this transfer directly to policing? ‘In addition the police literature suggests that 
effective police supervisors are instrumental in communicating organisational changes to 
employees preventing ethical misconduct and enhancing public perceptions of the police’ 
(Alison and Crego, 2008, p. 55). This quote, in this author’s opinion, is key to this subject of 
discussion and one that will be referenced throughout this paper. Leadership is essential in 
order for policing to be ethically just and can be measured by the perceptions of the public 
about their police force. Leadership has several principles, depending on the ethos of the 
organisation in question, however this author will focus on; transparency, integrity, 
cooperation (internally and externally) and being open to criticism. 
 
The second issue this chapter will focus on is what impact can rivalry have on policing, 
Anderson (2013, p. 133) asserts that ‘an organisation will only prosper with individuals who 
are ambitious, and ambition will lead to energetic rivalry’. Therefore internal rivalry could 
arguably serve as the catalyst required in order for an organisation to both grow and be 
effective. However, what can be said of rivalry between groups who are external to one 
another but with the same objective? This is one of the key questions for this paper to 
consider in relation to Colombian policing, and an idea which this author will explore in two 
different ways. Firstly, this will be considered with regards to the rivalry within the 
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Colombian government and its agencies - most prominently the Colombian National Police 
(CNP), the Colombian military with reference to other policing agencies including the 
Fiscalía (the attorney general’s office), and the CTI (judicial police) - although when this 
author discusses overall Colombian policing issues, the CTI will be included along with the 
CNP. Secondly, and arguably less orthodox, will be an examination of leadership within 
Colombia’s organised crime groups and Colombia’s guerrilla groups, and how policing has 
affected criminal leadership since the 1980s. This will allow the same issue which is at the 
core of Colombian policing to be considered from two perspectives; firstly, how rivalry 
affects Colombia’s policing leadership, and secondly, how Colombia’s policing affects the 
leadership of the cartels and insurgency. Colombia has a long and complicated history with 
regards to policing. Therefore, in order to better structure this chapter the author will focus on 
the following three areas: a brief note about the impact of post colonialism, policing during 
Pablo Escobar’s time and in the 90s from an academic perspective, and policing in the late 
1990s through to 2014 with interviews from protected sources. 
 
Post Colonial Challenges 
 
It is important to consider the historical context in Colombia: 
As the peoples of Mexico, Central and South America struggled against Spanish and 
Portuguese imperial rulers to obtain their independence during the first decades of the 
19th century, the primary difficulty in establishing legitimacy for new national 
institutions was due to basic problems of governance and public order. The protracted 
independence struggle of Latin America degenerated into anarchic violence against 
the population as regional warlords fought over power. Simon Bolivar attempted to 
unite the peoples of the Andean region of South America into “Gran Colombia” with 
a strong centralized government. However, soon after the final victories over the 
Spanish, “Gran Colombia” fractured into what is now Colombia, Panama, Venezuela 
and Ecuador. (Cassman, 2003, p. 5)  
Cassman presents the genesis of Colombia from a battle of independence with the Spanish, to 
the fracturing of a new country into several sovereign states. Cassman (2003, p. 6) continues, 
noting: 
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Bolivar’s famous lament ‘to govern the Americas is like plowing the sea’ remains a 
vivid reminder of the frustrations felt by the newly independent nations of Latin 
America to establish and consolidate their political and social institutions and achieve 
national unification. Public order became a military mission from the beginning of 
these societies, with overlapping roles of military services and police.  
This statement presents the origins of the issues that are at the core of this paper - leadership 
and rivalry in regards to Colombian policing. Cassman (2003) has underlined that 
postcolonial issues in Latin America that were left when independence was gained from the 
Spanish and Portuguese rulers became an integral part of the new nations that followed. That 
is how Colombia was formed, but how does contemporary Colombia compare to its origins? 
Is leadership in Colombia and Colombian policing similar to Bolivar’s frustrations, and do 
the overlapping roles of the police and military continue to cause rivalry that battles with the 
goal of strong leadership? How is the leadership of the cartels and insurgents affected by 
this? This paper aims to examine and extrapolate the answers to those questions. 
 
Pablo Escobar’s Policing Challenges 
 
During the time of Pablo Escobar, policing was under increasing pressure from Escobar’s 
sicarios (assassins) and his bombing campaigns which were focused mainly in Bogota: 
‘From 1983 to 1993, the annual rate of homicide in Colombia increased 366%, from 24 to 88 
per 100 000. In contrast, the crude homicide rate in the United States in 1993 was 9.5 per 100 
000’ (Villaveces et al., 2000, p. 1205). To counter this rise in violence in the early 1990s a 
new group was formed in the war against Esocbar, Los Pepes. Bowden (2007, p. 188/3177) 
describes the methodology of this new group, ‘It was a controlled bloodbath, because all of 
the victims had one thing in common-Pablo Escobar. Among them was a former director of 
the Polica Nacional de Colombia who had been publicly linked to the Medellín cartel’. 
Bowden theorises that those working within Search Bloc unit (the Colombian police’s top 
counter-narcotics force) also moonlit as vigilantes with the Los Pepes group, to the point 
where they could have been instrumental in the formation of the group. If Los Pepes were 
indeed the vigilante doppelgänger of Search Bloc, what does that imply of CNP leadership, 
especially in regards to Alison and Cregos’ definitions of police leadership? Arguably there 
are two distinct ways of analysing this situation. One would be to declare the CNP unable to 
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even control their own officers, which would demonstrate a complete breakdown of 
leadership across all levels of the police to the point of officers’ defection to a vigilante gang. 
Another perspective, however, would be that the CNP came to the realisation that Escobar 
couldn’t be captured or killed using current policing methods, and that to wait until the 
appropriate tools became available would mean further loss of life to civilians and also within 
their own ranks. The CNP might have decided that ‘the ends justify the means’ and allowed a 
small group of officers to operate outside the rule of law in order to bring Escobar to justice. 
How does this compare to Alison and Crego’s earlier definitions of leadership? This author 
theorises that it does conform to their description of ‘enhancing their commitment to an 
organisation’s goals and values, increasing their motivation and instilling in them a sense of 
group identity’ (Alison and Crego, 2008, p. 56), by taking any measures to prevent further 
loss of life in commitment to the goals and values of the police, and instilling a sense of 
group identity in Los Pepes. However, it does not conform to their assertion that effective 
leadership is ‘instrumental in communicating organisational changes to employees preventing 
ethical misconduct and enhancing public perceptions of the police’ (Alison and Crego, 2008, 
p. 56), i.e. by going outside the rule of law and killing associates of Escobar, the officers 
would have broken ethical conduct. Protected Source One raises the issue of judging previous 
policing by contemporary standards: ‘We look back at what we did in the 70s and 80s and we 
go well that was outrageous, but yet legal at the time there’s a danger that we look at the way 
that we operate and the way that we did our business in the 90s and in the context of 2013’s 
M.O.s of doing business and legislation…’. Whilst this would not cover an officer or a 
policing agency straying beyond the legal guidelines, it does underline the necessity for one 
to use appropriate comparisons and understand context when critiquing Colombian policing.   
 
Post-Escobar Statistical Challenges 
 
Another way to judge police leadership would be a statistical comparison. However, taking 
into account this author’s earlier concerns about statistics this comparison should be 
considered a rough estimate rather than an absolute comparison of events. Above, the figures 
showed the homicide rate during the height of Escobar’s violence, but how does this compare 
in post-Escobar Colombia? Martínez et al. (2007, p. 5) state that ‘although the number of 
murders abated in the later half of that same decade, the rate was still over 55 homicides for 
every 100,000 inhabitants’, so although the murder rate was falling from its height of 88 
homicides per 100 000 inhabitants to 55, the opinion of Martínez et al. was that it was still 
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unacceptably high. On the other hand, a 37 per cent drop in homicides could be argued as a 
substantial reduction and evidence of increased effectiveness in policing, but also as 
theoretical evidence of improved police leadership. Another statistic to consider would be 
cocaine production, as cocaine was the principle income of the Medellín cartel which was 
mostly dismantled after Escobar’s death (Bagley, 2013). In a post-Escobar Colombia, 
statistically there should be evidence to show a significant reduction in cocaine production. 
However, Bagley (2013, p. 6) describes how ‘Coca cultivation in the Andes rapidly shifted to 
Colombia in the mid- and late 1990s. By 2000, Colombia cultivated an estimated 90 per cent 
of the world’s coca leaf…’. How had this happened? One explanation offered is that the large 
and known cartels were now being replaced by ‘…some 300 plus smaller drug trafficking 
organizations (known as cartelitos) surfaced to fill the vacuum left by dismantling the two 
major cartels…’ (Bagley, 2013, p. 7). He goes on to state that these new cartels operate 
similarly to terrorist cell networks where personnel are interchangeable without adversely 
affecting their business, resulting in significantly more targets for the police with no 
connections (Bagley, 2013). Historically the police could target a cartel and its removal 
would have a considerable impact on drug production and trafficking, now the police were 
faced with numerous smaller groups whose demise wouldn’t offer a noteworthy impact on 
production or trafficking. This author would have preferred to utilise Colombian policing 
statistics in order to present how effectively Colombian policing was fighting the drugs war 
against the new micro traffickers, however, it should be reiterated that throughout this authors 
research there have been multiple concerns as to the validity of Colombian statistics, 
especially from the protected sources: 
 
….the police are getting it sorted by releasing these statistics, but I don’t think they are 
actual facts… (Protected Source Seven) 
 
I was in a meeting with Bogota’s police chief and he was talking about statistics and he 
was making a joke about statistics in a way that pointed towards the statistics not being 
real. (Protected Source Eight) 
 
No, there are many crimes that are never known by the police. (Protected Source 
Twenty-Nine) 
 
One source disagreed, ‘Yes, I really think so, because, they don’t really have a reason for 
lying.  As I have mentioned before, favours are granted, but this is not really perceived as 
corruption’ (Protected Source Fourteen). This source’s overall perspective during the 
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interview seemed to be that there are no problems with the statistics or indeed corruption in 
Colombia. Whilst this author disagrees with this point of view (and the research gathered 
contradicts such a position), opposing points of view should be considered. Is there a 
difference between corruption and favours at state level? Does a noble objective - to protect 
the people of Colombia as best as is possible – justify a certain level of corruption? These are 
arguably interesting questions for a paper covering state governance from a more 
philosophical point of view, but outside the scope of this paper. 
 
Cartel and FARC Challenges 
 
A primary tactic utilised by the Colombian police and military with assistance from USG 
against the cartels, was leadership interdiction; the idea of removing the head of an 
organisation to disrupt and dismantle it. However, Kenney (2007, p. 206/2479) believes this 
tactic has helped change the leadership structure in cartels from a traditional family 
arrangement to the organisations seen with the new micro cartels, ‘Instead Leadership 
interdiction tends to produce more diffuse trafficking and terrorist systems, as extremists and 
criminals adapt military and law enforcement pressures by replacing incapacitated leaders 
and decentralizing their operations’. Felbab-Brown (2013, p. 8) agrees, ‘A DTO’s [Drug 
Trafficking Organisation’s] capacity to regenerate leadership is great’. This also has a knock-
on effect in terms of processing tasks; a smaller group with less centralised leadership creates 
an organisation that can react faster than their law enforcement opponents; ‘What allows 
them to do so are the rapid decision cycles, flat management structures, and lack of 
bureaucratic and legal constraints that give terrorists and drug traffickers a leg up in 
competitive adaption’ (Kenney, 2007, p. 206/2480). In this quote, Kenney has in effect 
proposed an interesting question for this paper; has Colombia’s co-operation with the war on 
drugs unwittingly helped to create a highly streamlined and adaptable leadership model 
within the Colombian criminal groups, and if so what has been the impact on the US war on 
drugs? According to Kenney (2003, p. 194) it has had the opposite of the intended effect; 
While individual enterprises may transact less frequently and in smaller quantities than 
before, on the whole the Colombian drug trade produces more cocaine and heroin today than 
it did during the boom years of the 1980’s and early 1990’s’. Consequently, instead of being 
faced with the quantifiable traditional cartels with known families, currently drug production 
and trafficking has disseminated into the contemporary micro cartels who although singularly 
are less powerful, together produce and provide more illegal drugs to foreign markets than 
 108 
traditional cartels had. This has dealt a major blow to policing in Colombia, as now ‘when 
DEA and CNP official penetrate new groups, the damage is often limited to minor enterprises 
that specialise in single production or transportation activities’ (Kenney, 2003, p. 194). 
Debatably this scenario evidences both a positive and negative in Colombian policing 
leadership. From a positive perspective, Colombian policing had dismantled almost the entire 
traditional cartel structure by imprisoning, killing or extraditing to the US the traditional 
cartel bosses. However, in doing so they are a victim of their own success; instead of 
removing illicit drug production and transportation, it has transformed into many terrorist cell 
structured entities with far greater production and transportation capability without the 
weakness of centralised leadership, which is something Colombian policing is now having to 
adapt to. ‘It also illustrates the growth of individual, local and specialized responses to 
national policy. Policing drug-trafficking also needs to consider the complex interaction of 
volume/project crimes, the growth of highly organized crime, money laundering and 
corruption’ (Grieve, 2008, p. 18).  
 
That’s one of the key problems if the talks work with the FARC, a number of them 
will turn to crime, just as has happened with the paramilitaries. Therefore you’re 
always going to have to put pressure on these groups, because the groups will always 
be there to a greater or lesser extent. (Protected Source Three) 
 
How does the dismantling of the traditional cartels impact on the FARC? By the end of the 
1990s ‘the FARC had consolidated its position as the strongest guerrilla movement in 
contemporary Latin America, doubling the size of its army to between 15,000 and 20,000 
soldiers while simultaneously expanding its political and economic power to near half of 
Colombia’s territory’ (Peceny and Durnan, 2006, p. 95). Considering the significant influx of 
training and equipment to hunt Escobar, how was it possible for the FARC to gain so much 
ground and new personnel? The strong offensive by the Colombian government in the late 
80s and early 90s, arguably originating from strong political and policing leadership against 
the traditional family-run cartels, culminated in their being dismantled. A byproduct of this is 
that the traditional cartels – despite an early uneasy alliance in the 1970s - largely opposed 
the FARC and other guerilla groups. The FARC traditionally had targeted wealthy 
landowners as a source of income, but Escobar and his associates at their height had become 
the new wealthiest landowners in the Country, ones who also had access to military grade 
equipment and a well-trained force: ‘…these narco-funded paramilitary groups formed close 
ties with the army, and together they had the FARC, the ELN and M-19 on the run’ (Bowden, 
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2007, p. 33/581). However, when the traditional cartels were largely dismantled, so were 
their paramilitary forces. Furthermore, the Colombian government amended legislation that 
weakened the protection the wealthy landowners had customarily used, ‘…President Barco 
issued Decree 1194, which made it illegal for civilians or members of the military to create, 
aid or participate in ‘self-defence’ groups’ (Leech, 2011, p. 58), thus leaving rural areas that 
at the time, were poorly policed, open to exploitation from the guerilla groups. 
 
Political Corruption Challenges 
 
The CNP would be faced with another major issue when President Ernesto Samper took 
office; his administration already mired in corruption allegations for accepting drug money to 
help win the second round of votes (Frechette, 2007, p. 10). This culminated in the US de-
listing Colombia as an ally in the war on drugs, and more importantly rescinding all US aid. 
Up until this point the United States government had been keeping the Colombian military 
and the CNP stocked with the latest equipment and provided training packages so they could 
use them. Without this support the CNP was left in a precarious position. This evidences 
CNP leadership being directly and adversely affected by the decisions of the Colombian 
central government. Furthermore, without the US aid Colombian police would suffer in their 
ability to fight the new threat of the new ‘micro cartels’. As a result, police presence was 
focused mostly in large cities such as Bogota, Cartagena, and Medellin instead of spreading 
into the more rural areas where the cartels and guerrilla groups were operating (Nagel, 2002). 
Interviews with protected sources revealed a divide on how much of a problem corruption of 
the police in contemporary Colombia was. Several of the sources believed that police 
corruption by narcotraffickers and criminal groups had lessened: ‘I think a lot of success has 
been made since the mid to late 1980s when the cartels were really infiltrating the 
government, the most important thing was to protect the democratic former government and 
not let outside agents, and in this case, drug traffickers corrupt the system’ (Protected Source 
Eleven). In contrast, other sources believed corruption had worsened, but was more difficult 
to quantify: ‘I	think	corruption	is	still	in	the	Colombian	system	,	though	it’s	hard	to	see,	be	it	in	the	military,	there’s	been	theft	of	weapons,	there’s	been	in	my	time	here	there’s	been	assisting	of	planes	across	the	border	to	Venezuela,	the	level	of	corruption	is	there	because	the	basic	wage	in	the	military	and	police	makes	it’ (Protected Source Twenty-
Two). Given the comments from those this author interviewed and the general trend of 
narcotraffickers operating in a more covert nature, this author believes that there is a larger 
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problem with equally more covert corruption, but one that is difficult to quantify. However, 
whilst the issue of covert corruption might be debatable, a point that nearly all protected 
sources agreed upon was that those in the political arena and the greater CJS as a whole, had 
a considerable corruptive influence on the police. 
 
I know that corruption still exists within the police, but nothing compared with the 
corruption in the congress. (Protected Source Fourteen) 
 
Politicians when they do something bad, drunk driving etc., as soon as they are 
approached by the police they always say do you know who I am, do you know who 
you are dealing with, do you know who my contacts are, there’s a real lack of morals. 
The fact that there is no respect, it always happen at the low levels of police and with 
corruption. (Protected Source Nineteen) 
 
This is a cancer on our country, our judicial system is manipulated indiscriminately not 
only by wealthy individuals but also by politicians with great power, with threats and 
offers to control and distort evidence and how evidence is used. (Protected Source 
Thirty-Two) 
 
This evidence of undesirable impact by the Colombian central government on the CNP and 
other agencies to efficiently police Colombia, echoes a comment made by Adrian James a 
senior lecturer in Criminal Investigation at University of Portsmouth on the 10th June 2014 
Leadership workshop at the London Metropolitan University: ‘…That’s because the police 
can’t resolve the problem of crime on their own’ (James, 2014). James continued to elaborate 
that in order for policing to be effective and in turn for leadership in policing to exist, there is 
a requirement that central government must also provide appropriate leadership and policy 
(James, 2014). Without effective leadership from the top it is unlikely that effective police 
leadership can exist:  
 
The lack of leadership has also resulted in the irretrievable loss of police officers and 
troopers whose lives might have been spared had the officer corps and civilian 
officials exerted greater care and stewardship over law enforcement personnel. The 
indictment against a failed leadership command structure is in the numbers: In the last 
10 years, more than 2,000 police officers have been killed fighting guerrillas. Many of 
those losses were unnecessary and due directly to corruption and/or incompetence. 
More than a few police commanders and army officers have the blood of their own 
troopers and soldiers on their hands. (Nagel, 2002, p. 23)  
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The damning statement from Nagel is nevertheless accurate; police leadership is integral to 
both the safety and success of its officers. The absence of competent leadership can lead to 
appalling outcomes. 
 
President Uribe’s Tenure 
 
When President Uribe’s administration gained power in 2002 one of his pledges was to 
provide a more efficient national police force and more critically, to set policing across 
Colombia as a primary concern for his administration. In reference to working with senior 
government officials and senior policy managers deploying police officials Adrian James 
stated, ‘A message that comes through very loud and very clear, is that few of them are 
looking for policies that will … guarantee their fame, their celebrity. What they are all 
looking for is a policy that actually won’t drop them in it that will just pass nicely and then 
they move on to their next post’ (James, 2014). Debatably this statement was true of 
President Samper’s administration, but perhaps not of President Uribe, as might be seen by 
examining his election promises compared to his delivery: 
 
In August 2002, the newly inaugurated government of Álvaro Uribe received 
additional drug war assistance from Washington and the George W. Bush 
administration in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Supported 
by almost $8 billion in U.S. aid under Plan Colombia over the course of a decade, by 
2010 Colombian President Uribe and his program of “democratic security” had 
managed to beat back the FARC guerrillas, demobilize many – if not all – of the 
country’s paramilitary bands, and substantially reduce the country’s astronomically 
high levels of drug-related violence. (Bagley, 2013, pp. 7-8).  
 
 Uribe had provided Colombia with a strong legitimate government who in turn had 
strengthened the CNP and the military, enabling the extension of the legitimate governments 
influence beyond Bogota and other large cities into the rural areas where the problems laid, 
which made a difference. Protected Source One, who had experience during this time, 
commented that due to Uribe’s leadership Colombia had gone: ‘…from almost being a failed 
state to a developing nation with a healthy economy….’ This demonstrates strong and 
efficient leadership from central government filtering through to policing, leading a force 
capable of turning the tide on crime across the entire country. This is echoed by Frechette 
(2007, p. 16): ‘President Uribe’s election ushered in the greatest level of counterdrug 
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cooperation ever achieved between the United States and Colombia’. Although it should be 
highlighted by this author that Uribe’s presidency was not without its own controversy – 
falsos positivos (false positives), occurred in high frequencies during Uribe’s administration. 
False positives were when the military or other agencies killed civilians and presented them 
as insurgents killed in order to increase the enemy body counts with over 3,000 cases known, 
(Semana 2014). 
 
Rivalry Challenges 
 
This chapter has thus far looked at Colombian police leadership on the ground, as well as 
how central government politics can affect police leadership. The next key issue is one of 
rivalry in regards to policing in contemporary Colombia. As mentioned at the beginning of 
this paper Anderson (2013, p. 133) has stated that internal rivalry can be a necessity in order 
for an organisation to prosper. However, does that ring true in terms of the CNP? One of this 
author’s interviewees did not agree when discussing two sections inside the CNP:  
 
…there is a real rivalry between the Anti Narcotics and DIPOL for instance, so they 
kind of accept that they are working against the same targets and I have some very 
senior officers say to me it’s just a case of who gets them first, which is worrying 
really, because you think that if they carry the same badge then they would be 
working together, but that’s still a big problem for Colombia’s police. (Protected 
Source One)  
 
Debatably this does not counter Anderson’s statement, instead it highlights an unhealthy level 
of rivalry within the CNP to the point where policing resources are not combined on 
operations, but are instead split depending on the commanding officer. In the grander scheme 
of things, what is the cause of this rivalry in terms of police leadership? Is it an issue of 
strong leaders conflicting over operations, or is there a cultural issue at play? Protected 
Source One continued: ‘As I said, it’s all about who gets the credit, who gets to do the press 
conference, whose careers are made out of the high-profile results’. Therefore this points to a 
wider leadership problem within the CNP, where competition is favoured over co-operation 
and senior officers fight for recognition through their operational results. Most protected 
sources believed that rivalry was an issue and was related to mildly dysfunctional command 
structure or a lack of agency maturity. There is much to improve with regards to maturity 
between the organisations: ‘less rivalry, more collaborative working, work to be done on 
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stripping out the duplication between the agencies so that they cannot be played off against 
each other’ (Protected Source Eighteen). There were a few sources that believed rivalry was 
natural and could be utilised to achieve better results: ‘Each agency has its own professional 
pride so each agency will think that they achieve better results, I think this is a natural 
competition between the two investigative units. I don’t think this can been seen in a negative 
light, I would say this can be regarded as positive’ (Protected Source Eleven). However, 
despite this, even those sources believed that excessive rivalry, especially in regards to 
operations where there was a risk of threats to life, was corrosive and counterproductive. 
 
‘If relationships between different parts of the police are bad, relationships between the CTI 
[Judicial police] and police are worse’ (Protected Source One). The source continued to 
comment that agency rivalry between the police and CTI constantly leads to operational 
conflicts, and a race between both groups to see who can capture the individual and claim 
credit for the operational success first. Conversely, problems that surface are not always a 
matter of operational conflicts - there can also be a conflict over government projects. This 
author can recount an example of rivalry with regards to a project between four Colombian 
agencies; the CNP, the Fiscalia, the CTI, and the Colombian military. While working with 
these with the four Colombian agencies in relation to a technical project linked to Intelligence 
Led Policing (ILP), over the course of over five years (as of October 2017) this author has 
borne witness to an environment of constant rivalry. During this process all four agencies 
have ignored several key principles of leadership, namely transparency, integrity, agency 
cooperation and being open to criticism. Firstly there is the issue of transparency. Primarily 
the owner of the project in question is the Fiscalía, as they have an overarching responsibility 
to all other Colombian agencies with regards to this ILP project. However, several months 
after their project was presented another competing project was revealed by the CNP, which 
had secured a significant amount of funding (USD 60 million+) from the central Colombian 
government without consulting with partner agencies - this could be argued to show a lack of 
integrity. Furthermore, a year later the CTI presented a third competing project. 
Fundamentally, all three projects offered near identical specifications, with the two key 
differences being which agency had control of the project and which external company was 
to build the project, showing a lack of inter-agency cooperation. In the years that followed all 
three agencies were involved in discussions about which agency should have the overarching 
responsibly for the project and who would build it. Ultimately this lead to three different 
contracts being signed without agreement from their partner agencies or the Fiscalía, and 
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ended with the three agencies having three different projects trying to offer the same solution 
paid for several times over by the Colombian government, showing that each agency didn’t 
want to discuss their project and be left open to criticism. 
 
Rivalry Challenges Between the Police and Military 
 
Whilst an example of rivalry between the policing agencies has been given above, what of 
the rivalry between the police and the military? Rivalry could be considered a common 
occurrence in the UK between policing and security agencies according to (Sheptycki, 2004), 
but is less common between the police and the military. How is the problem seen in 
Colombia? Cassman (2003, p. 2) points out that ‘[in] Latin America, police and military roles 
frequently overlap, particularly in the areas of counternarcotics and counterinsurgency. These 
overlaps have historically created frictions and interagency rivalries that often frustrate 
national goals of maintaining public order’. So the issue of agency rivalry is not just an issue 
with Colombia, but with Latin America as a whole, and again this stems from postcolonial 
issues: ‘Latin American constitutions and the inquisitorial legal system inherited from the 
Spanish colonial rulers have contributed to the problem of defining what is police and what is 
military.’ (Cassman, 2003, p. 6). Whilst there is a move to change certain constitutions and 
the adversarial legal system in contemporary Colombia, the current climate has been shaped 
by these legacies. Does this mean there continues to be substantial rivalry between the 
policing agencies and the military? Cassman (2003, p. 11) believes so, in relation to 
Colombia he comments: ‘Military counternarcotics operations cause major turf battles with 
police agencies and raise some serious jurisdictional and legal questions. Are drug labs and 
coca fields legitimate military targets to be destroyed, or crime scenes with valuable evidence 
for prosecution?’. This is an issue with the policing agencies the CNP and CTI targeting 
illegal drug production and illegal drug trafficking, whilst the military target the insurgencies, 
however both the FARC and the ELN are heavily involved in both areas. This situation is 
amplified when considering that careers are made within Colombian policing by large scale 
operations, whereas everyday policing is not given the same interest, as highlighted by 
Protected Source Twelve: ‘I think this is something that is endemic in policing, people love 
getting involved in anti-terrorist work, the organised crime drug cartels, walking around the 
streets in uniform is not considered to be sexy, no one really wants to be in charge of that, 
you are not going to make your name in the highest levels by being in charge of that’. This 
situation elevates the rivalry between the police and the military to governmental policy 
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level, where the central government in Colombia needs to define what are military targets and 
what are crime scenes. A solution to this might be chronological demarcation whereby the 
military engage first to ensure the environment is safe for police to investigate a site as a 
crime scene, enabling improved joint working at the operational level. This would improve 
trust and understanding, in tandem with their leadership utilising working groups and 
committees. Such an initiative would have to be clearly defined in policy within both groups 
in order for it to be effective. Beyond the environment itself, is also the more involved 
question of how the illegal activity should be classified, ‘Should drug cultivators, processors 
and traffickers be treated as “enemy forces” to be killed or as suspects in criminal 
investigations and provided legal protections under due process of law?’ (Cassman, 2003, p. 
11). Once again this is an issue that needs to be covered at a policy level above the police and 
the military. Without an overarching policy dictating the precise ‘rules of engagement’ for 
the military in regards to drug operations, or policing guidelines for investigations around 
drug cultivation and transportation cases in order to create a clear division between the 
responsibilities of the two groups, conflict will continue between them. 
 
Promotion Challenges 
 
Problems also exist with entry to the police, and internal promotion within the policing 
structure. Protected Source One noted that four years of training is required before one can 
enter the police at the rank of senior officer, which has to be paid for by the applicant: ‘So in 
other words no matter how bright you are, if you haven’t got the money, you can’t do it’. In 
Colombia there is a big disparity between the rich and the poor (UN News Centre, 2008), so 
essentially this process excludes a sizeable section of the population from entering into the 
CNP as a senior officer, which reduces the candidates from those who are able, to those who 
are able and have considerable financial support. Several sources discuss the need for 
personal backing from a friend or family member already within the CNP structure:  
 
You do need to have the support probably of somebody in the police, if your father’s in 
the police better still, if you’ve got several generations of police officers in your family 
then you’re probably in even if you are stupid. (Protected Source One) 
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…[O]bviously the incentive is that you don’t blot the copy-book. You perform at a 
standard whereby you will get recognised because that promotion is not just done on a 
paper sift basis, it’s people around a table who say do we want him or her or do we not 
want them and therefore it is down to how well are you known. Not just what you have 
done or what you have achieved, but what are you like as a person and are you liked as 
a person, is this someone we want as a future leader in the organisation. (Protected 
Source Five) 
 
There is selective recruitment, a lot of social prestige that gets in the way of working, 
also it’s too hierarchic and nepotistic. (Protected Source Twenty) 
 
Nepotism to the point that it disregards ability could be considered as a factor that has a 
serious negative impact on police leadership. Although it has been stated ‘Leadership is a 
complex, abstract idea that is defined in many different ways by many different people’ 
(Alison and Crego, 2008, p. 54), one thing that is agreed upon is the need for competence. 
Without sufficient ability, the presence of competence and therefore appropriate leadership is 
questionable. Moreover, this nepotism extends far up the chain of command. Protected 
Source One asserts that:  
 
…up to Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel and Brigadier onwards it is a selection process, 
the selection process is a pretty nepotistic one. So to give you an example if you want 
to progress from Colonel to one star there are something like 38 Generals in the 
police, but it’s a bit like a Papal Conclave so they sit down with all the aspiring 
Colonels who are three years in as a full Colonel with files and bits and pieces and 
they decide, but from what I understand they are like Papal conclaves in the sense that 
nobody else is allowed in… 
 
Protected Source Five then gave an example of a case using another officer’s name, that if 
Officer X, a Colonel, had previously been considered an obstruction for one of the Generals 
in the past, whether that had been professionally or personally, this would be brought into 
account (although the specifics would be left out) and would act against the Colonel’s 
promotion to a General. This was also discussed by Protected Source Twenty-One: ‘The way 
crime is tackled here appears to be for appearance, to make the Generals happy, nothing 
moves until it has been signed off by the Colonel or someone in command, they don’t 
delegate down’. Theses example from the sources highlight three key points. Firstly, they 
demonstrate the presence of internal rivalry, to the point where superiors can hold one 
accountable for an incident years earlier if they believe that that officer had or has an agenda 
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that competes with (rivals) their own, which can culminate in withholding promotion from 
that officer. This could be considered as counter to effective police leadership as it 
demonstrates discrimination, with one having to align to a superior’s agenda in order to 
achieve promotion rather than promotion achieved through ability. This also counters the 
ideas of leadership presented on the 11th June 2014 Leadership workshop at the London 
Metropolitan University by a Metropolitan Police Officer Robert Bhairam (2014) who stated 
a need to ‘[c]reate a talent pool and use it’. He further explained that diversity adds 
significant substance to a team, but also recommended: ‘Don’t have obvious favourites… 
favouritism can really rot a team’ (Bhairam, 2014). The aspects described by Bhairam are 
inverted within the CNP, diversity is opposed if it can reduce one’s future career prospects, 
and favouritism is entrenched in both the officer recruitment program and within the 
promotional program. Another aspect of leadership that is called into question is that of 
transparency. Can transparency exist in a culture of partiality that extends from the beginning 
of one’s career until its apex as a General? If transparency cannot exist then can one learn 
from one’s mistakes? During the Leadership workshop it was highlighted that ‘criticism is 
the best way you learn’ (Bhairam, 2014); learning from one’s mistakes is key in an effective 
leader.  The third key point highlighted by this authors sources was the reluctance to act on 
given information due to an officer being concerned about his or her future promotional 
possibilities, and therefore, how passing the decision-making process up the chain of 
command reduces the efficiency of policing by adding needless temporal hurdles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Street Level Policing Challenges 
 
Local, street level policing ability and leadership came into question frequently amongst this 
author’s sources. Whilst many praised those officers working in specialised groups targeting 
narcotraffickers and organised crime groups at a national or international level, almost all 
those interviewed discussed the urgent requirement for improvements to street level policing.  
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…interaction at the local level, there are quite low levels of education, quite low levels 
of training, there’s an enormous difference within the police between the elite groups 
such as the groups that protect diplomats, where they are very highly trained… 
(Protected Source Two) 
 
General police that I have met, are of a pretty low standard. (Protected Source Seven) 
 
There is no direct supervision, where is their leadership, who is telling them what they 
are expected to do. I’m sure if you asked them ‘what did your senior management tell 
you that they need you to do today’ they would probably answer ‘just go and stand on 
the street’. (Protected Source Twelve) 
 
They are true heroes, although many are corrupt, I believe that those who act according 
to the law are true servants, because they protect Colombian citizens in any condition. 
(Protected Source Twenty-Seven) 
There is a lot of improvisation because they do not have the training. There is no 
permanence because they transfer staff constantly. (Protected Source Twenty-Nine) 
 
Senior leadership is strong. Local leadership appears weak. (Protected Source Thirty-
One) 
 
The general consensus was that street level policing appears problematic due to the lack of 
leadership and training, with little to no senior officer oversight or direction on a day-to-day 
basis and training courses are either non-existent or irrelevant to the officer’s daily duties. 
Also, it is interesting to note the slightly polarising perspective of Source Twenty-Sevens 
description of the police as both having significant corruption problems, but also being 
heroic. This view was not unique and despite the acknowledgement of corruption, most were 
keen to also point out the heroism within the police and the harsh environments that they 
work in both geographically, but also in terms of working within insurgents’ strongholds. 
When discussing the reasons for problems with street level policing during interviews, 
multiple reasons were cited. Firstly was the issue of training: ‘So an elite structure is created 
that is probably very capable and we have left at the bottom probably capable people, but 
who have not been trained and are not getting the investment put into their roles’ (Protected 
Source Eighteen); ‘…most of the Colombian police officers come from poor backgrounds, 
therefore, sometimes I would say that the selection process should be more careful, but that 
needs to be supported with better salaries, to attract those with a better education’ (Protected 
Source Eight). Seemingly, training for those entering the police at street level is not being 
provided because there is limited overall funding, with investment within the police force 
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appearing to be directed more towards officer grades: ‘I think the officers are well looked 
after, but the core officers on the ground aren’t, so they look after themselves, but not the 
core. The senior guys do have respect for their police officers, but if you go to the officers 
club and you look at the way they look after themselves. I think the general grunt on the 
ground is put there with minimal support…’ (Protected Source Seven). Having a police force 
on the ground that is under-skilled, not supported by senior officers and undereducated is 
problematic for multiple reasons, morale being one, but also the inability of the officer on the 
beat to feel empowered enough to tackle crime: ‘There are a lot of things happening, one is 
cultural, the police are seen as uneducated, that is changing, but slowly, the other thing is 
police on the street who try to do good are scared by those who are really dangerous or with 
contacts/well connected so they will get fired or moved to a really bad position. The pay also 
really needs to be addressed’ (Protected Source Nineteen). Lastly, a key point is that 
Colombia’s National Police force at street level is a hybrid of those who have chosen policing 
as a career and conscripts, which again problematises street level organisation: ‘CAIs have a 
mixture of professional and conscript professional police. You can tell visually who is a 
conscript or professional police by the insignia on their uniforms, and conscripts will never 
be armed with a firearm, they will have a baton’ (Protected Source Twenty-Four). 
Anecdotally, this author has seen a considerable difference between professional police and 
conscripts; professional police officers are more likely to be courteous, efficient and focused; 
comparatively, conscripts are more likely to be distracted - on their phone, in groups talking 
amongst themselves, and apathetic. This hybrid of police officers can cause considerable 
problems, with apathy and unprofessional conduct migrating from conscripts to the 
professional officers they are working with and ultimately undermining leadership at that 
level. Corruption at the street level also needs to be fully quantified and curtailed 
appropriately and transparently to further gain public trust. 
‘Reform’ typically conveys that heads will roll, with chiefs and senior personnel 
replaced or moved, new styles of control will be implemented, opportunity structures 
and enforcement patterns will be altered and that new values will be propagated as 
reassurance that the organisation has genuinely put its house in order. (Punch, 2009, 
p. 194)  
 
Police Structural Challenges 
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A key area that underpins all issues within the Colombian National Police, and which was 
raised by all sources, was the position of the police within the state’s structure. As previously 
discussed, unlike most other countries around the world, Colombia's police sit under the 
Ministry of Defence rather than existing as a civilian policing agency.  
 
Institutionally it sits unusually perhaps uncomfortably with some who are familiar with 
UK policing that the national police are within the Ministry of Defence and have close 
links with the military. I think that relationship, immediately muddies the perception 
that people may have of the police, given that the country has been at war for 50 years 
and it makes it harder I think to extricate the police as a concept from that relationship. 
(Protected Source Four) 
 
I think the problem the police have at the moment is that they are part of the Ministry of 
Defence and therefore they are not policing by consent, which is something in Europe 
we are very proud of. (Protected Source Twelve) 
 
At the moment the police look like the military, they operate like the military and they 
take their instructions from the military. (Protected Source Eighteen) 
 
To contrast these viewpoints, there are benefits to Colombian policing coming under the 
MOD, as argued by Protected Source Thirteen: ‘In a war fighting capacity the police need to 
be under the MOD, if it wasn’t under one chain of command at present, there will be an even 
more disjointed approach to fighting OCG & terrorist groups. If the transition to peace the 
threats become more isolated and less heavily armed, yes the police would probably operate 
better running under their own (away from the MOD)’. The fact of policing during an active 
civil war could be considered a valid one, and as of December 2016, despite the current peace 
agreement with the FARC, other guerrilla groups like the ELN are still active. This makes 
policing in tandem with military operations, despite the aforementioned rivalry, considerably 
easier. Additionally, due to the topography of Colombia and its poor infrastructure, military 
transport is often required in order to reach remote areas. The general consensus of opinion, 
including that of Protected Source Thirteen, was that Colombian policing in the future needs 
to be moved into a civilian ministry in order to provide an appropriate policing service rather 
than a quasi-military police force. This author does believe there is a trend of policing 
moving away from an almost paramilitary force towards more of a UK or US model, with a 
focus on community level policing. This was again heavily discussed during the interviews: 
‘They may have taken a couple of aspects and made their own, but that are really similar to 
what is being done in the UK and the US, you can see the way that they have modelled their 
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investigative programmes etc., they have completely overhauled their judicial system and 
made it into an accusatory system…’ (Protected Source Nine); ‘I think that the police are 
much more engaged with the public nowadays and they have tried to improve their image 
with the public by getting involved with community policing. Through recruitment the 
numbers of the police now are a lot higher, so this allows them to have a higher profile’ 
(Protected Source Eleven). This author believes this change is happening somewhat 
organically as Colombia is slowly transitioning from a country at civil war, to a post peace 
environment, and the leaders of Colombia’s police are recognising this and adapting. 
 
Inequality Challenges 
 
Another issue, although not a direct policing issue per se, which will have a sizeable impact 
on policing is the issue of inequality within Colombia. ‘While a good “rule of law” is 
supposed to protect the weak against the powerful… these legal frameworks have sometimes 
done just the opposite…’ (Stiglitz, 2013, p. 235). Stiglitz continues to surmise that in the 
United States, large corporations are able to avoid certain rules and regulations by virtue of 
the amount of resources they have at their command. From this author’s perspective (and 
reinforced by Bowden’s (2007) commentary on Escobar) the same is true in Colombia, those 
who have the resources carry a weightier voice and can also avoid certain rules and 
regulations. This effects police leadership with respect to the recruitment process of the 
police. The current recruitment process of officers requires a noteworthy amount of money in 
Colombian terms and considering the sharp rich/poor divide in Colombia, will exclude a 
sizeable part of the Colombian population. This permits only the higher social strata in 
Colombia to enter the CNP at a level where they can affect policy, which in turn dictates that 
policing policy will most likely favour members of Colombia’s higher social class, thus 
‘…the laws and regulations, and how they are implemented and enforced, reflect the interests 
the top layer of society more than those of the people in the middle and at the bottom’ 
(Stiglitz, 2013, p. 258). Although Stiglitz’s quote references the U.S., this author believes the 
same holds true for Colombia. 
Colombian policing, and specifically leadership within Colombian policing, has evolved 
considerably over the last three decades: ‘My personal view is that I have respect for the 
police that I have worked with, I have seen first-hand how hard they have worked together, 
side by side, the many hours they put in and effort in trying to do the right thing, their level of 
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integrity and their work ethic is exceptional’ (Protected Source Ten). However, this author 
argues that there is a real threat of some believing the war on drugs has been completed, or 
that issues of corruption are in the past and that the focus should turn to other areas like the 
peace process, a perspective with which this author disagrees. Although (Nagel 2002), 
Bowden (2007), and some of this author’s protected sources believe the situation is 
improving, others like Bagley (2013), Frechette (2007), Peceny and Durnan (2006) and some 
of the other protected sources this author has interviewed believed there is a lot more to be 
done, and that some contemporary policies are failing. Domestically whilst Colombia’s 
policing leadership has improved dramatically and the CNP have considerably more 
resources than they have historically, their recruitment and promotional polices need to be 
evolved if the CNP is to have effective leadership rather than a nepotistic structure. In regards 
to both foreign and domestic issues; rivalry - within the CNP, with the military, and with 
partner agencies (both domestic and foreign); and critically, better co-operation with their 
Andean neighbours, need to be addressed. Whilst Colombia is engaging more with their 
Andean neighbours, further leadership is required - both from the police and the Colombian 
government as a whole - in regards to co-operation across the continent in order for unilateral 
operations to end the bubble effect. The bubble effect allows drug traffickers and guerrillas 
that are targeted in one country, to migrate to another country that is ill-prepared to deal with 
the threats that they pose. If this is not addressed, those two key problems will traverse the 
continent and continue to evolve into more complicated and more dangerous beasts. 
Therefore, a new form of leadership is required across the whole Latin American arena; one 
that needs to have a unique perspective on the problem and, with a will to act rather than 
relying on past techniques with established figureheads. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to deliberate on what this new leadership would be, arguably referencing previous 
techniques alone might not be the answer, but instead viewing the problem from the 
perspective of physics to see the problem in a new light. 
 Acquiring a solution to police leadership throughout Latin America is a considerable 
problem and in order to ascertain a solution to that problem, a seemingly counter intuitive 
perspective may open up new possibilities that were previously overlooked. This author 
believes that it is in this way that a solution will be found. 
 
Outcomes and Future Direction of Colombian Policing 
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In summation of the issues investigated in this chapter, this author believes that police 
leadership has significantly improved since the times of Escobar, and there are those who 
agree: 
 
Despite past scandals in the upper ranks of command, many dedicated officials 
remain who have tried to reform the military and the National Police, such as General 
Rosso Jose Serrano, former head of the National Police, who during his tenure 
discharged more than 12,000 personnel for corruption, human rights violations, and 
drug trafficking. Serrano is proof that honest and tough leaders capable of meeting 
national objectives can be cultivated and empowered in the officer corps. Serrano’s 
leadership may have inspired a new movement among the officer corps of the 
National Police to fight corruption from within. (Nagel, 2002, pp. 28-29).  
 
Nagel presents a perspective that evidences a true evolution in Colombian policing in 
Serrano, a General and former head of the CNP who sought to eliminate officers who were 
either involved in criminal activity or demonstrated inappropriate behaviour not befitting a 
police officer. As previously referenced, this complies with Alison and Crego’s (2008, p. 55) 
definition of leadership, ‘…enhancing their commitment to an organisation’s goals and 
values, increasing their motivation and instilling in them a sense of group identity’.  
Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether this applies to the current police leadership. 
The evidence points to Colombian policing still having a number of areas that require 
attention in regards to leadership, as previously mentioned, and rivalry, another key focus of 
this paper. This author believes that rivalry in regards to policing exists far in excess of 
Anderson’s (2013, p. 133) assertion that internal rivalry can be industrious, leading to a more 
productive organization; ‘An organisation will only prosper with individuals who are 
ambitious, and ambition will lead to energetic rivalry’. The academic sources reviewed, the 
primary sources interviewed, and this author’s own experiences point to rivalry being a very 
corrosive influence in Colombian policing. Within the CNP itself, rather than Alison and 
Crego’s (2008, p. 55) example of the individual augmenting the ‘organisation’s goals’ and 
providing the officers with a ‘group identity’, it appears instead that the goals are more 
centred on the individual and his or her career than the greater picture. Protected Source One 
highlighted this point when he mentioned that groups internal to the CNP would constantly 
be racing to capture a figurehead so the officer in charge could gain credit and further their 
career. Arguably, the internal issues with rivalry can be resolved by strong leadership in the 
CNP’s Generals, most notably the head of the CNP overall as stated by Nagel (2002) in 
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regards to General Serrano. This author believes that such a change to the culture in the 
police would take more than one individual and over a longer period of time, but that it is 
possible. However, when examining the relationships between the policing agencies and the 
military there is a different problem; the issue of postcolonial legacy, as brought to light by 
Cassman (2003). Cassman (2003) underlined the different approach not just in Colombia, but 
the whole Latin American region when it comes to how counter-narcotic and counter-
insurgency work is accomplished. Latin American countries traditionally have a sizeable 
difficulty with drugs and guerrilla groups that oppose legitimate government rule. However, 
operations against these two groups have always been targeted with enthusiasm by both the 
military and the police, creating great rivalry between the two groups. This is exacerbated 
further when one looks at the Latin American arena overall; not only is there rivalry between 
the policing agencies and the military, but externally between the nations. This is both from a 
post-colonial perspective after Gran Colombia fractured into several other countries, but also 
from a political perspective in regards to the different politics in play across the region. For 
example, would a country with debatably communist sympathies like Venezuela want to 
assist Colombia in tackling an insurgency, like the FARC with its communist ideals, when 
the issue crosses into their territory? This author argues that it would be highly unlikely. 
Another area that this author believes requires considerable improvement is that of 
transparency in appropriately fighting corruption within the CNP. While Nagel (2002) points 
to real progress being made within the CNP to fight corruption from Generals like Rosso Jose 
Serrano, as Protected Source One pointed out, there is a considerable problem with nepotism 
and favouritism in both the recruitment of senior police officers and the process for their 
promotion. If police leadership within the CNP is to evolve, the processes for recruitment and 
promotion need to be both transparent and unbiased. This will ensure that the most capable 
officers are utilised, instead of the officer with a family legacy in policing.  
I could say that now it is a lot better, because Naranjo was a leader of the police, he 
wasn’t weak he was a good General, he left a good structure and good ideas behind, 
even when Cartels tried to pay Naranjo, he didn’t accept the bribes instead he went 
after them, to capture or kill. He left a very good example to the police he left a 
legend. (Protected Source Six) 
 
This author’s perspective worked with the Colombian National Police daily for five and a 
half years. Even within that relatively short time frame this author witnessed a considerable 
change for the better, namely in that there was a greater focus on transparent processes and 
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accountability at higher ranks. As can be evidenced by the new police code of 2017, there is 
more of a focus on policing objectives aimed not just at the HVTs (high value targets) of old, 
but greater emphasis on street level policing. For example section three from the new code 
states ‘LGBT community to be protected from abuse. Colombia’s LGBT community will be 
protected from being targets of abuse from other citizens. Attacks for verbal abuse against a 
member of these communities will result in a fine of $225’ (CNP 2017).  
Putting such legislation into effect in traditionally conservative Colombia shows the 
innovative approach being taken. 
 
I admire anyone who takes an oath of service. Policing is the hardest profession, 
however, I would remind the questioner, policing is so much more than dealing with 
the bad guys, it’s about protecting the rights of everyone, maintaining law and order 
and assisting the vulnerable, get those right and it’s a good day for everyone. I am a 
career police officer. My son is a police officer. (Protected Source Thirty-One) 
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Chapter 5 - Colombia’s Criminal Justice System - Challenges & Outcomes 
 
I think Colombia has got ample laws, I think Colombia has a quite sophisticated legal 
system, to the point where, it might be argued that it contradicts or overlaps.  I think 
the problem comes in its application, there is a massive bottleneck in the legal system 
and things don’t always go through. (Protected Source Eighteen) 
 
Colombia’s legal system has undergone numerous changes over the last 100 years including 
to its structure, as well as policies and amendments created due to national security threats. 
This chapter will cover the most pertinent changes to the Colombian criminal justice system 
in relation to this thesis. 
 
Given the previous chapters covering the classic cartels, paramilitary groups turned militias 
turned organised crime organisations, guerrillas, the FARC’s political party the UP and the 
police themselves, the last chapter of this work before the conclusion presents a high-level 
view of Colombia’s criminal justice system (CJS). How it has managed to adapt to the 
numerous challenges that it has faced and continues to face in the future? Has it helped or 
hindered Colombian policing? To answer these questions, this author will again visit previous 
topics including Escobar, the AUC, and policing and how they relate to the CJS as a whole to 
assess the problem faced versus the outcome and also discuss the implications of Colombia’s 
change of legal framework from an Inquisitorial system to an Accusatorial system.  
 
The CJS vs Pablo Escobar 
 
Multiple academics, documentaries and other forms of media including this author’s own 
research highlight the fact that corruption was rife at the time of Escobar. Protected Source 
Eight noted that ‘In	the	past	when	the	big	cartels	were	in	place	corruption	was	worse,	it	was	bigger.	Pablo	was	a	person	who	bought	anything’. Escobar famously stated that when 
competitors or the Colombian state opposed him, he used a method called ‘Plata o Plomo’, 
which translates literally silver or lead; meaning ‘choose between a bribe or a bullet’. Given 
Escobar’s incredible wealth, this strategy resulted in according to Leech (2011, p. 57) ‘In 
1982, Escobar’s popularity with Medellín’s lower classes led to his election as a Liberal Party 
alternate (deputy) to the national Congress’. This afforded him a diplomatic visa and in 
theory the capacity to influence Colombian legislation and judicial policy, including the 
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ability to oppose extradition to the United States, something that Escobar fought against 
constantly. This author’s protective sources considered the fact that the head of a known 
cartel assumed a role in Congress and had influence over judicial policy as one of the heights 
of corruptive influence in the Colombian criminal justice system. The fact that this came 
about brings into question the robust nature of the Colombian CJS and the wider Colombian 
state. Indeed Restrepo highlights that the criminal justice system in this period in Colombia’s 
judicial history was practically impotent:   
 
The level of intimidation and corruption of the system by drug traffickers proved very 
successful during this phase: judges were unable to sentence drug leaders in any 
meaningful way.  This situation reinforced both a growing distrust among 
Colombians of the system of justices’s inability to prosecute and punish criminals and 
a decreasing confidence in the government and the state. This second phase was 
characterised by the semi-paralysis of the system of justice caused mainly by the 
assassinations of and death threats to judges by the drug traffickers. (2001, p. 141) 
 
The next noteworthy infiltration of Colombia’s legitimate state structure was the appointment 
of President Ernesto Samper Pizano. As previously stated, after running out of funds and in 
order to see a close presidential campaign through to completion, Samper’s campaign team 
turned to the Cali cartel for funding and received six million US dollars. This allowed 
Samper to continue and subsequently win the presidential race to become Colombia’s 29th 
president in 1994. Despite a lengthy investigation and the arrest of several of the members of 
his party, the investigation against the president himself ended without a conclusion of guilty 
or innocent. As a result the United States declassified Colombia as an ally in the war on 
drugs, and with that any aid that was due. President Samper had his diplomatic visa revoked, 
essentially barring him from visiting the U.S. Despite this, President Samper served the full 
four-year term in office. This author is of the opinion that it would be unlikely that a criminal 
donor such as the Cali cartel would provide six million US dollars without requiring 
something in return, a view shared by Restrepo (2001). However, to date there has been no 
solid evidence of such demands made by the Cali cartel or agreed to by the Samper 
administration.  
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[On corruption] Politicians	when	they	do	something	bad,	drunk	driving	etc,	as	soon	as	they	are	approached	by	the	police	they	always	say	do	you	know	who	I	am,	do	you	know	who	you	are	dealing	with,	do	you	know	who	many	contacts	are,	there’s	a	real	lack	of	morals. (Protected Source Nineteen) 
 
The 1991 Constitution 
 
How did the CJS adapt to face these evolving challenges? One of the most notable ways was 
the 1991 Constitution, the largest legislative and policy change since the 1886 constitution 
which until 1991 had been one of the oldest constitutions in the region. One goal of the new 
constitution was to re-balance Colombia to become a more equitable society, one in which 
access to fair and reasonable justice was available to the populace. ‘The strengthening of state 
institutions this time was to be achieved by promoting other values, such as efficiency, 
accountability, representativeness and responsiveness.’ (Posada-Carbó et al 1998, p.85). One 
of the most powerful parts of the 1991 constitution according to Posada-Carbó et al was the 
’acción de tutela’ from decree 2591 which along with the previous ‘acción popular’ allowed 
citizens to challenge any law and therefore holding the legitimate state to account if 
legislation were deemed to oppose the rights of the citizen via the constitutional court. ‘The 
new procedures to protect constitutional rights, foremost tutela, enhanced the power of every 
judge in the country’. (Posada-Carbó et al 1998, p.85). The other pertinent issue was 
reinforcing the CJS in order to tackle the new threats to the state, namely the cartels, 
narcoterrorists and guerrilla groups. ‘Above all the judicial system was significantly 
reorganised and strengthened. Colombia moved towards an accusatory system which gives 
the state greater capacity to investigate and prosecute criminals, especially organised-crime 
bosses.’ (Posada-Carbó et al 1998, p.85). An example of one of the ways sought to 
accomplish this goal was the creation of the attorney generals office (the Fiscalía), to provide 
a secure central agency from which judges that could not be easily corrupted by criminal or 
insurgent groups. 
 
Torres (2007, p.4) highlights that with the pre 1991 constitution and the inquisitorial model, 
judges were often vulnerable when opposing large well financed criminal networks such as 
the Medellin cartel: 
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[B]ecause judges held such extraordinarily concentrated power in accusing suspects, 
prosecuting defendants, and determining guilt or innocence, they were especially 
susceptible to bribery, intimidation and violence. The danger posed to judges was 
especially apparent in Colombia in the decade preceding the criminal code reform. 
From 1979-1991, for example, 550 Colombian judges were assassinated, presumably 
for deciding against the interests of one of the parties.  
The 1991 constitution was significant in strengthening the criminal justice system, both by 
the addition of the new constitutional court, the Fiscalía and the beginnings of the transition 
from the inquisitorial to accusatorial judicial system.   
 
Finally, the (Constitutional) Court did not hesitate to strengthen the state when it 
came to review measures taken by the executive to fight violence resulting from 
guerrilla groups and drug traffickers.To guarantee public order, the 1991 constitution 
provides for a state exception, conferring on the executive three kinds of emergency 
powers. These have been used to strengthen the judicial system by enhancing the 
power of the public prosecutor. (Posada-Carbó et al, 1998 p.89) 
 
A key change in the Colombian CJS is the change from a inquisitorial to accusatorial court 
system. Traditionally in Colombia, the judiciary has had an inquisitorial system whereby 
judges were actively involved in judicial investigations.  In contrast, the accusatorial system 
that Colombia has recently adopted requires that the judge be neutral and receive the facts of 
the case from the prosecution and defence, with the ruling dictated by the judge and 
potentially a jury based on the evidence presented. This migration from inquisitorial to 
accusatorial justice system is a highly pertinent subject in terms of an outcome to previous 
CJS challenges, however, it is also a complex issue, one that this author’s research reveals to 
be still very much in a transitional state. Restrepo (2001, p. 63) analyses and discusses the 
early implementations of a pseudo accusatorial system with the implementation of the 1991 
constitution:  
 
The search for efficiency has been a constant factor in the reforms of the Colombian 
system of justice since at least the 1970s. Consequently, most judicial policy in the 
last three decades has favoured efficiency above all else, with the aim of clearing the 
judicial backlog of the courts. With this objective in mind, the 1991 Constitution 
introduced a ‘semi accusatorial’ system of justice into Colombia for the first time in 
the history of the country.  
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How does the contemporary criminal justice system fare post 1991 constitution? This 
author’s protected sources who work with Colombian legislators on a regular basis covered 
many areas of interest. Many sources stated there was a profound problem with rivalries 
between the different CJS partners, especially in terms of sharing information. When asked 
how the CJS works as a whole, Protected Source Four said:  
 
I think there’s a big disjoint and a lack of understanding and co-operation between 
Fiscalía, the Colombian prosecutors and especially the national police. You hear 
constantly of difficulties institutional sharing of information and it certainly 
problematizes the work of the judicial police within the Fiscalía who seem to be 
expected by prosecutors within the Fiscalía to have principled role in investigating 
crimes when they can often be after the national police sometimes the army and then 
the prosecutor themselves third of fourth in line in terms of information received and 
authority they are able to wield. 
 
 Protected Source Four went on to elaborate further about the issues of rivals between 
multiple state actors:  
 
Yes it certainly is a problem, I think again it’s not just those agencies, but it’s a 
Colombian phenomenon that agencies tend to jealously guard their remit or their own 
powers, there’s a real reluctance to work inter institutionally and you often see strange 
situations where it appears one agency is entirely duplicating the work that another 
agency is doing potentially without either of them being aware that that’s the situation 
going on. I think it’s a fair criticism of the Fiscalía that they still consider themselves 
to be the bastions of probity and integrity in an otherwise murky and corrupt system 
and that there can be a degree of haughtiness when prosecutors have to deal with, in 
my experience principally the judicial police. 
 
 Nearly all sources said the same, with Protected Source Ten especially highlighting this 
point by saying, ‘Yes, I think there is, there is lack of trust, where the agencies do not want to 
share the information that they have for the greater good, they will compartmentalise what 
they have’. Therefore, rivalry is again perceived as a barrier to progress, this time within the 
CJS as a whole and the way in which investigations are processed. As previously discussed, 
whilst rivalry can be a catalyst to change and improvement of one’s skill set in order to 
provide better results versus a competitor, this author would argue that the form and degree 
of rivalry between agencies in the Colombian CJS effectively slows avenues of investigation, 
and therefore has a more negative impact on the overall justice system - an issue that has 
been constantly referenced throughout this paper. This author argues that this is especially 
 131 
damaging when groups or agencies not only conflict in this nature, but actively block 
potential overarching solutions: They don’t, there is a lot of inter institutional rivalry, since I 
have been here there have been several attempts to create a joint intelligence committee and 
joint operational commands and they meet, they have meetings, but there is still a reluctance 
to share intelligence’. Protected Source Twenty-Four has highlighted a more troubling side of 
rivalry, one that is not operation specific, but instead process specific, where attempts to 
create a committee to specifically bridge intelligence gaps is being obstructed by rivalries. 
However, it should be noted that a one source did report that old dissensions between state 
actors were slightly subsiding: ‘The rivalry between the army and the police has not really 
been resolved in my view operationally, but it’s much better than it was…’ (Protected Source 
Three). Whilst an earlier perspective from Protected Source Eleven stated that agency rivalry 
can energise groups into providing better results, and that perspective should not be 
dismissed, this author contends that the evidence gleaned from research showed the overall 
view of rivalry between agencies is that of a negative influence on the overall Colombian 
criminal justice system. One that not only affects the day-to-day investigations, but that is 
supposedly so ingrained into the mindsets of the different institutions that at present, it is 
sabotaging movements towards resolving overarching plans to share information. Whilst this 
may change in the future, it is likely to require a change to the next generation to do so. 
 
I do believe justice is elusive in a lot of cases, but with the primary mission for peace 
now, this may change as the police can dedicate more resources to street crime and 
working with [the] Fiscalía. (Protected Source Thirty) 
 
The Unión Patriótica 
 
The next significant issue to be covered in the previous chapters was that of the Unión 
Patriótica (UP), who as discussed, were systematically wiped out by paramilitary with 
information pointing towards support from state actors. Whilst some police and military 
actors were dismissed, this was not in recognition of the crimes against the UP, and arguably, 
this was one of the largest failings of the Colombian CJS. In theory, the reason that 
prosecutions were not sought was the UP’s position as the unofficial political face of the 
FARC, and therefore, an enemy of the state. The new legal frameworks that preceded the 
AUC’s peace process, began with Law 418 which was passed into legislation in 1997. This 
law provides amnesty from the criminal justice system for those who demobilize, excluding 
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them from investigation through to incarceration. Following Law 418 was 2002’s Law 782, 
which considers all persons who are engaged in armed conflict but under the age of 18 years 
as victims, therefore not eligible for prosecution, though must be demobilised under any 
peace agreement. This was in turn followed by presidential Decree 128 which states terms by 
which those who demobilise can claim benefits; these were a mix of legal aid as outlined in 
Law 418, but also aimed at re-assimilation into society, including provisions for financial 
support. These legal frameworks also complied with international law, which states that 
serious human rights abuses can be prosecuted and any individual found guilty of such acts 
would have their amnesty annulled. On the 22nd of July 2005, the Justice and Peace Law (Law 
975, Ley de Justicia y Paz) came into effect and was intended to work in tandem with the 
previous legislation. This law allowed those who demobilised but were not covered by 
previous legislation to be included. It was also created to provide better access to the right to 
justice from the victims of the conflict, either allowing them to seek criminal charges against 
their perpetrator or other reparations such as financial compensation. The rights of the 
victims is a fundamental change to previous peace processes, which were more concerned 
with demobilisation of enemy combatants and re-integrating them into society and had little 
to no legal framework to give victims access to the right of justice. However, as much 
progress as these changes in legislation promised, many questioned their application as Isa 
(2008, p. 03) evidences: ‘This situation has received harsh criticism from various quarters, 
the argument being that it amounts to a surreptitious way of guaranteeing impunity for the 
majority of those involved in the process’. Isa (2008, p. 03) states that there has been 
considerable progress, but the approach is still ‘fragmented’ and the long-term outcomes are 
still unknown. García-Godos and Andreas (2010, p. 516) reviewed transitional justice in 
regards to the Justice and Peace Law and found that ‘The strength and potential of victims' 
rights lie in their capacity to convey legitimate claims on a solid normative base; this is an 
opportunity that victims, victims' organisations and civil society at large are increasingly 
taking advantage of in the Colombian process’. García-Godos and Andreas (2010, p. 516) 
conclude by stating that although there can be equality, the fundamental issue is that of 
peace; if that can’t be guaranteed then neither can that of appropriate justice to the victims. 
However, when one considers the historical areas of concern as outlined in previous chapters, 
that is, cartels, paramilitaries, large organised crime groups and insurgencies, these relatively 
recent legislative changes are a positive sign the Colombian CJS is moving in the right 
direction to provide a judicial framework that is appropriate to the needs of its citizens. 
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(The) strongest part of CJS? That they have recognised that there is a problem and 
that they need assistance. (Protected Source Twenty-Five) 
 
Case Backlogs & Issues With Impunity 
 
Another pertinent issue highlighted was that of considerable case backlogs at the Fiscalía 
affecting Colombian citizens’ right to justice. Many of this author’s sources stated that the 
case backlogs are so severe that the Fiscalía is considerably delaying cases and dissuading 
prosecutors from taking on new cases: ‘…knowing the backlogs that the Fiscalía have, in 
their systems and the slow movement of the court processes in Colombia…’ (Protected 
Source Four). ‘For instances there are hundreds of thousands of cases that are backlogged in 
the Fiscalía and there isn’t sufficient people to deal with them’ (Protected Source Twenty-
Four). This point is echoed by Torres (2007, p. 3) around the inquisitorial system that was the 
only judicial process for Colombia pre 1991, ‘The emphasis on written and secretive 
adjudication, combined with the multiple responsibilities required of one judge, made it 
difficult to process even the simplest cases quickly.’ Therefore, this is seemingly not solely a 
historical, but an ongoing issue; Restrepo (2001, p. 76) also states that when looking at 
independent research into the Colombian justice system between 1972 and 1982, ‘The 
rhetoric around justice in that period is always based on the judicial backlog (congestión 
judicial) or gnarl inefficiency of the system of justice, occasionally focusing on the high level 
of impunity’. However this trend stretches even further back with Restrepo (2001, p. 78) 
noting that ‘The evidence shows that since 1937, when judicial statistics became viable in 
Colombia, there has been a serious pattern of judicial accumulation in the criminal 
jurisdiction’. This is of considerable importance since it not only highlights a contemporary 
issue, but poses the question of is this an inherent weakness in the Colombian judicial 
processes and if so why, with continual changes in legislation; the creation of a new judicial 
body in the form of the Fiscalía; and judicial reform by changing from an inquisitorial to 
accusatorial system, is case backlog such an enduring problem? Another critical aspect of any 
judicial system is its impunity rate. As previously mentioned, the impunity rate during the 
paramilitary demobilisation could be debated as poor, but what is the overall impunity rate in 
Colombia? Restrepo (2001, p. 93) discusses that impunity rates are often discussed in the 90-
95 per cent range, which is remarkably high, however the last documented figures discussed 
‘… by the  Departamento de Planeación Nacional in 1998 claimed that there was a 97.5 per 
cent degree of impunity in Colombia’. Torres (2007, pp.4) states that, ‘Not surprisingly, this 
 134 
procedural inefficiency led Colombia and Guatemala – two nations historically marked by 
high levels of violence and criminality – to suffer from astronomical impunity rates.’ In 
contemporary Colombia this author’s sources still saw the impunity rate as a considerable 
problem, with Protected Source Twenty-Five noting that: ‘It seems like the mechanism is 
broken between someone committing a crime and then their likelihood to go to prison for that 
crime’. This also has a considerable direct knock on effect to policing, where Restrepo 
commented on police officers being ‘demoralised’ by the inability for the CJS to prosecute 
suspects that they arrest (2001). Coupled with this is the fact that reporting rates are 
supposedly equally low - around 20 per cent according to Restrepo in the late 1990s (2001), a 
fact backed up by numerous sources: ‘If a crime were to happen I think the general thinking 
is not to report it to the police’ (Protected Source Twenty-Five). This thought was echoed by 
Protected Source Twenty-Nine, ‘…there are many crimes that are never known by the 
police’. There is one final aspect for consideration on this issue and that is the very low rate 
of incarceration of those who have been convicted, with Restrepo (2001, p. 97) again 
highlighting that ‘For example in 1990, the state only managed to imprison 49 per cent of 
convicted criminals who were given jail sentences’. To summarise, the first issue; the lack of 
public trust in the criminal justice system, to the point that a very low amount of criminality 
is reported, is quite possibly linked to the continued public acknowledgement that the 
Colombian CJS is permanently backlogged with cases, therefore, theoretically dissuading 
both the public and the prosecutors from creating new cases. Secondly, is the high rate of 
impunity; not just in the case of large scale demobilisations of insurgent or paramilitary 
groups, but also in traditional criminal cases, diminishing not only the public’s perception of 
the CJS, but also policing agencies. Lastly, even if a prosecution is successful, there is a high 
probability that a suspect with a combination of power, wealth and influence will abscond 
avoiding incarceration entirely. This combination of issues could mean that if one were to 
take 1,000 crimes perpetrated, and consider this with a 20 per cent reporting rate, a 
subsequent 90 per cent impunity, coupled with the knowledge that 49 per cent of those 
prosecuted avoided incarceration altogether, this would result in a likelihood of around ten 
convictions per 1,000 crimes perpetrated, something which this author would argue illustrates 
a dramatic weakness with Colombia’s criminal justice system. However, evidence from 
Restrepo and this author’s sources shows that the Colombian system of justice not only fails 
to be efficient (as the high level of impunity shows) but also fails on the grounds of 
impartiality and equality, creating distrust in the system; ‘The legitimacy deficit is 
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accentuated by, among other things, a limited access to the system of justice by citizens, and 
a tradition of class justice - that is, two degrees of inequality’ (Restrepo, 2001, p. 75)  
Although Colombia has broken up gangs, increased drug seizures and cut its murder 
rate, its courts and jails remain inefficient and corruptible by global standards. Because 
it now extradites even mob foot-soldiers, no one knows if it could jail a proper capo 
safely. Just 9% of murders there lead to a conviction. (The Economist 2015a) 
 
It is in fact very difficult to prove the existence of corruption since its immediate effects 
are often invisible and in most cases the victims of corruption are rarely aware of it. 
(Restrepo, 2001, p. 117) 
 
From this author’s protected sources, there were a number of perspectives of the criminal 
justice system overall and the problems with a re-occurring theme, corruption: 
 
I often think that if they applied the laws that exist efficiently, things would be a 
whole lot better in that area. (Protected Source Eighteen) 
 
People feel there is no justice, because there is such corruption in the justice system. 
Too many groups only have interest in their own groups and not doing their jobs. 
(Protected Source Nineteen) 
 
(Do you think the Criminal Justice system works?) No, because of the lack of 
resources. (Protected Source Twenty-Nine) 
 
(In regards to the CJS) If it works, but I believe that justice in Colombia is delayed, it 
should be more expeditious, but I believe that I am one of the few people who love 
the Penal System in Colombia, even if its result is delayed and if I believe justice 
exists in Colombia. (Protected Source Twenty-Seven) 
…I think this is difficult to do and the problem lies in our judicial system, which is 
very flexible, ineffective and lenient to the crimes that should have some higher 
penalties. For this reason I think it's not a matter of physical coverage in the territory 
but more appropriate penalties. (Protected Source Thirty-Two) 
(How well do you think the police work in the Criminal Justice System?) Not really 
well, due to weak legal system and poor support from the institution to the officers. 
(Protected Source Thirty-Three) 
 
Therefore, the general opinion from this author’s sources is that a form of justice exists in 
Colombia, but it is not without its problems both in reputation and in practise. A key issue 
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gleaned from this authors research is that corruption has the potential to either delay or 
blocking justice.  
 
Corruption 
 
Corruption is a running theme within this paper and potentially one of the most significant 
factors to affect Colombian policing, influencing many sections of the Colombian state 
whose actions cascade into policing, to congress and the president. The indifference of the 
state regarding the deaths of the members of the Union Patriotica and the state collaboration 
with paramilitaries are examples of this. Corruption can be excused by some as a cultural 
issue, or an economic issue when the legitimate state and its actors need to access extra 
funds, where the state itself is impoverished. However corruption isn’t just a method of 
accruing funds, but a very serious security issue, as Chayes (2015, pp. 6-7) discusses in 
regards to contemporary Afghanistan: ‘Corruption, it made plain, was not solely a 
humanitarian affair, an issue touching on principles or values alone. It was a matter of 
national security - Afghan national security and, by extension, that of the United States’.  
Chayes is alluding to state corruption which quickly spread internationally by way of creating 
insurgent groups, and therefore transformed a state level security concern into a security 
concern for the international community as a whole. This author argues that the Afghan case 
closely mirrors the issues of corruption in Colombia which in part enabled the rise of the 
international security issue of narcoterrorism. However, Restrepo argues corruption can be 
considered a somewhat nebulous concept (2001), with very few statistics to allow accurate 
quantification of the problem. This is an instance where anecdotal evidence from experienced 
professionals can yield highly pertinent and valuable information on the subject at hand. 
When discussing corruption within the CJS with this author’s sources, there was clear 
anecdotal evidence across a multitude of considerable problem areas. When asked if he 
believed that there are corruption issues within the Colombian CJS, Protected Source Four 
answered: ‘Yes and sadly, you hear anecdotal evidence of police corruption at the lowest 
level taking bribes to make difficult situations go away or to facilitate processes, what 
sometimes seems more extraordinary here, is that it visibly reaches the higher echelons of 
state institutions seemingly with little being done’. As discussed, this is problematic for two 
reasons; firstly, that it reaches senior figures in the CJS, but also, that little is being done to 
prevent it. It makes the situation far harder to address if it is not even seen as a problem to 
begin with. Protected Source Four followed up with an illustration:  
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A good example is the director of organised crime in the Fiscalía was caught taking 
backhanders from a BACRIM group operating in one of the Colombian regions, but 
rather than investigate and prosecute the guy, he was simply shifted to another post 
within the Fiscalía. I suppose it’s not criminal justice, but another example is the 
president of Constitutional court who has allegedly received money to change the 
judgment of the court and yet remains in post, whilst the investigation [against him] 
goes on. The practice seems to be just to move people out of harms way for a bit.  
 
This author has witnessed this behaviour firsthand. Whilst working with a particular policing 
agency, a member of a specialist group was identified as taking bribes when submitting to 
their annual polygraph. Whilst this individual was removed from what was considered a 
sensitive and specialised policing unit, this person was not removed from the agency, but 
instead moved into an administrative position. What this author found most troubling was 
that this individual was allowed to work on projects associated with his former group and 
socialise with his former colleagues inside the work environment, arguably reducing the 
severity of the punishment and minimising perception of the deviancy of corruption. The 
situation also allowed for access to information from his previous position via a third party. 
Nearly all protected sources could recount a scenario based around corruption. Protected 
Sources Fourteen & Fifteen discussed traffic cops requesting financial incentives to ignore 
either genuine traffic violations or ones considered tenuous at best. Protected Source Nine 
believes that in regards to BACRIM/GAOs: ‘They have access all over the country to 
whatever they need and again they have some very good corrupt sources within the judicial 
system and some of these small departments, so they don’t have to worry about going to jail.’ 
This further evidences the high impunity rate; why would one be concerned with arrest if a 
corrupt official can nullify one’s crimes? ‘Trafficking rings, whether they deal in illicit drugs 
or substandard medicine, restricted resources such as protected wildlife, or weapons, or 
conflict minerals, can obtain their product of choice or move it without leaving tracks through 
highly corrupt environments’ (Chayes, 2015, p. 185). Despite this, it is worth noting that not 
all of the protected sources believed that corruption was as big an issue in contemporary 
Colombia, with Source Eleven answering in regard to the question of whether the Colombian 
police offer fair and reasonable justice to their citizens: ‘Yes. I think that the quality of 
policing has improved tremendously, there will always be small pockets of corruption, but 
not anything like it used to be’. There could be a basis for this, as this source had worked in 
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Colombia on and off for over fifteen years supporting the CNP and other agencies, therefore 
from this person’s perspective, the problem could be considered considerably reduced to 
where it used to be and that complete elimination of corruption is unrealistic. Lastly, 
Protected Source Thirty-Two underlined again that if the crimes are not reported in the first 
instance, there will be no statistics on these crimes: ‘I think not, here you can only reflect 
what is reported, which arrives at police stations, investigations assigned to prosecutors etc., 
this is what can be quantified and are the figures that they deliver to the public, but there are 
many crimes that are ignored that do not pass through the control of the police’. 
Another perspective is how corruption relates to insurgencies, as Chayes (2015, p. 185) 
describes corruption and inequality can assist in the breeding of insurgent groups: 
‘Worsening environmental conditions, in turn, increase the suffering of the populations, 
making them more likely to rise in revolt’. Therefore as corruption increases so does 
inequality, and according to Wilkinson and Pickett (2010, p. 144) inequality is a catalyst for 
violence: ‘In summary, we can see that the association between inequality and violence is 
strong and consistent; it’s been demonstrated in many different time periods and settings’. As 
previously discussed with Colombia not having an official state presence across all of its 
territory, inter-community violence can quickly spread regionally and evolve into insurgent 
groups, leading to long term security problems for the state that traditional policing models 
alone are unlikely to overcome. Therefore as discussed in this chapter, corruption of the 
Judiciary is very much a causal factor to the erosion of policing ability and overall 
diminishing state security. 
 
Acutely corrupt governance doesn’t just aid terrorist organisations by driving 
indignant citizens into their arms; it provides haven and logistical support for those 
very same groups, as officials avert their eyes in exchange for a bribe. (Chayes, 2015, 
p. 184) 
 
…The success of the drug trafficker’s influence on the formal system of justice and 
its capacity to corrupt the state or paralyse the system of justice. However, the 
survival of the system of justice - in spite of drug traffickings’ severe subversion … 
gives signs of hope. (Restrepo, 2001, p. 149) 
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Potential Post Peace Problems & The Media 
Source Ten pointed to a new criminal justice problem, one of the legitimate state arriving into 
a region where previously there had been no presence: ‘…one of the big problems that people 
will have regarding the peace process, if you have never had a police force or a government 
force in the community for years and years, then suddenly you have a foreign entity in your 
neighbourhood trying to control the rule of law, it is going to be difficult’. It is a common 
occurrence that previously large regions of Colombian territory has been unofficially 
governed by numerous illegal actors: ‘… there are a lot of areas in Colombia, as previously 
stated, that are controlled by the ELN, the FARC and other ex AUC where all the rule of 
government is manned by those groups’ (Protected Source Ten). Migrating from that 
structure to one of the official state will be problematic, as the two structures will not be 
identically parallel. There is also a high probability of the local communities opposing 
official government representation as they seek to impose previously ignored laws or are 
simply unknown and therefore untrusted. This perception of a trusted or untrusted actor has 
been prevalent in relation to the CJS for decades according to Restrepo (2001, p. 128) where 
several national survey findings in ‘1967 [show that] 68 per cent thought judges could be 
bribed’ and that in ‘1986 it was 88 per cent’. Also there appeared to be a historical class 
divide in relation to impunity, whereby certain sections of society have been exempt from the 
CJS; ‘White-collar criminals - such as those convicted for corruption, sophisticated 
criminality such as computer theft and paramilitary, guerrilla and drug-trafficking associated 
criminals only began to appear in the prison statistics from 1992 which suggests that jail has 
generally been used for marginal criminals from the less well-to-do sectors of society’ 
(Restrepo, 2001, p. 98). This author received anecdotal evidence from his sources about 
certain criminal activities that have either been ignored due to the perpetrator’s social 
standing or instances in which the perpetrator had paid to have the charges dropped, however, 
the sources requested that this author not divulge the names.  
 
… I have visited 3 prisons in Colombia and the prison police and workers are more 
afraid than the inmates. Criminals are able to communicate freely with the outside 
world and operate criminal enterprises from within. I believe it needs a complete 
overhaul. (Protected Source Thirty) 
 140 
 
Another area for concern is where the media can also be utilised by corrupting forces to 
leverage the CJS. Restrepo (2001, p. 127) comments that  
 
[a] third issue, which could be related to the dishonesty of judges, is the influence of 
the media in the administration of justice.  Some experts claimed that the importance 
given by judges to cases involving prominent political or economic figures was more 
the result of media attention, hence public opinion ‘interest’ in the particular case.  
 
This was reinforced by Protected Source Fourteen who stated that:  
 
For a case to progress swiftly, the media have to be involved.  If it appears in the 
media it will be fast, if not, it will be a much slower process.  It is amazing, when 
something appears on the news, quite often the next day they will have arrested the 
guilty person.  The intelligence within the police here is extremely good.  
 
Therefore this is very much a contemporary issue as well as a historic one, which offers those 
with media connections - or the money to make them - the ability to undermine the CJS in 
their favour. When discussing this further the question was posed whether those people that 
have more money can get faster results - to which Protected Source Fourteen replied:  
 
Yes.  Lawyers cost money and if you are rich this will usually mean that you will 
have good contacts and obviously good contacts can do you favours. There was a case 
where a woman murdered her boyfriend and her father was very wealthy (he worked 
in the oil business).  In the area where the murder occurred, there were many security 
cameras, and it is widely speculated that the father may have paid people to erase the 
footage. If you are rich you will have many advantages. 
 
 What was striking about this was not just what this source said, but how it was said, this 
author found their perspective to be very matter of fact and accepting that this takes place - 
almost wondering why one would be questioning this practise. Whilst this author will protect 
the identities of all the sources, it is worth noting that this source works inside the CJS and 
therefore their comments should carry added concern. 
 
A further issue is how the Colombian CJS deals with statistics. As mentioned in this author’s 
methodology, statistical analysis was dropped during the research and interview phases due 
to the number of inaccuracies and commentary on statistics, to the point that this author 
 141 
believed they would harm this paper more than support it, or that this author would have to 
expend far too much time within this thesis to explain and make use of erroneous statistical 
data. In regards to judicial corruption, ‘… in the case of Colombia such statistical data is poor 
and incomplete …’ (Restrepo, 2001, p. 117). Indeed, this was verified by the protected 
sources: ‘No, I think crime statistics in Colombia are speculative at best’ (Protected Source 
Twenty-Five); ‘No, I don’t think crime statistics are accurate. I think that part should be more 
honest for crime prevention in Colombia. Colombia is changing and we need to integrate 
with police agencies and prosecutors in order to be actors in the fight against criminal gangs’ 
(Protected Source Twenty-Six). Protected Source Four provided the most comprehensive of 
accounts about whether the CJS can produce accurate crime statistics:  
 
I find that the Colombians are fairly good at collating statistics, they certainly do a lot 
of it, whether the accuracy of all of it can be acted on unchallenged is another 
question… This is an assessment of the accusatorial justice system from its inception 
in 2004 through to 2014 and the statistical evidence they have collected and rely on is 
extraordinary, but there was criticism that the Fiscalia’s SPOA sources of statistics 
about the organisation are strategically chosen to give the best possible reflection of 
the institution. (Protected Source Twenty-Six) 
 
Also Protected Source Seven gave examples where they knew for a fact the statistical figures 
were not accurate, despite it being reported that they were ‘…no homicides in Chapinero in 
January 2016, sorry, but we know of two homicides here in Chapinero, car thefts one, 
really?!’ When asked if he thought crime statistics weren’t particularly accurate then, the 
source merely replied with a forceful ‘No!’ 
 
Challenges & Outcomes  
 
In the 70s and 80s the Colombian criminal justice was challenged constantly with the rise of 
insurgent groups and the classic cartels. The Colombian government responded to this by 
overhauling the criminal justice system.The 1991 Constitution and the creation of the Fiscalía 
was a noticeable effort to bring about judicial changes, not just for having a central body with 
a markedly different judicial ethos for the time, but also in its far reaching judicial powers. 
Restrepo (2001, p. 63) continues, ‘The creation of the Fiscalía as part of the introduction of a 
‘semi accusatorial’ system of justice represented a great change in the administration of 
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criminal justice. Apart from the investigation and prosecution of all crimes, the Fiscal 
General can prosecute any minister in the cabinet…’.   
 
These changes, however, were not without their limitations: ‘Regardless to the claims of 
some commentators, the creation of the Fiscalía in the 1991 Constitution did not represent the 
beginning of the accusatorial system of justice. Indeed, the evidence suggests that some of 
the most positive structural characteristics of the accusatorial system of justice were excluded 
in the Colombian system’ (Restrepo, 2001, p. 63). Despite Restrepo’s conclusion that the 
1991 changes did not lead to Colombia fully utilising the accusatorial system, in 2005 
Colombia did formally adopt this system (Marcella, 2009). How effective has this change 
been? Academic sources see Colombia ‘…as a work in progress. For example, the number of 
backlogged cases is still staggering despite the fact that the trials are held more quickly under 
the accusatorial system’ (Marcella, 2009, p. 33). From this author’s protected sources the 
narrative is mixed, with some claiming the system is working well: ‘Overall I think it has 
assisted Colombian policing. With inquisitorial the criminal knows that he is being 
investigated and he will probably hire a lawyer and then it’s unlikely that the criminal will go 
to jail, with accusatorial an investigation takes place, evidence is collected and presented to 
the prosecutor and then an arrest warrant would be issued’ (Protected Source Eleven). Others 
highlighted that: ‘I think there’s questions as to whether the adoption of an entirely new and 
foreign criminal justice system is the right way to go, in a country which has historically been 
struggling with criminal justice issues anyway and particularly to seek to do so in such a 
short period of time’ (Protected Source Four). A large number of this author’s sources did not 
want to comment stating that they didn’t know enough about the process, with many sources 
not even sure of the year that the Colombian CJS adopted the accusatorial system. In short, 
there appears to be considerable confusion over the process and how it’s currently being 
incorporated. These perspectives from both academia and the protected sources lead this 
author to believe that, although it is worth referencing the process and the direction that the 
Colombian CJS is heading, at present there appears to be limited evidence as to how it is 
performing both as a whole and in terms of the transfer to the accusatorial system. When 
enquiring as to how long the accusatorial system could take to be solidified in the CJS, 
Protected Source Four stated that: 
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 This is a generation, not least because changing the processes and institutions 
responsible for the criminal justice system is one thing you could feasibly do that 
within the ambitions ten year time frame that the Colombians chose, but the problem 
is cultural, you still have a series of judges who are used to their previous roles and 
prosecutors who are used to their previous roles and changing their mind-set may just 
require their replacement with a new generation of lawyers and judges. (Protected 
Source Four) 
 
Therefore, it is highly likely that it will take considerable time until one could accurately 
quantify the success or failure of the implementation of the accusatorial system, with 
Protected Source Four even debating if the: ‘…accusatorial system [should be] further 
entrenched or [should be] abandoned…’ If the system were to be abandoned, it would 
arguably be a blow to over 20 years of legislative changes and from one point of view, the 
evolution to the CJS. Arguably the accusatorial system provides the police and the judiciary 
as a whole with a more balanced platform by which justice can be achieved.  
 
Furthermore, on the 30th of January 2017, the new police code came into effect, the full code 
as well as 16 highlighted points can be seen under Appendix four. There have been a number 
of amendments that will allow the police more powers to pursue actions listed within this 
thesis, such as dangerous driving, that they had not been able to do so before. However, it 
should be equally highlighted that some consider these new powers could be abused and used 
to increase corruption (The Bogota Post 2017). At this stage, this author can’t quantify the 
full affects of the new police code, neverthertheless it does show willingness of the state to 
tackle the policing problems of the past, it’s success will be judged by its implementation and 
will be a good point of study for future academics. 
 
The other thing I think is perhaps overlooked is that [the] accusatorial justice system 
prizes the role of society and society needs to be taught that new role and more than 
that needs to have faith in the system it’s being told that it has a vital stake in. I’m not 
sure the Colombian institutions have done enough to educate the population nor 
whether the system as it is, will ever inspire that sort of faith. (Protected Source Four) 
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
 
Over the preceding five chapters, this author has provided an outline of the challenges and 
outcomes of the war on drugs, leadership in the Colombian police and the criminal justice 
system and how they have changed over the decades. The conclusion to this thesis will pull 
the main themes together, outline the most pertinent problems and suggest possible solutions. 
The conclusion is broken down into three separate sections: ‘The Road to Peace’ addresses 
the FARC peace process, ‘The Problems of Inequality & Corruption’ looks at how these have 
affected Colombia and ‘Potential Solutions’ suggests some solutions to the challenges 
highlighted by this this research.  
 
The Road to Peace? 
 
For over fifty years Colombia has been in a state of civil war. In August 2016 the key points 
of a peace process with the FARC were agreed upon by all negotiating actors and a 
referendum was presented to the Colombian people in October 2016. The result of the 
referendum was the rejection of the initial peace plan, but after some amendments a modified 
plan was presented within the Colombian government. Congress approved second plan 130-
0, but this time without a vote from the citizens of Colombia. All of the sources interviewed 
by this author accepted that a peace process, one that will end the FARC as we know it, was 
now inevitable.  
 
Yes, I think there is a direct parallel to the peace process with the IRA, there is a 
massive swing in public opinion for peace, so the people in the country want peace… 
The attempts before had almost failed before they had started, however now the 
momentum with this peace process, it will be very difficult to go backwards from 
that. (Protected Source Twenty-Four) 
 
As Protected Source Twenty-Four highlights, the swing towards peace was considerable, 
despite the rejection by Colombian citizens. A few protected sources involved in the peace 
process stated during informal conversations (as the interviews had been concluded) that they 
felt public opinion was now far more in favour of peace than it had been previously. 
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The next logical step to quantify is how successful that peace process will be. One way to 
assess this will be in terms of how many of the FARC guerrilla fighters will demobilise. It is 
also important to see how many would migrate to either a purely criminal lifestyle without a 
focused political agenda, a FARC splinter group similar to the real IRA, or migrate to an 
alternative existing guerrilla group. As discussed previously, nearly all of the sources 
interviewed by this author felt that peace would not lead to all of the FARC demobilising: 
 
I don’t think that they will all disband, many will keep doing what they have always 
done, drug running etc., the huge income that has been made in recent years will not 
be given up by some, the money and the power will be too much for them to forfeit. 
(Protected Source Ten) 
 
It is widely known that the FARC fund themselves through all sorts of criminal 
activities, mostly drugs, there will be an awful lot of people who will want to 
continue, the networks and contacts will be there. (Protected Source Twelve) 
 
…the same way that has always happened in Colombian history, this means the main 
(FARC) heads have gone but small heads start to appear and have control. (Protected 
Source Fourteen) 
 
If they want one seat in parliament because of who they are, that’s fine, but it is not 
going to stop narco terrorism, which is what it is. (Protected Source Twenty-One) 
 
No, not all of them will disband, there will be some hardened criminal elements who 
will either join existing BACRIMs or form their own mini BACRIM groups. 
(Protected Source Twenty-Four) 
 
In response to FARC funds/weapons, will they be handed over post peace] No, sold, 
hidden and used to fund further criminality. Of course there will have to be a show of 
solidarity with the peace process however the FARC are a well-established 
organisation and will have already thought about this a long time prior to any process. 
(Protected Source Thirty-One) 
 
The general consensus of opinion is that when the peace process concludes, the process of 
disbanding the FARC will run the risk of the formation of sizeable breakaway groups that 
will find drug trafficking, illegal mining or other illicit activity too financially beneficial to 
leave. Vast inequality issues in Colombia exacerbate the problem. Several sources articulated 
the fact that rural communities won’t look to deviate from established criminal enterprise if 
there are limited legitimate alternatives, or if those alternatives were to pay so poorly as to 
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not be a viable alternative. Coupled with the state’s lack of investment in rural areas, even if a 
viable substitute were present, if those communities do not receive proper investment they 
run the risk of exploitation from criminal groups or foreign companies. As Bulla and Guarín 
(2015, p. 01) state;  
 
The citizen security service provided by the Colombian State is unequal. It focuses 
mainly on large cities and municipal capitals, and is absent in vast expanses of the 
national geography. In these regions, state incapacity to enforce the law, resolve 
citizen conflicts, and protect and promote social order based on peaceful coexistence 
is painfully evident.  
 
This underlines the fact that even in contemporary Colombia, many rural communities have 
little to no official state or policing presence and therefore could be vulnerable to exploitation 
from numerous illegal or legal external actors. There is also the requirement to ensure that if 
the FARC aims to transition into politics in a post conflict environment, that the historical 
lessons from the UP are learned and the same mistakes are not repeated. This author proposes 
that this could happen in two stages; firstly, an open and public dialogue from the Santos 
administration stating that those who had operated within the FARC are free and able to 
pursue a new civilian life and subsequently, the state needs to provide an environment 
whereby previous guerrillas can practise their legitimate politics without hindrance. State 
presence, especially in rural areas, will be key to achieving that. 
 
Worsening environmental conditions, in turn, increase the suffering of the 
populations, making them more likely to rise in revolt. (Chayes, 2015, p. 185) 
 
With a lack of state presence comes a lack of policing resources. The FARC, as well as other 
insurgent and paramilitary groups, all share the same origins in groups from rural 
communities banding together and arming themselves for protection. As mentioned, in this 
authors experience, if contemporary Colombia doesn’t look to dramatically invest in these 
rural areas, then history will potentially repeat itself. Even if new groups do not emerge, there 
is a great chance of migration of members from demobilised groups into existing organised 
crime groups, augmenting their ranks with highly trained and experienced guerrillas. This 
author reiterates his belief that reducing inequality and improving state and policing presence 
in these areas is fundamental in diminishing the influence of illegitimate actors, but in this, 
political will will be key. Therefore if more investment is focused into rural areas to increase 
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infrastructure, it will reach a point where inequality is not a causal factor for insurgent groups 
to be formed or for those external actors to be able to exploit those communities. 
Furthermore, protecting these new areas of state investment with a permanent policing 
presence, not proxy policing or use of the military as a policing force, and applying 
community policing practises will be key to working towards a safe and secure environment 
for the local citizens to exist without the need to form self-protection groups or deviate from 
legitimate state law and practises.  
 
During peace it brings with it stability for all, stability and opportunity for the whole 
of the country and [its inhabitants] to tackle the entrenched inequality that has been 
the cause of some many problems, Colombia has huge potential, if current 
stratification of the country remains I think there will be a perception that peace will 
only be enjoyed by a select few, it won’t be seen as the sort of egalitarian peace that 
ultimately the country needs. (Protected Source Four) 
 
This author therefore believes a sustainable peace with the FARC, and in the future the ELN 
via a separate peace process, is possible. Colombia’s infrastructure is improving, there is 
more international oversight and remote rural areas are more visible than they have been 
previously than, for example, in the AUC’s peace process. Most importantly there is more 
support from citizens to solidify peace. Despite this, as with many other areas within this 
thesis, the Colombian state and their international partnerships run the risk of becoming 
complacent and believing that the job is done, and mistakenly withdraw funding from rural 
communities, reducing these fundamental societal issues into a political issue tied to a 
particular presidential administration or a particular time period. The risk of such 
complacency could lead to either a regression into bad practice, or moving onto another 
problem before solving the underlying issue of inequality in rural areas. That, in this author’s 
opinion, would sow the seeds of discontent for future generations to come. 
 
All of this is about political will…when President Pastrana was in power and then the 
peace process he had with the FARC which was essentially resulted in Colombia 
handing over a large swathe of this territory the size of Switzerland to the FARC as a 
demilitarised zone, it was a piecemeal, if you want to put it in Neville Chamberlain 
terms… It allowed the FARC to re-group it was an area where coca productivity and 
production took place it was in every sense of the word a piecemeal of course 
eventually even he realised that and it was retaken… (Protected Source One) 
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The problems of Inequality and Corruption 
 
Corruption is Colombia. The climate helps the drugs grow here and due to poverty 
etc. the people here, it seems, are easy to corrupt. Money taken from taxes does not go 
to where it should go, some people get rich with kickbacks etc and schools and 
hospitals don’t receive what they should. Millions are taken from this and society as a 
whole suffers here because of it, if people can get away with it and prosper then that 
will continue. (Protected Source Fifteen) 
 
Whilst Protected Source Fifteen’s claim that ‘corruption is Colombia’ could be seen as 
excessive, there is legitimacy in his statement with regards to corruption’s impact. Prior to 
the paramilitary peace process that ended in 2006, corruption had allowed cartels and 
paramilitaries to gain a significant hold of legitimate state actors. This included infiltration of 
policing agencies as well as and also the Senate and Congress where such corruption could 
influence legislation and policing policy - as previously discussed in the chapter about Pablo 
Escobar. Whilst the severity of the corruption might be seen as a problem of the past, its 
influence stretches into contemporary Colombian society where both corruption and 
inequality still persist, as highlighted in Chapter Three. Unfortunately, they are rarely 
perceived as contemporary problems and continue to erode the Colombian state. This author 
has witnessed first-hand contracts for tens of millions of dollars being signed and amended in 
pencil, where there has been little to no accountability for projects or companies who have 
not delivered all the requirements of a projects specifications, yet the projects have still been 
paid. Anecdotally, this author has heard that the reasons for such occurrences are twofold. 
Firstly, in the case of a dispute the Colombian state rarely wins legal battles with foreign 
companies. Secondly, the decision to pay foreign companies despite the contractually agreed 
project not being fully delivered is usually made by either one person alone or a very small 
group (three to five people) and where one or more of those involved would also benefit 
financially from the project. These lone government officers and small groups have written 
off millions of dollars of Colombian investment for projects that have not been completed, 
whilst receiving incentives and benefits themselves.  That said, in this author’s experience 
this is the exception rather than the norm. Colombia has worked hard over the years to 
considerably reduce the harm of corruption which in this author’s opinion has worked 
exceptionally well. However, the battle has not been fully won just yet and more oversight is 
required across all institutions, especially when it comes to complex technical projects.  
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Potential Solutions 
 
The above examples have now helped to quantify the pertinent issues, around the creation 
and expansion of insurgent groups, the cultivation of criminal groups, and some areas of the 
state that are susceptible to corruption. Some causal factors have also been identified, namely 
inequality, limited state presence and limited oversight on government contracts. The 
question remains as to what methodology could be deployed in order to control current issues 
and to prevent future occurrences. 
 
Potential Solutions - Communication 
 
Firstly, with regards to the issue of insurgencies and criminal groups, as previously stated, 
insurgencies in Colombia have been able to mobilise and recruit based on their ability to 
convince certain areas of society – usually the poorest - that they are being marginalised by 
the official Colombian state, and that therefore, there is a need for social revolution. Their 
purported goal is to prime society towards a political platform that would have their best 
interests in mind. Criminal groups have also recruited from poorer communities, as with 
fewer social mobility options they are more vulnerable to threats and corruption. There are 
two ways to combat this propaganda and deviant influence exerted by illegitimate actors; 
firstly, legitimate state actors need to improve communication with remote rural areas. This 
should not be considered a temporary fix, but rather a permanent scheduled dialogue with 
community leaders in order to allow them to voice their requirements and their frustrations. 
Whilst this does now happen to a point, with town hall meetings in some areas, it is far too 
sporadic and needs more leadership from central government to ensure these remote 
communities are considered in Colombian government policies. This will reduce the feeling 
of marginalisation and assist with incorporating these citizens into wider Colombian society 
rather than living in social isolation. Communication is fundamental to bringing previously 
marginalised groups back into legitimate society, whether the initial isolation was by choice 
or not. As mentioned previously, Kelling’s work around communities and the criminal justice 
system working in tandem to provide a strong partnered message could provide a compelling 
model for Colombian communities. This can be especially potent if ex-criminals can assist 
with this process. In the Safer Cities example he noted that ‘ex-gang members have been 
recruited and will be trained to reach out to the community in an attempt to end the cycle of 
violence; someone is shot, someone else seeks revenge, ad infiinitum’ (Kelling, 2013, p. 
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136). Communications strategies such as those undertaken by some British police forces 
might also prove useful. For example, in the UK the British Transport Police regularly have 
awareness days and community events to promote awareness of issues and improve public 
relations (The British Transport Police, 2017), and Thames Valley Police have similar 
meetings as well as community policing awards where the public can vote for officers who 
have excelled in their positions (Thames Valley Police 2017). Colombia will need to find 
similar techniques and strategies that best suit their communities in order to build trust 
between the local/marginalised communities and the police force that is meant to protect 
them. 
 
Potential Solutions - Inequality 
 
The second and far more difficult issue that of reducing inequality by investing in 
infrastructure, that is; electricity, water, gas, roads and communications (phone and internet). 
Historically it has been very hard to traverse parts of inner Colombia by car, due to both 
security concerns and lack of infrastructure - there are far too few routes connecting central 
cities, and with limited capacity. It was understandable that in Colombia's past, it was logical 
to keep just a few roads open between central cities, as this would make them easier to police. 
Considering that the security in contemporary Colombia is improving, so must the planning 
for transport infrastructure. An investment in all this infrastructure, but specifically transport 
in remote communities, will ensure that they are incorporated into the legitimate Colombian 
state. It will also allow remote farmers to transport their goods more easily and become a core 
part of Colombia’s formal commercial sector rather than being forced to work for insurgent 
groups. Policing will also be easier, allowing for law enforcement to reach remote areas that 
might previously have only been accessible via helicopter. Better access to water, gas, and 
electricity will allow these communities to flourish and reduce the feeling of isolation. Lastly, 
communications will play a very important role by further reducing isolation and also 
improving social visibility, allowing those citizens access to more information about 
Colombian society as a whole and improving education. This will in turn improve social 
mobility and reduce the effect of insurgent groups' propaganda, although care must be taken 
that improving all of these areas is also accompanied by more legitimate state presence in the 
areas of schools, police, hospitals and local government. If not, improved infrastructure could 
easily be hijacked by guerrilla groups to more effectively control these remote communities.  
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Whilst all of these steps might seem quite gargantuan in scope, the reality is they could be 
developed slowly but surely, with communication being a key component. If citizens are 
constantly in communication with the central Colombian government and happy that their 
voices are being heard, they are considerably more likely to ignore invitations into social 
deviancy by illegitimate actors (be they insurgent groups or criminal gangs/organisations), 
and assist the criminal justice system. Additionally, if there is greater state presence in these 
regions, legitimate state actors will find it easier to enforce the legitimate rule of law and in 
turn, enable Colombian citizens access to the right of justice rather than depending on non-
state actors who provide the only justice and policing options, which can vary from town to 
town. These sorts of changes cannot be implemented overnight. A comprehensive course of 
action with pre-defined goals and objectives that are achievable over a long period will have 
to be constructed, to support all of Colombian society, rather than be subject to the whims of 
the changing political climate poorly managed and eventually forgotten when the tide 
changes. As previously stated, it is absolutely imperative that these projects are widespread 
across all of Colombia to avoid displacing criminality and guerrilla groups into other areas of 
country. Similarly if the construction of this new infrastructure is not all-encompassing, or 
not continually done with both the collaboration and consonance of these remote 
communities, it could quite easily be re-purposed by the illegitimate state actors to 
significantly erode state security. If appropriately handled, infrastructure projects could help 
to considerably reduce crime and criminal influence and potentially eradicate the origins of 
insurgent groups before they have the ability to be formed. This outcome would extensively 
improve state security, especially in border regions, where the neighbouring nations 
themselves have considerable state security problems 
A man can grow coffee, or he can make an awful lot more growing coca, if he is a 
poor farmer, what do you think he will do, especially if he is under pressure to grow 
coca, you have to deal with the problem at that end. (Protected Source Twelve) 
 
I think it is very difficult at the moment, Colombia’s infrastructure is almost non-
existent in over 40% of the country. Things like roads, communication, better housing 
and security could lead to better enforcement. (Protected Source Thirty) 
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Potential Solutions - Corruption 
 
In order to improve infrastructure, there must first be the political will to fight state level 
corruption. Previously corruption has caused problems with large infrastructure projects, such 
as the project to run Bogota’s TransMilenio (its bus rapid transit system) to El Dorado 
airport. The TransMilenio line had to be cut short of the airport due to corruption and 
embezzlement that left the project short of funds. Later several council members had their 
property seized. Of the four councillors investigated and charged, all came from different 
political parties, which is indicative of the fact that corruption cuts across party lines. The 
former Mayor of Bogota Samuel Moreno Rojas was removed from office and incarcerated on 
similar charges of corruption and embezzlement of state funds. Corruption with regards to the 
state awarding public contracts has come under heightened national and international scrutiny 
over the past ten years. A freedom of information law was passed in 2014 allowing all 
citizens and industries to view how government funds are expended. Law No. 1712, the Law 
on Transparency and the Right to Access to the Public National Information [Ley No. 1712 
Por medio de la cual se crea la ley de Transparencia y del Derecho de Acceso a la 
Informacion Pública Nacional y se dictan otras Disposiciones. (Wipo 2014). This law 
requires that government agencies provide information on contracts, finances and staff 
available for public examination. This will offer the possibility of better oversight by national 
and international NGOs, but it will also enhance the ability of the commercial sector and 
Colombian citizens to hold state actors to account on how public funds are utilised.  
However, given the relatively recent passing of this legislation, it is unknown how effective 
this will be.  
 
There are two issues to consider when fighting corruption. Firstly, there is the need to 
improve the state's ability to offer instruments to monitor corruption: 
 
I think there is definitely, there is a serious lack of economic interest in certain parts 
of the country by the Colombian government, some would say it’s departmental, but I 
think the Colombian government have to have some kind of control over certain 
things. If money is given for certain projects, the projects have to go ahead. How 
many governors have we seen that have been on the take? Both from taking from the 
funds given to them and being on the take turning a blind eye to contraband, to 
movement of drugs. (Protected Source Twenty-Two) 
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The second is the punishment and perceived punishment for partaking in corruption 
regardless of the scale, which needs to be proportional and increase the risk to render 
corruption undesirable. Historically, corruption cases have been very difficult to prosecute, 
either due to evidence being little to non-existent or the judicial system itself suffering from 
corruption. Another complicated area has been the use of financial fines as a punishment. 
These fines are problematic for two reasons: one, if the accused used corruption to collect 
funds to pay the debt, then it is most likely they will continue to do so, equally a financial 
punishment could be insignificant compared to the gains during the corrupt practices. Two, 
most investigations have in the past attempted to prosecute based on one corrupt practise, but 
ignoring others. If the punishment is financially based, the likelihood is that punishment will 
be ineffective either for the reasons cited above (paying off the fine is easy to do), or because 
in cases where the individual will find him or herself financially impoverished it may seem 
preferable to continue the cycle of criminality. This author would recommend seizure of all 
assets that the accused cannot demonstrate were acquired legally, as there has been a 
narrative used in many corruption cases of existing family wealth. Such claims should be 
investigated thoroughly in order to ascertain the full extent of illicit resources, both 
domestically and overseas. Then, if corrupt practises have been evidenced and all illegally 
obtained resources have been catalogued, there should be a considerable incarceration period 
attached to the crime to prevent others from following the same path. If the individual 
involved is a government official, a lifetime ban from politics or working externally with the 
Colombian state should be enacted to ensure that the individual does not seek to refine their 
corrupt practises, or seeks to corrupt the government institution externally using previous 
contacts (as did ex-president Samper).  
 
Another pertinent issue here is what happens if the criminal justice system itself is corrupt. 
This author has heard anecdotally that there are considerable problems with the Colombian 
prison system - to the degree that fair and reasonable justice cannot be offered to Colombian 
citizens because depending on the accused’s financial assets, media connections and 
government connections, many sentences are considerably reduced without reason or 
mitigated due the payment of financial penalties. However, even if one should be arrested, 
convicted and incarcerated, the prison system has been heavily criticised by protected sources 
for not preventing criminality. Instead the reverse appears to be true; criminality is bred 
within the prison system, and those running these institutions are not willing to discuss - let 
alone oppose - the problem at hand. This issue typically relates to national criminality, as for 
 154 
more severe and internationally linked crime, for example to the United States of America, 
extradition is usually sought, removing the individual both from the Colombian judicial 
system and Colombia entirely. This solution has been very effective for decades with even 
Pablo Escobar and his cartel group of ‘The Extraditables’ saying: ‘We prefer a grave in 
Colombia to a prison in the United States’ (The Economist, 2015b). However, there are again 
two key problems with extradition as a solution; firstly, it does not solve the issue of the 
flaws of the Colombian prison system, but merely displaces it to the United States, putting 
the punishment at the will of that nations state, and if there is a change in political climate, 
that option might not continue to exist. Secondly, extradition in such cases relies on a 
criminal link to the US. 
 
People feel there is no justice, because there is such corruption in the justice system. 
Too many groups only have interest in their own groups and not doing their jobs. 
(Protected Source Nineteen) 
 
It is a big country, the citizens have to be more proactive in their communities to aid 
the police.  Unfortunately the police are not respected by many people due to 
corruption, so there is a general reluctance sometimes to call the police. (Protected 
Source Fifteen) 
 
Lastly as mentioned in the police leadership chapter, corruption should be investigated across 
all levels of Colombian policing, at the street level with its leadership as well as throughout 
the larger Colombian government. As Punch (2009, p. 194) described previously, reform will 
be necessary across multiple layers to be effective, not just the operational policing layer, but 
the leadership as well. 
 
 
Potential Solutions - Conclusion 
 
The key point of this thesis is not to demean the progress that Colombia has made within the 
last 30 years. In fact, this author through his doctoral research has interviewed many people 
across many different backgrounds in Colombian society and has seen, through his work, 
exactly how hard the Colombian state has fought and continues to fight to protect and offer 
their citizens the right to fair and reasonable justice. Punch (2009, p. 195) discusses 
Sherman’s perspective that corruption is impossible to eliminate entirely and therefore, such 
a significant reduction in corruption could be considered a victory. This author has seen a 
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considerable drop in corruption and rise in accountability within just the last five plus years 
of living and working in Colombia. This has been corroborated by his own academic 
research. It should also be noted that Transparency International placed Colombia as 94/177 
on their perceived corruption index of 2013 and 83/168 in 2015, showing the trend of 
perceived corruption is downward. 
 
However, Colombia is facing a turning point in its history. There is a chance for peace 
against the world's longest lasting insurgency. But no matter how successful the peace 
process is, there will be a very high probability that some members within the FARC that will 
not demobilise. When that happens, those individuals could bolster other insurgent groups 
with similar objectives or migrate to other criminal groups. Although any successful peace 
process would be a profound victory, it will require the state to be mindful and not run the 
risk of thinking the battle is over. It will require constant state attention to ensure a lasting 
peace with the FARC, and that peace processes with other groups are sought out and are 
successful. Another fact to consider is that following any major peace process around the 
world, there is normally an upsurge in violence as splinter groups vie for control of resources, 
be they geographic, influence or contacts with other criminal organisations. This will be a 
key test of Colombian society; if the Colombian state can, in parallel to the peace process, 
address the issues in inequality, then it will provide strong foundations for a more inclusive 
Colombian society and provide far fewer avenues for exploitation by insurgent and criminal 
groups. At the same time, strengthening Colombian society further by adding permanent state 
presence in remote communities to ensure there are no safe havens for criminal or guerrilla 
groups to operate in, will significantly reduce both their recruitment potential and their 
support base, which could be transferred to the legitimate Colombian state instead. 
 
If they can curb the corruption enough to put into place the infrastructure required, 
this country could really prosper. I know that there are many really intelligent 
Colombians living here who have a vision of how things could be and are willing to 
fight the corruption and ignorance that exists here. (Protected Source Fifteen) 
 
The fight against corruption needs to continue at the same pace to ensure that the legitimate 
state is robust enough to face the coming challenges. For the Colombian state to effectively 
oppose criminal and insurgent groups, there will need to be a strong criminal justice 
infrastructure in place. Any corruption remaining in these institutions must be fought 
rigorously, and this author recommends with actors external to the state, such as NGOs and 
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international government partners who can provide advice, experience, frameworks and 
resources to help combat a problem that this author feels is being underestimated. 
Unhelpfully, corruption is sometimes considered a cultural issue within certain countries 
instead of an authentic criminal problem. Complacency would be dangerous as it would 
allow certain levels of corruption to be ignored, which could then grow into considerable 
security problems further down the line. If work is not done from the outset to eliminate 
corruption and ensure appropriate criminal justice is in place to offer fair and reasonable 
punishment, it could lead to citizen disillusionment with the state and also undermine 
progress made by the steps to reduce inequality. Corruption could spread via legitimate state 
actors across the country and present an unfavourable representation of the central 
government, which could in turn generate discontent that could be exploited by criminal and 
insurgent groups. 
 
Another perspective was proposed to this author, that in a post peace environment converting 
the Colombian National Police into a civilian ministry would not make a difference in terms 
of its operation. A fellow academic highlighted to me that in France, the Gendarmerie were 
moved from a military to civilian ministry to almost no effect. This author argues that the 
Colombian case would be different because France was not transitioning from a state of civil 
war when those changes were made, whereas Colombia is. Some potential changes from such 
a move could be: the reduction of police deployed in military roles and vice versa, police 
tactics moving away from kinetic activity and a greater focus on police services to 
communities rather than a high value target work. For these transitions to be practical, it 
would require a considerable amount of political will to restructure and change the objectives 
and the current culture of Colombian policing away from a more militaristic model. This 
transition would not be quick and more than likely take several generations to change the 
mindset not only of the officers on the beat, but also the command structure that directs them. 
Numerous experienced people in policing that make up this author’s protected sources, who 
have analysed this specific issue in detail, are convinced there are positive changes to be 
made by switching the CNP to a civilian ministry. Nevertheless, this author also accepts that 
not all successful policies or practises can be transplanted internationally. One such example 
was an attempted move to community policing in Colombia in 1999 which according to Dr 
Ruiz-Vazquez was unsuccessful because of senior officials ‘who fear losing power to the 
discretion of their subordinates’ and the perception that community policing is a ‘soft’ 
version of policing whereas beat officers favour a tougher model (2012, p.51). Additionally, 
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as mentioned in the police leadership chapter, police careers in Colombia are frequently 
advanced by producing quantifiable short-term results to gain notoriety, whereas community 
level policing ‘works with intangibles, and its results only become obvious in the long-term’ 
Ruiz-Vásquez (2012, p.51). 
 
It should also be noted that, contrary to this author’s perspective, Dr Ruiz-Vásquez (who this 
author considers an expert in Colombian policing) believes that although the police are 
situated within the Ministry of Defence, their modus operandi is civilian in deployment: 
 
Although some officials do have military ranks and the police force is subsumed 
under the Ministry of Defense, legally it is an armed civilian corps. In practical terms, 
the culture and mindset of the Colombian police differ greatly from those of a military 
police force, such as found in Brazil or the Carabineros of Chile. (Ruiz-Vásquez 
2012, p.51) 
 
Whilst this author accepts that in comparison to their Brazilian and Chilean neighbours the 
CNP are far more civilian than military, the overall perspective of this authors sources spread 
over decades of experience of working with the CNP and his own experience is that their 
operations were still considerably militarised, with a focus on military style tactics to fight 
criminal groups.  
  
This author accepts that the process for transitioning the Colombian police from a military to 
civilian ministry would not be straightforward. It would need to be fully researched in great 
detail and even then potential gains that have been mentioned would be far from definite. 
Nevertheless, from everything this author has heard from his sources and witnessed working 
day to day with multiple Colombian policing agencies, there is a lot to be potentially gained 
from migrating the current pseudo military model where groups are targeted with military-
esque tactics to a model focused on providing policing services to Colombian communities. 
Ruiz-Vásquez highlights that small pockets of community policing does occur in Colombia, 
but it is not a unified process. However, he notes that if properly harnessed and directed, 
existing ‘talent, training and devotion of community police officers . . . could make a 
substantial difference in Colombian society, if they were adequately deployed’ (Ruiz-
Vásquez 2012, p.53). This author argues that this would be unlikely at a national level with 
the current policing models in place, but could be if the policing culture was transitioned to a 
more community-focused model as opposed to a high value target military style model. 
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To highlight the solutions, this author has recommended the following:  
 
• A continual fight against state level corruption, preferably with a neutral third party 
such as an NGO and other international assistance. 
 
• Improvement of the state's Criminal Justice System to be able to offer Colombian 
citizens fair and reasonable justice by providing appropriate sentencing, reducing 
ability of those incarcerated to commit criminality, reducing corruption within the 
prison institution without resorting to other methods - such as extradition. 
 
• Reduction of inequality across Colombia by improving infrastructure, starting with; 
better access to water, electricity and gas, and communications, that is, phone and 
internet (with heavily discounted pricing); more permanent state presence of police, 
schools, hospitals and overall local governance; and more investment in roads and 
small airports. 
 
• A full research study to glean if there is a benefit of moving the Colombian policing 
from a military to a civilian ministry. 
 
If these solutions are deployed appropriately, and, across the entire country, Colombian state 
security will improve its effectiveness dramatically. Colombia has a rich and varied 
ecosystem with large amounts of precious resources, and this author is confident that if total 
and appropriate investment is provided by the legitimate Colombian state, Colombian society 
overall will be more attractive to increased foreign business investments and an increase in 
tourism which will boost the country's economy and make it a true powerhouse in Latin 
America. 
 
If Colombia doesn’t get to a stage where it can actually improve infrastructure, they 
are getting quite good at getting into areas eradicating the coca, arresting the 
traffickers and leaving, but you need to maintain state presence, you need to get stuck 
into your alternative development stuff, there’s no point in just ripping out all these 
coca plants and leaving the campesinos to do their own thing, otherwise they will go 
back to growing coca plants. You have to turn up and give them bananas to grow or 
give them a market to sell their bananas in, then you have to give them a sustainable 
 159 
way of delivering and operating and you need to protect them while you do it, there’s 
no point in giving them banana plants and a market and then saying we will be back 
in a months-time leaving the remnants of the FARC and the BACRIM to come in and 
say right you’re not going to do that or we will shoot you. (Protected Source One)  
 
 
Overall Conclusion 
 
We remain haunted by old ghosts, prejudices and the monsters that our fears have 
created over the course of centuries. These fears have come in recent decades to 
dictate the way in which those with more have come to view those with less. These 
are the fears that support racism, which under the idea of social exclusion are 
acceptable; they are they fears behind elitism. (Dorling, 2015, p. 157) 
 
This thesis has aimed to identify historically where Colombia's policing agencies have been, 
the challenges they have faced and how they have adapted to the challenges that have 
confronted them. Colombia has faced moments of extreme hostility throughout its territory 
over the last 70 years, from La Violencia, to the birth of insurgent groups and paramilitaries, 
to the rise of drug cartels. Overall, Colombia's policing agencies have expanded and enabled 
more modern policing strategies such as intelligence-led policing and community-based 
policing. Although arguably these changes are still in the early stages, some of the new 
strategies have also performed well in exceptionally difficult climates. However, this author 
believes that their toughest challenge has been the fight with inequality and corruption, both 
of which could be seen as a force multiplier, eroding policing capabilities and fortifying their 
enemies.  
 
Inequality has enabled criminal groups to recruit and spread from poorer areas of society 
quickly and efficiently. But considering the effect of inequality within the police themselves, 
the issue of police pay was highlighted by nearly all of this author’s sources, and so was the 
issue of inequality between different police officers’ areas of responsibility. This was 
particularly well highlighted by Protected Source Twenty-One:  
 
The other thing is that the officers get paid the same rate whether you are standing on 
the corner with a stick or going into very difficult situations in the jungle, so same 
rank same salary. They have professional units that are very good at what they do, but 
there does need to be recognition of that.  
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When the working conditions and objectives of a police officer have no impact on their pay 
there is inequality and there is apathy, as some are required to work in considerably more 
hazardous environments when there is no incentive to do so. Additionally, due to the military 
structure of the police, there are significant disadvantages for poorer Colombians who join as 
a Private working at street level, versus those who are able to afford the expensive training to 
enter at officer level, as opportunities for career progression are limited for those who do not 
come from wealthier backgrounds. Whilst historically there have been some grants and 
scholarship programs, according to the protected sources who work within the police, these 
have been rare exceptions to a regimented structure which promotes a class divide. This 
division finds its parallels in Colombian society as a whole, and is not solely a failing of the 
police, but it is an important factor. Similar examples abound in civilian life; for example, it 
should be noted that when renting or purchasing a house or apartment in Colombia, it is 
stated which social strata (class) the building is in, which affects the cost of utilities. In the 
case of the police, the inequality across job roles, the limited opportunities for advancement 
and the low rate of pay mean that it is far more tempting for officers to succumb to bribes, or 
more egregiously, to organise their own extortion.  
 
The second pertinent issue is that of corruption, which can flow from the police onto 
civilians, such as extorting the community/criminal groups they are working with, but also 
affects the police force through corruption within other state actors, such as the rest of the 
criminal justice system that the police are coupled with. Here, the relationship is far more 
corrosive, as historical widespread corruption in the judicial system not only undermines the 
rule of law in regards to impunity rates, sentencing, and the ability to incarcerate those who 
have been sentenced, but also these factors severely dampen the morale of the police, to the 
point of institutional apathy. Often, an officer encountering a crime has little to no impetus to 
intervene as the chances of prosecution and appropriate punishment are so low, and the 
prospect of reprisals in some areas of Colombia are so high. As Protected Source Thirty-Two 
described previously there is a concern that corruption has had a considerable negative affect 
on Colombia’s criminal justice system to the point where the source described it as being, 
‘manipulated indiscriminately’ by those with the wealth, power and influence to do so, both 
inside and outside of the government. This source sadly described that this is still a 
pronounced problem in contemporary Colombia and one not seen by many unless they have 
worked within the criminal justice system. The problem is that as policing has evolved, so 
have the criminal and insurgent groups that work against them. Corruption at this moment is 
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more covert in nature and therefore, regularly goes unnoticed only to be momentarily 
highlighted when there is a public scandal such as the aforementioned TransMilenio 
embezzlement. Protected Source Fifteen surmised that the core problem in Colombia is 
corruption across all areas of society, and that everything else is just a symptom of the 
disease: ‘Corruption here is on a completely different level, more than a drugs problem, 
Colombia has a corruption problem. In my opinion, corruption here is not just regarding 
drugs, but at every level, with businesses etc’. This is something that this author strongly 
agrees with; corruption and inequality have gone hand in hand to create an environment for 
both the old traditional cartels and now the micro cartels to prosper. With this new covert 
style of corruption also comes the problem of quantifying it. If it cannot be perceived, how 
can it be measured? 
 
This author argues that despite these challenges, overall the police have improved. There are 
fewer reported human rights abuses, greater international oversight and work with NGOs, 
and fewer corruption scandals, relating to obstruction of security and improved access to 
justice for all Colombian citizens. With that, one should take into account, that despite the 
considerable progress still to be made in Colombian policing, there are more officers working 
to do the right thing. This sentiment is emphasised again by Protected Source Thirty-Two: 
‘But you cannot leave out the hard-working people in the police who perform their duties 
with dedication, reflecting strong blows to criminal structures, captures, seizures and other 
positive operations as reflected in the dismantling of some criminal gangs’. (Protected Source 
Thirty-Two). 
 
With the potential of the most prominent insurgent groups coming to an end in Colombia - 
the continuation of the FARC peace process and the ELN looking for a separate peace 
process - Colombian policing is facing an impasse with regards to its justification for 
remaining within the Ministry of Defence. The BACRIM, now reclassified as GAOs in order 
to justify military targeting, may pose the biggest new threat, however in this author’s 
opinion these groups are criminal in nature. Therefore arguably they should be a policing 
objective rather than a military target. GAOs, this author believes are the to be the next 
largest threat to security in Colombia in post peace environment, they are not ideologically 
based, have access to military grade equipment and hard to police against. Whilst the FARC 
peace process is certainly important and will have a potential impact on criminality and 
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policing, peace with the FARC is a small step towards the larger process for peace in 
Colombia.  
 
Multiple protected sources, each with abundant experience in policing, underscored the 
requirement to have a separate civilian police force as a separate entity within the Colombian 
governmental structure, citing confusion among civilians over a police force with a military 
structure, policing priorities being dictated by a military command infrastructure and the 
perception that they were not ‘policing by consent’ (Protected Source Twelve). Protected 
Source Two stated the requirement for ‘more civilian and less paramilitary strategies’ or 
policing will not continue to evolve. This change would in turn cascade downwards, a series 
of policy and process changes. This author will reiterate a few previously highlighted 
changes that could make a lot of difference. Firstly, having a unified force where all officers 
have the same training and policing powers would assist in setting a policing standard both 
for the police themselves, but also for the citizens. Both sides would then be cognisant of 
what is required of a police officer and how they should respond. This would reduce 
confusion in reporting, but also with managing crime as it happens without having to defer to 
a different specialist group. This element was stressed by this author’s sources with 
experience in policing:  
 
Unless they get around to changing their policing, by incorporating it one force, one 
arrest, so they can do each other’s jobs, I think if they keep their diversity of their 
roles, I don’t think you will see much change, I think they have to have a cultural 
change to how police actually do their job on the street… (Protected Source Seven).  
 
Secondly, linked with this is the idea that a police officer is empowered through appropriate 
policy to make judgements, and intervene with events as they happen. This should 
considerably increase policing ability by virtue of the fact that officers will be able to react 
faster to a situation, without having to transfer the decision-making process to a higher 
ranking officer. In some circumstances this requires an officer to defer their decision all the 
way to a General, which can seriously impact a police officer’s ability to prevent or reduce 
harm in a timely basis. 
 
Coupled with the changes in policing, there needs to be a considerable change in the Criminal 
Justice System as a whole, with three key issues being those of; criminal case backlog, 
impunity rates, and the ability to provide appropriate and just sentencing. Firstly, the case 
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backlog, as referenced previously, has been an issue since the 1930s (Restrepo, 2001, p. 78). 
Despite all the legislation changes and the addition of new CJS institutions like the Fiscalía, 
this remains a profound problem. This author argues that the backlog affects both the will of 
prosecutors to take on new cases and, as publicly acknowledged, the will of the Colombian 
citizen to report criminality in the first place ‘…there are numerous crimes and atrocities that 
go unreported’. (Protected Source Thirteen). Both factors contribute to Colombia's low crime 
reporting rate. This area needs more research to define the causal factors of this consistent 
backlog to redesign the prosecution case process system accordingly, however, it is a primary 
area of concern as it is significantly reducing Colombians citizens’ access and right to justice. 
Impunity rates are also incredibly high and were a core reason among voters for the rejection 
of the FARC peace proposal in the referendum on the 2nd October 2016. According to 
protected sources the general consensus of opinion was that if FARC members who have 
committed war crimes can’t face justice, then peace amounts to impunity as with the AUC 
peace process as previously cited from Isa, (2008, p. 03). However, impunity is a constant 
issue in the CJS, not just in the high profile cases such as the AUC’s peace process, but also 
in general with day-to-day criminality. Unless this is addressed then regardless of the 
situation, the majority of criminal activity will go unpunished, leading to a skewed risk vs 
reward paradigm, that deviant members of society will consider ‘in their favour’. Also there 
are two key issues with regards to the police that were highlighted constantly to this author 
throughout his research: education and pay. Both of these will need to be addressed in order 
to provide an enhanced pool of more efficient policing officers. Finally, there is a 
considerable problem with those who have been reported and convicted by the CJS to 
actually serve their full sentence, with the guilty either having their sentencing considerably 
reduced through good behaviour - sometimes by as much as 90 per cent (Protected Source 
One) - or avoiding sentencing altogether. This again works as a force multiplier in making 
citizens less likely to report crimes, when it is unlikely that the guilty party will face 
appropriate and just punishment. In parallel, through its inefficiency, the CJS is not 
dissuading the criminal. This author believes this to be the primary reason that extradition to 
the United States is utilised so frequently in Colombia for serious and dangerous offenders, 
and also the reason for accused parties constantly fighting extradition through the decades. 
Offenders acknowledge the fact that they can abscond from or evade Colombian justice, but 
not the justice system of the United States. This again highlights a weakness of the 
Colombian CJS to provide fair and reasonable justice to its citizens. If these three 
fundamental issues are addressed, Colombia will have an efficient and capable criminal 
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justice system, which in partnership with a civilian policing ministry would not only provide 
the Colombian people with greater security and access to justice, but also have the potential 
to be an exemplary example of criminal justice on the international stage. 
 
As of October 2017, this author has had the pleasure of over five years of working with the 
Fiscalía, the Colombian National Police, CTI and the Colombian Military Forces. All these 
agencies were found to be professional and welcoming of foreign support and advice. It has 
been a profound honour and privilege to work with them.  
 
The Colombian police and greater judiciary have responded to decades of their country being 
subjected to crime, disruption and violence by continually adapting and combating threats 
without hesitation. Colombian policing has indeed significantly made significant advances, 
but there is some way to go. This author hopes that policing will be given the priority and 
investment it requires by the Colombian central government in order to continue to evolve 
into the public service that Colombian citizens so badly need and deserve. 
 
Everything it takes to defeat injustice lies in the mind. What matters most is how we 
think. And how we think is metamorphosing because - everywhere - there are signs of 
hope. (Dorling, 2015, p. 392-393) 
 
 165 
 
Appendix 
 
 
Appendix 1 Colombian Courts Organisational Charts 
Original source: http://todaycolombia.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/4.jpg 
[Last accessed July 4th 2018] 
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Appendix 2 Fiscalia Organisational Chart 
Original source: https://www.fiscalia.gov.co/colombia/wp-
content/uploads/Organigrama-FGN-Decreto-Ley-898-de-2017-pdf.pdf 
[Last accessed July 4th 2018] 
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Appendix 3 Colombian National Police Organisational Chart 
Original source: https://www.policia.gov.co/organigrama 
[Last accessed July 4th 2018] 
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Appendix 4 – Colombia’s 2017 Police Code 
 
Here is a selection of 16 out of the 243 points within the new Colombian National Police 
code that came into affect on 30th January 2017:  
 
1. Police officers must not be disrespected. The new code makes provision for the 
protection of the police in the street, in that they must not be subjected to abuse, verbal or 
otherwise. Any citizen who attacks, disrespects or challenges a police officer may be subject 
to a fine of $225. 
 
2. Police may enter your home without a warrant.  The new laws stipulate that a police 
officer may enter your home without a warrant in the case of an emergency. The entrance to a 
house without judicial order is only allowed in cases of urgency or of imminent danger for 
the life of a person. Specifically, this includes cases of violence or physical abuse. 
 
3. LGBT community to be protected from abuse. Colombia’s LGBT community will be 
protected from being targets of abuse from other citizens. Attacks for verbal abuse against a 
member of these communities will result in a fine of $225. 
 
4. Citizens who do not carry their ID will be heavily fined. The new code obligates 
citizens to carry their identity card with them at all times. Failure to do so will be considered 
to be interfering with a police order” and will obstruct the police procedure. Citizens not 
carrying their cedula will be subject to a fine of $266, which is roughly $11 more than a 
monthly minimum wage. 
 
5. Keep the music down and your pets in order. The new code approves intervention in 
cases of noisy pets or loud music within urban areas. In cases of noisy parties, the code 
authorizes the deactivation of sound equipment or speakers that generate high noise levels 
and interrupt the tranquility of a neighborhood. The organizers of noisy block parties can be 
fined for $112. 
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6. The Police may enter homes and educational centres. Authorisation is given to 
uniformed members of the National Police to register persons, property, and enter 
educational institutions when there is reason under the following six cases.  
 
 1) When there is no reliable identity of the person.  
 2) To establish whether the person carries weapons. 
 3) If there is a possibility that the person has stolen goods.  
 4) If the person has prohibited drugs or substances.  
 5) Whether to prevent any behaviour contrary to coexistence.   
 6) Whether to ensure the safety of attendees to an event. 
 
7. Put a light on the bullies. The possibility of cutting the electricity were established for 
those who do not listen to the authorities in repeated occasions of large noise disturbance. 
The fine would be approximately $ 184,000 and in case of persistent noise, the authority may 
temporarily deactivate the power source if the resident refuses to disable it. 
 
8. Fines for those who burn gunpowder. Bans were approved such as the use of pepper 
spray, gunpowder; Fines for leading street fights; Circus acts in the streets. 
 
9. To combat illegal mining. With this tool, the police and civilian authorities can, for 
example, more easily combat environmental pollution caused by illegal mining as is now 
being done against groups that illegally exploit resources, incinerating machinery and 
occupying these places. The Code contemplates fines of between $ 92,000 and $ 736,000 for 
those who throw pollutants into bodies of water or who capture rivers and streams without 
authorization. 
 
10. Danger at the wheel. Drivers who do not respect traffic signals or perform dangerous or 
high risk maneuvers will also be fined with four minimum daily wages, that is, $ 91,927 
pesos. 
 
11. Prevention of “flashers”: Exposing yourself in public carries a fine of Category Three: 
393.440 pesos (US$130). 
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12. Owning “wild pets” forbidden: The code for owning an animal from the wild as a pet, 
involves the maximum Category Four: 786.880 pesos (US$270). 
 
13. Keep Life Vests under the seat: Tampering or removing an aircraft life vest is 
considered a Category Four offense. 
 
14. Leave alarms alone: Damaging the alarm or signaling systems of public transport is  
considered a type Four fine. 
 
15. Cellphone caution: Buying, renting, or using a cell phone that has been reported as 
stolen is a Category Two fine. 
 
16. Keep it clean: Dog owners must pick up after their pet or face the minimum Category 
One fine. 
 
Original Source and the full police code: 
http://static.elespectador.com/archivos/2017/02/ddaded47db60946fd9e1e59cec13710d.pd
f   
[Last accessed February 8th 2017] 
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